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On 14 January 2010, a mystic criminal trial was scheduled in the Intermediate Court of 
Langfang, a satellite city 50km southwest to Beijing. The Grand Adjudication Hall, the 
largest trial room in the court, was made available one week ahead just for this event. The 
trial was treated with an unprecedented level of secrecy. The identity of the defendant 
was not revealed until the opening of the trial. Traffic blocks were set up 500m away in 
all streets leading to the court building, which kept away the media and any inquisitive 
audience. The trial lasted 10 hours unstopped. The following day, a standardized brief 
report was disseminated through the major press. Huang Songyou, the vice-president of 
the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) was on trial in Langfang Intermediate Court. During 
the trial, Huang was prosecuted for bribe-taking of 3.9 million yuan while serving at the 
SPC and of embezzling 1.2 million yuan while serving as the president of the 
Intermediate Court of Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province.1 
 
Huang’s trial revived the memory of the public when he was detained one year ago in 
2008, which marked the climax of a series of actions taken by a special task force of the 
Central Committee of the Discipline Inspection Commission (CCDIC)2. Proceeding the 
detention of Huang was the detention of Yang Xiancai, former Director of the 
Enforcement Bureau of Guangdong High Court and five high-profile lawyers, all from 
Guangdong, one of the most prosperous provinces of the country.3  Yang and the lawyers 
are suspected of having colluded with Huang in the alleged corrupt conduct mentioned 
above.4   
 
As the highest judicial official who was removed from office and punished due to 
corruption since the establishment of the PRC, Huang’s case has a significant impact on 
judicial development in China. It highlights the severity of the problem of corruption in 
the entire judiciary, which the SPC had long been reluctant to admit in public.5  More 
importantly, as a judge with the highest rank in the judiciary, Huang’s case poses as a 
strong challenge to the official explanation of the occurrence of judicial corruption, which 
is the moral decadence of the individual poorly-educated and undisciplined offenders.6  
Even if that were true for the 12,3497 judges, who had been reportedly investigated and 
punished for corruption during the past decade, how would one explain the collusive 
                                                 
1 http://www.dzwww.com/xinwen/guoneixinwen/201001/t20100102_5296556.htm 
2 As a part of the CCP organizational apparatus, the CDIC is the highest anti-corruption institution, which 
has both the investigative and sanctioning power. For more details, see Chapter 7.  
3 http://news.hexun.com/2010-01-15/122365094_1.html 
4 Ibid. 
5 Only after the exposure of Huang’s case, the SPC for the first time admitted in public that judicial 
corruption is not an isolated or sporadic incident but a persistent and pervasive defect in the adjudicative 
process in China’s courts. See "Fighting Judicial Corruption Tops Agenda," China Daily, 1 May 2009.  
6 See the annual working reports of the SPC. 
7 The total number of 12,349 is calculated according to the statistics provided in the annual SPC work 
report. The number covers 13 years between 1993 and 2007 (the statistics of 1997 and 2002 are missing). A 
break down of the number can be seen in Chapter 2.  
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corruption detected in, for instance, Shenyang Intermediate Court, Jilin High Court, 
Wenzhou Intermediate Court, each of which involves at least half dozen of judges. Also, 
how would one explain the resurface of corruption in the Wuhan Intermediate Court, 
Shenzhen Intermediate Court and Fuyang Intermediate Court after swift anti-corruption 
campaigns which had reportedly purged the “rotten apples”?8 
 
Unlike the authorities, whose explanation is suspiciously blame-diverting, scholars 
instead paid attention to more structural factors. One representative group of such 
explanations can be summarized as the “resource insufficiency” argument. These 
insufficiency includes the lack of political power of courts vis a vis other state organs and 
the lack of financial and human resources of the judiciary.9 However, this argument is 
directly confronted by Huang Songyou’s case since serving as the standing vice-president 
of the highest judicial institution Huang had one of the most prestigious offices in the 
state machinery. Huang holds a doctoral degree of law and an appointment as a law 
professor in four reputable law schools in the country. How can one then explain the 
corrupt conduct of Huang who was not lacking political, financial or human capitals? 
Similarly, how can one use the “resource insufficiency” argument to explain, for example, 
the case of Tang Jikai, a “star” “expert judge” well-trained both in China and abroad, who 
not only took bribes from litigants during his term of office as vice-president of Changsha 
Intermediate Court but also offered bribes to his superior in exchange for promotion? 
How can one explain the conduct of Wu Zhenhan, an “erudite” judge, who took bribes of 
6 million yuan from litigants and subordinate judges during his term of office as president 
of Hunan High Court?   
 
In contrast to the above-mentioned factors, which do not seem able to explain the cause 
to the persisting and pervasive occurrence of corruption in China’s courts, some other 
factors, such as the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in interfering court 
affairs, the lack of independence of the judiciary, the lack of accountability of judges, do 
seem to have a closer connection to the functioning or rather dysfunction of the judiciary 
and to the related malpractices.10  Furthermore, some authors also pointed out that certain 
“cultural” factors, such as the indulgence of what has been named as “guanxi-practice”, 
                                                 
8 See news report at the following links http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4cd8a3a40100ilz7.html. 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-10-13/062711224922.shtml. 
http://news.163.com/06/0909/17/2QJJFTPT00011SM9.html.   
9 For example, see Keyuan Zou, "Judicial Reform Versus Judicial Corruption: Recent Developments in 
China," Criminal Law Forum 11 (2000). Xin He, "Zhongguo Fayuan De Caizheng Buzu Yu Sifa Fubai 
[Lack of Financial Funding and Judicial Corruption in China's Courts]," ershiyi shiji (21 Century 
Bimonthly), no. 2 (2008). Yuwen Li, "Court Reform in China: Problems, Progress & Prospects," in 
Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China, ed. Chen Jianfu, et.al. (Kluwer Law International, 
2002). 
10 For example, see Ting Gong, "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in 
Contemporary China," China Review 4, no. 2 (2004).  
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have also fueled corruption. 11  However, none of these studies has sufficiently 
investigated through which mechanism these factors have contributed to the corrupt 
practices that have been found in China. Instead, the causal relations between these 
factors and the occurrence of corruption are, in a frequent manner, only ambivalently, if 
not wrongly, assumed 12  and insufficiently treated. 13  The absence of a thorough 
investigation on these factors and their relation to corruption is not only because of the 
sensitiveness of the topic and of the issues concerned but also because of the lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of how corruption is carried out in the political, social and 
legal setting of China’s courts. The necessity to gain such an understanding shall not be 
permissively ignored since it is the key to the many questions mentioned above which 
have been raised but not satisfactorily answered. To gain such an understanding will also 
enable a more precise diagnosis of the problem of judicial corruption and a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the roles of certain formal and informal practices associated 
with corrupt conduct. This is exactly where this thesis starts.  
 
1.1. Main research questions 
 
Different from most corruption literature, which delves directly into the question of why 
corruption takes place, this thesis firstly asks how corruption takes place. Therefore, the 
main question this thesis deals with is how corruption participants carry out corrupt 
conduct in the litigating process in courts and what factors in particular are attributable to 
their completion and success. Through the answers to the main question, this thesis will 
also discuss the root causes of corruption in China’s courts and the reasons of its 





Corruption is broadly defined in this research as the abuse of entrusted/public power in 
exchange for private gain/benefit, a succinct definition adopted by the Transparency 
                                                 
11 For example, see Thomas Gold, et. al., "An Introduction to the Study of Guanxi," in Social Connections 
in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi ed. Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, David 
Wank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
12 For example, in explaining the relation between the guanxi-practice and corruption, Mayfair Yang 
mistakenly assumed that corruption is impersonal, short-term oriented transaction while guanxi-practice is 
long-term oriented and personal. For more details, see Chapter 3. 
13 For example, a lot of scholars pointed out the connection between judicial corruption and the lack of 
judicial independency. However, explanation on how and why is rarely seen. For such literature, see for 
example Gong, "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary 
China." Keith Henderson, "The Rule of Law and Judicial Corruption in China: Half-Way over the Great 
Wall," in Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems, ed. Transparency International 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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International, 14  World Bank 15  and widely accepted in corruption literature. 16  The 
definition does not exclude conduct such as embezzlement or misappropriation of public 
fund; however, the typical corrupt conduct falling into this definition is bribery, a concept 
that is sometimes used almost interchangeably with “corruption”.17  As the most salient, 
resilient and damaging form of corrupt conduct,18  bribery remains the main focus in this 
thesis except in Chapter II, which provides an overview of various forms of corrupt 
conduct, not exclusive to bribery. To be more specific, bribery, in this thesis, refers to the 
offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of 
influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or her public or legal duties, 
regardless of whether it constitutes a crime. For the sake of simplicity, “corruption” is 
often used as being synonymous with “bribery” unless it is specified otherwise. 





To answer the questions mentioned above, this thesis collected empirical data from the 
following sources, which are classified into three groups. The first group consists of 
officially reported (and thus often punished) corrupt conduct. These reports concern a 
total number of 398 judges of various ranks served in various divisions of courts. This 
dataset covers all administrative regions and all levels of courts in China, from the lowest 
people’s tribunal to the Supreme People’s Court. All these cases were collected between 
2005 and 2009 by regularly screening the legal sections of major internet news outlets 
and newspapers or magazines focusing on legal affairs and corruption issues 19 . A 
                                                 
14 The terms “entrusted power” and “private gain” are used by the Transparency International. See 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq  
15 The terms “public power” and “private benefit” are used by the World Bank. See Vito Tanzi, 
"Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers 45, no. 4 
(1998). p.564.  
16 For more definitions, see Arvind K. Jain, "Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys 15, no. 
1 (2001). Robin Theobald, Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment (Duke University Press, 
1990). 
17 For example, see Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988). Peter 
Graeff, "Why Should One Trust in Corruption?," in The New Institutional Economics of Corruption, ed. 
J.G.Lambsdorff et. al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Diego Gambetta, "Corruption: An 
Analytical Map," in Corrupt Histories, ed. Emmanuel Kreike, William C. Jordan (University of Rochester 
Press, 2004). 
18 According to the recent researches, the significance of bribery has been increasing both in terms of its 
occurrence and the volume of the bribes involved. Qinghua Meng, Shouhuizui Yanjiu Xin Dongxiang [New 
Trends and Implications of Research on Bribery] (Beijing: Fangzheng, 2005). pp.3-10. Yong Guo, 
"Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis," The China Quarterly 194, no. June (2008). 
p.357.  
19 These sources include the legal sections of www.sina.com and  www.xinhuanet.com, Fazhi Ribao 
(Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo 
(Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and 
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supplementary number of cases have been located by using the popular PRC domestic 
search engines baidu and google.20  Twenty-one of these cases are supported by court 
judgments, the procuratorate’s statements or the defense’s statements. Also included in 
this group of data are surveys and assessment carried out by other legal academics 
concerning corrupt activities in China. This first group of data, from officially reported 
cases, also includes 100 cases concerning corruption in anti-corruption institutions 
spanning from 1985 till 2009. This dataset is analyzed in Chapter 7 on corruption in 
anti-corruption institutions. These cases concern mainly the procuratorators and agents of 
the internal party discipline inspection commissions rather than judges. Information 
concerning these cases comes from media reports of court-trials or press releases from 
courts or related investigative bodies, principally the party discipline inspection 
commissions and the procuratorates.21  In Chapter 3 on the “performance” of bribery, I 
also employed cases concerning corrupt conduct of officials in public institutions outside 
of the justice system.  
 
The second group of data consists of personal account of unreported corrupt conduct. It 
includes over 100 hours’ formal and informal focused interviews about details of corrupt 
practices. I conducted these interviews during 2005-2008. I interviewed 12 lawyers in 
various parts of the country. Some of the interviews were one-off. But with some lawyers, 
I was able to do follow-up interviews intermittingly through face-to-face meetings, phone 
calls or emails at different stages of the research. Apart from the 12 lawyers, I also 
conducted interviews with 2 judges, 2 procuratorates and 2 officials in the legislatures. I 
found that attempts to interview judges on the topic of judicial corruption are difficult. 
Even with judges, whom I went to law school with, the mere reference to the topic made 
them nervous. Their knowledge about my affiliation with a foreign institute made them 
even less hesitating in rejecting my request for interview. I also conducted rather informal 
interviews with people of all walks of life whoever I happened to meet and could strike a 
conversation with. Due to the confidential nature of this group of data, information of 
these interviews is not exhaustively applied in the thesis. However, they are critical in 
helping me to develop an “intimate” understanding of the corrupt behavior and to choose 
the proper perspective for my investigation. Finally, this group of data, about personal 
experience of corruption, also includes numerous blog posts and bulletin board 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an internet-based magazine run by the Supreme 
Procuratorate. 
20 A considerable proportion of the cases was initially posted at “tanguan dangánguan”, a web-blog hosted 
by Zhang Hongjian, a procuratorator in Heilongjiang Province, whom I owe thanks to. 
21 These sources include the legal sections of Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), 
Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu 
yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an 
internet-based magazine run by the Supreme Prosecutorate. They also include the legal channels of two 
major internet news websites in China: www.sina.com and www.xinhuanet.com. 
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discussions concerning individuals’ personal experience of corrupt practices in courts, 
which I collected regularly during the period of this research.  
    
The last group of data used for this thesis consists of information indicating the formal 
and informal practices concerning adjudicative conduct in China’s courts. The data 
includes regulations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the party) and policies and 
internal directives including opinions, instructions and guidelines issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC), the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and the Central 
Committee of the Discipline Inspection Commission (CCDIC). Also included in this 
group of data are internal regulations of individual courts investigated, memorandum, 
personal accounts or official reports written by legal practitioners, including lawyers and 
judges. All empirical data mentioned above are in the Chinese language. 
 
1.4. Analytical framework 
 
To answer the question how corruption participants carry out corrupt conduct in the 
litigating process in courts and what factors in particular are attributable to their 
completion and success, this thesis developed the following framework to analyze the 
above-mentioned empirical data. This framework treats corruption as a contracting 
process, which includes four phases: 1) initiation of the exchange; 2) negotiation of the 
exchange; 3) contractual performance; and 4) enforcement of the contract in case of 
non-performance. By dissecting corrupt conduct into these four phases, the framework 
helps to break down the complexity of the conduct into several recognizable parts, each 
of which has different yet inter-relating functions in completing the corrupt conduct 
concerned. Such a framework is a valuable analytical instrument to extract and assemble 
dispersed empirical data from discursive narrations, case-reports and other sources as 
mentioned in the previous section so as to provide a more complete scene of corruption in 
China’s courts. Applying such a framework will not only offer a close-up portrait of how 
a secretive practice such as corruption is carried out in China’s courts in reality but also 
provide the basis for a more precise diagnosis of what factors have enabled, facilitated 
and/or proliferated such practices in which phase and how.  
 
Apart from the “four-phase” framework, which guides and links different chapters of the 
thesis, other existing theoretical findings on corruption developed by different scholars 
from various disciplines are also employed to advance the analyses in different chapters 
of the thesis. Since each chapter has provided space for more elaborate introduction of 
these theoretical findings, here I will only introduce those, which have an overall 
influence of the thesis.  
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The first and foremost is the institutional economics of corruption, which has influenced 
the thesis most. The institutional economics of corruption considers corruption as “a form 
of contracting amenable to analysis from the viewpoint of transaction-cost economics”.22 
“Trust”, “opportunism”, “risk” and “transactional cost” are among the key analytical 
instruments of this body of scholarship. In his seminal work, Husted was the first to point 
out that “corruption can be conceived as the transferal of a service between the bribe 
donor the bribe recipient”, which covers both the “according-to-rule” transactions and 
“against-the-rule” transactions.23  According to Husted, three behavioral assumptions of 
transaction-cost economics are applicable to corruption.24  The first is bounded rationality, 
which refers to the unpredictability of where and to whom a bribe shall be provided. This 
unpredictability makes ex ante planning difficult for the bribers. The second is 
opportunism, which rises when simultaneous performances of the exchange parties are 
difficult. The third assumption is asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the difficulty 
of redeploying assets to their next best alternative use without a significant sacrifice in 
value. For example, if a litigant fails to deliver the bribe to a judge after the judge has 
delivered the agreed corrupt service to the litigant by rendering a decision in the litigant’s 
favor, the judge cannot redeploy the asset, namely the court decision, to other uses. In 
other words, the asset under exchange is deprived from and is valuable only in specific 
circumstances. This type of assets is considered to have “idiosyncratic attributes”.25 
Transactions involving such assets require different safeguard mechanisms, for example, 
incentive alignment, private ordering and trading regularities, in order to prevent 
opportunism.26   
 
After Husted, Lambsdorff took the flag of the institutional economics of corruption. His 
catch-phrase - “contracting in the shadow of the law” represents the key attribute of 
corrupt conduct.27  In this article, Lambsdorff made a convincing analysis about how 
corruption participants strive to overcome the barriers of illegality and secrecy and also to 
minimize transactional costs in the contracting process. In particular, Lambsdorff 
identified three sequential stages of the corruption contracting process, where transaction 
costs arise. The first is contract initiation, including partner seeking and determination of 
contract conditions. The second stage is contract enforcement, in which transaction costs 
are generated to prevent opportunism, which is particularly conspicuous in corrupt 
                                                 
22 B. W. Husted, "Honor among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World 
Countries," Business Ethics Quarterly 4, no. 1 (1994). p.17. 
23 Ibid. p.19. Also, Philip Oldenburg, "Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian 
Case," World Politics 39, no. 4 (1987). 
24 The rest of this paragraph is a summary of Husted, "Honor among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost 
Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries." pp.17-27. 
25 Ibid. p.20. 
26 Ibid. 
27 J.G. Lambsdorff, "Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law," Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 48 (2002). This is also the reference of the summary in the rest of this paragraph. 
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contract due to its illegality and the lack of legal protection. The third stage is what 
Lambsdorff calls “aftermath”, which refers to the risk of denunciation and extortion after 
the completion of the contract. By identifying the significance of transactional costs 
entailed in corrupt transactions, Lambsdorff explained why middlemen take an important 
role in corrupt transactions and why corrupt transactions are often grafted with legal 
exchange. In one of his later works in collaboration with Mathias Nell, Lambsdorff 
explored the effectiveness of “asymmetric penalties and leniency”, proposing to impose 
“asymmetric” punishment on bribers and the bribed so as to “destabilize” the contracting 
relations as an alternative anti-corruption policy.28 
 
The “four-phase” framework developed in this thesis is built on and adds to what has 
been developed by the above-mentioned pioneers of institutional economics of corruption. 
Unlike Lamsdorff’s framework, which has a chosen focus on the impact of transactional 
costs on initiating and enforcing a corrupt deal, the framework developed by this thesis 
instead examines the full cycle of the contracting process. It included the negotiation 
phase and in particular the contractual performance phase, which is quintessential in the 
contracting process of corruption even though transaction cost is not a major concern in 
this phase. By including all the four phases and completing the full cycle, the framework 
is able not only to identify precisely which factors have facilitated the contracting process 
in which phase but also to demonstrate the structural relations among these factors. Such 
a demonstration will help to explain the dynamics, persistence and resilience of the 
corrupt activities under investigation. 
 
Apart from the institutional economics of corruption, the analysis of this thesis, as a 
whole, is also greatly influenced by two other conceptual frameworks. The first is the 
principal-agent-client model, which was firstly proposed by Klitgaard and has since then 
been widely adopted in corruption studies as a definitional framework of corruption.29 
Indira Carr summarized the model most succinctly, which I quote in full below.  
 
“Based on the principal-agent-client model, corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s 
interest in pursuit of his own by accepting or seeking a benefit from the service seeker, the client. The 
conditions for corruption present themselves when the principal is in a powerful position and the 
agent to whom the principle has entrusted to carry out the services has an element of discretion in 
administering the services and there is a lack or near lack of accountability.”30   
 
                                                 
28 Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Mathias Nell, "Fighting Corruption with Asymmetric Penalities and 
Leniency," in CeGE Discussion Paper (Georg-August Universität Göttingen, 2007). 
29 Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption. pp.22-4. 74. 
30 Indira Carr, "The Principal-Agent-Client Model and the Southern African Development Community 
Anti-Corruption Protocol," in The Selected Works for Indira M. Carr (University of Middlesex, 2007). 
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In the context of judicial corruption, the bribed judges are the agents; their constituents 
are the principals and the bribing litigants, their representatives or other court-users are 
the clients. The framework is highly illustrative in helping us to understand the structural 
relations among the main participants of corruption. This understanding underpins the 
analysis of the entire thesis even though it is not expressively addressed in each chapter.   
 
The other conceptual framework that has an overall influence of this thesis is the one on 
social exchange, which was originated from the late prominent sociologist George 
Homans and advanced by other social scientists in a wide range of disciplines.31  
According to Peter Blau, “Processes of social association can be conceptualized … as an 
exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, 
between at least two persons…Social exchange can be observed everywhere once we are 
sensitized by this conception to it”.32  Concepts, such as, reciprocity, gift, favor, 
reputation, exchange and power and exchange and cooperation, that are intensively 
investigated in these studies,33  are found most useful in understanding corruption as a 
form of exchange. Since these studies generally do not have a specific focus on 
corruption, they are therefore not expressively engaged in the rest of the thesis.  
However, these studies are most enlightening in helping me, especially at the early stage 
of this research, to theorize my empirical understanding of corruption in the frame of 




The most significant research obstacle of this thesis is the access to empirical data due to 
the evidently sensitive nature of both the investigated conduct and of the habitat where 
the conduct takes place. In a highly politicalized legal system, certain court statistics are 
                                                 
31 L. Cosmides, "The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? 
Studies with the Wason Selection Task," Cognition 31, no. 3 (1989). L Cosmides, J Tooby, "Cognitive 
Adaptions for Social Exchange," in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of 
Culture, ed. L Cosmides, J Tooby (Oxford University, 1992). L. D. Molm, "Structure, Action, and 
Outcomes: The Dynamics of Power in Social Exchange " American sociological review 55, no. 3 (1990). 
Walter Nord, "Adam Smith and Contemporary Social Exchange Theory " American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology 32, no. 4 (1973). John; Michael J. Lovaglia Skvoretz, "Who Exchanges with Whom: 
Structural Determinants of Exchange Frequency in Negotiated Exchange Networks," SOcial Psychology 
Quarterly 58, no. Sep (1995). B.F. Meeker, "Decisions and Exchange," Americal Sociological Review 36, 
no. Jun (1971). Toshio et. al. Yamagishi, "Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange 
Networks," The American Journal of Sociology 93, no. Jan (1988). 
32 Peter M Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (John Wiley & Sons, 1964). p.88 
33 George Caspar Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc., 1961), Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, Richard M. Emerson, "Social Exchange Theory," 
American Review of Sociology 2 (1976). J. Thibaut, Kelley, H. H., The Social Psychology of Groups (New 
York: Wiley, 1959). Robert Axelrod, "The Evolution of Cooperation," Science 211, no. 4498 (1981). L. C. 
Becker, Reciprocity (1990). Rajiv Sethi, E. Somanathan, "Understanding Reciprocity," journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 50, no. 1-27 (2003). 
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protected as state secrets, especially those concerning corruption of judges. Court 
judgments concerning judicial corruption are not provided in public case databases. The 
most important form of court case file (fujuan), which records the decision-making 
process in the adjudicating process, is classified and kept away even from the litigants 
and their representatives, let alone researchers. Although I have exhausted all alternative 
means to collect data, which is sufficient enough to allow me to re-enact the events of 
corruption for the purpose of this research, the data set could be better sampled and more 
systematic to permit more rigorous analyses. The impact of this limited access to data 
varies depending on the specific task set for different chapters, which will be specified in 




This book is structured into eight main chapters. After the introduction, Chapter 2 
provides an overview of corrupt conduct in China’s courts, its various forms of presence, 
the salience of different conduct in different group of judges in different groups of courts. 
Chapter 3 presents the main analytical framework, namely “corruption as a contracting 
process”. By analyzing patterns of the four phases identified in the contracting process, I 
conclude that the initiation phase and the phase of contractual performance on the part of 
the bribed are of critical importance to the successful completion of the contracting 
process. Correspondingly, the initiation phase is closely investigated in Chapter 4 and the 
contractual performance on the party of the bribed is examined in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Chapter 7 probes into anti-corruption measures and practices, especially corruption in 
anti-corruption institutions from a micro perspective. Chapter 8 presents the conclusion. 
Since all the main chapters are designed as self-standing articles, their self-contained 
form and structure are mostly preserved in this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 Corruption in China’s Courts - An overview 
of scope and general patterns 
(Included in Judicial Independence In China: Lessons For Global Rule Of Law 
Promotion, Randall Peerenboom ed. Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Corruption in China’s courts is a rather neglected field of study in both the Chinese and 
English language academic circles. Although scholars and commentators have pointed 
out various deficiencies in the operation of courts, their relation to corruption has never 
been closely examined, let alone systematically investigated.34  Policymakers as well as 
scholars seem rather more ready to attribute judicial problems to external factors, such as 
undue interference from the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP or Party), lack of 
resources and local protectionism. Even when scholars do pay attention, they do so most 
often only in passing.35  This casual treatment of corruption in the courts has resulted in 
the marginalization of the problem in academic discourse. As a result, corruption in the 
courts appears omnipresent yet untraceable and elusive. 
 
The relative scarcity of studies on this topic is perhaps attributable to the evidently 
sensitive nature of the topic, which makes empirical research difficult. The fact that 
corruption is openly denounced and severely punished in China makes interviews with 
judges or other court officials extremely difficult. 36  Even for punished and closed 
corruption cases against court officials, access to case-files is highly restricted. For 
researchers, attending court trials sometimes may yield interesting findings.37  However, 
what is seen in courtrooms provides little information on what happened behind the 
scenes. Therefore, a preliminary examination on the existence and salience of various 
corrupt conducts in contemporary China’s courts proceeds any further comprehensive 
studies on the subject, which will be provided in the rest of the thesis.  
 
                                                 
34 Edited volumes on this topic include Yaxin Wang, et.al., "Falü chengxu yunzuo de shizheng fenxi [A 
Positive Analysis to Practice of Legal Procedures],"  (Beijing: Law Press China, 2005). Suli Zhu, ed., 
Falü he shehui kexue [Law and Social Science] (Beijing: Law Press, 2006). Yefu Zheng, et.al., ed., Beida 
qinghua renda shehuixue shuoshi lunwen xuanbian [Selected Theses for Master-Degree in Sociology from 
Peking University, Qsinghua University and Renmin University] (Jinan: Shandong People's Publishing 
House, 2006).  
35 Li, "Court Reform in China: Problems, Progress & Prospects." pp.57-8; Dingjian Cai, "Development of 
the Chinese Legal System since 1979 and Its Current Crisis and Transformation," Cultural Dynamics 11, 
no. 2 (1999). pp.152-4; Zou, "Judicial Reform Versus Judicial Corruption: Recent Developments in 
China."pp.328-9. Henderson, "The Rule of Law and Judicial Corruption in China: Half-Way over the Great 
Wall." Benjamin L. Liebman, "China's Courts: Restricted Reform," The China Quarterly 191 (2007). 
p.627. 
36 During my fieldwork, I made several attempts to interview judges and other court officials. Some 
declined the request. Some agreed to be interviewed but were clearly reluctant to discuss corruption in the 
courts. 
37 Liang’s recent work provides a valuable “thick-description” of the operation of the courts by attending 
open court-hearings, shedding light on various discriminative and unfair court practices. Bin Liang, The 
Changing Chinese Legal System, 1978-Present: Centralization of Power and Rationalization of the Legal 
System (New York, London: Routledge, 2008). 
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This chapter seeks to answer three main questions : What types of corrupt behavior exist 
in China’s courts? Do the different types of corruption occur with equal salience in 
different court-divisions, different types of cases, courts at different levels and for 
different groups of judges? How can the findings be interpreted and explained?  In 
answering these questions, I adopt an inductive analytical framework developed from a 
comprehensive study of about 350 court corruption cases, spanning the years 1991 to 
2008. These cases are supplemented by numerous media reports, diaries and essays 
written by court-users about their court experience during the same period of time. Unlike 
the policy- or solution-oriented approaches adopted in most current studies,38  I attempt in 
this chapter to investigate, describe and analyze the basic factual features of corruption in 
China’s courts, which will be used as the basis for the more in-depth studies in the 
following chapters.   
 
2.1.1. Analytical framework 
 
In this chapter, I divide corrupt conduct into three sub-categories: Type A involves cases 
where corrupt judges have physically abused litigants, illegally seizing and detaining 
them by force. Type B represents corrupt conduct without exchange between the judge 
and litigants, such as embezzlement, misappropriation of assets, swindling litigants and 
serious negligence. Type C represents mainly bribery and favoritism. 39  The cases 
investigated in this research include both those punishable and punished in accordance 
with PRC Criminal Law and those that do not meet the minimum legal requirement for 
criminal indictment but involve violations of ethical, professional or Party disciplinary 
rules. 
 
2.1.2. Data sources 
 
The data includes 350 cases corresponding to 341 individual judges and 9 non-judge 
court officials, including 4 court clerks, 4 court accountants and 1 court bailiff.40  In each 
of these cases, a judge or court official was punished for one or in some cases several 
corrupt acts according to the CCP anti-corruption disciplinary regulations or the Chinese 
criminal code. Information concerning these 350 cases comes from media reports of 
court-trials or press releases from courts or related investigated bodies, principally the 
                                                 
38 Gong, "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China." 
Xin He, "Zhongguo fayuan de caizheng buzu yu sifa fubai [Lack of Financial Funding and Judicial 
Corruption in China's Courts]," ershiyi shiji (21 Century Bimonthly), no. 2 (2008).  Henderson, "The Rule 
of Law and Judicial Corruption in China: Half-Way over the Great Wall." 
39 These cases are often referred to as jinqian’an, renqing’an, guanxi’ an (literally translated as money case, 
personal-feeling case and connection case). 
40 Since the number of non-judge subjects in the database is limited, for ease of reference this group is also 
referred to as “judges”. 
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procuratorates or the discipline inspection commissions of the local CCP. 21 of these 
cases are supported by court files, such as court judgments and statements by prosecutors 
or defendants. The cases were collected between 2005 and 2008 by regularly screening 
the legal sections of major internet news outlets and newspapers or magazines focusing 
on legal affairs and corruption issues41 . A supplementary number of cases have been 
located by using the popular PRC domestic search engines baidu and google.42   
 
2.1.3. Data configuration 
 
The data are summarized by when the corrupt act was detected rather than by the time the 
corrupt act was committed, since many cases involve multiple corrupt acts, extending 
over several years. Among the 350 judges, 12 were accused of corruption in the period 
of1991-1999, 183 in the period of 2000-2004 and the remaining 155 in the period of 
2005-2008. It is difficult to ascertain the cause of this imbalance. It could be that reports 
of recent cases are more visible and accessible online than reports of earlier cases. It 
could also be the result of increasing incidences of violations, increased efforts against 
corruption, or both.  
 
Concerning court levels, 55 out of the 350 judges served in high courts (gaoji renmin 
fayuan) at the time of detection and 151 in intermediate courts (zhongji renmin fayuan). 
The remaining 144 judges served in basic level courts (jiceng fayuan), of which 60 were 
in urban districts, 73 in counties and 11 held appointments in people’s tribunals (renmin 
fating). The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is not represented in this database, although 
the openly reported on-going investigation against the SPC vice-president Huang 
Songyou suggests it is highly likely that a corruption prosecution will be pursued.43    
 
At the regional level, the data covers all provincial-level administrative regions except 
Shanghai City, Qinghai Autonomous Region and Tibetan Autonomous Region. Different 
regions have different rates of representation in the database. However, the regional 
representation in the database should not be mistaken with that of the actual occurrence 
                                                 
41 These sources include the legal sections of www.sina.com and  www.xinhuanet.com, Fazhi Ribao 
(Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo 
(Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and 
Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an internet-based magazine run by the Supreme 
Procuratorate. 
42 A considerable proportion of the cases was initially posted at “tanguan dangánguan”, a web-blog hosted 
by Zhang Hongjian, a procuratorator in Heilongjiang Province, whom I owe thanks to. 
43 Since the public media are under strict control by the central government, pre-prosecution media reports 
of corruption cases, especially those concerning high-profile officials, often serve as a means for the 
political leadership to “prepare” the public, providing guidance about how the case should be perceived. 
Among the cases studied, a prosecution is most likely to take place, followed by a conviction, when the 
media reports start to “demonize” the suspect already in the investigation period, which is exactly what is 
happening with the case of Huang Songyou. 
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of corruption.44  Rather, it is more an indication of the visibility of corruption in public 
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So-called “political corruption,”45  or cases where judges render partial decisions in 
response to political pressure, is not represented in the database and hence not discussed 
in this chapter. What Wang describes as judicial corruption in a “special environment,”46 
that is institutional corrupt practices carried out semi-officially by courts, such as illegal 
over-charging of litigation fees, is also not represented in the database. Crimes committed 
by court personnel but unrelated to the exercise of a court’s function are also excluded.  
 
                                                 
44 For example, Shanghai had reportedly investigated and punished 8 court officials in 2006 and 14 in 2005. 
See “Shanghai Court Officials Sign Anti-corruption Pledge First Working Day after Spring Festival 
(2007)”, http://news.qq.com/a/20070226/000696.htm and “Shanghai Court Officials Sign Anti-corruption 
Pledge First Working Day after Spring Festival (2006)” 
http://news.eastday.com/eastday/node37/node189/node4644/userobject1ai63508.html. However, no 
publicly-reported corruption cases were found during the research period concerning corruption in the 
Shanghai courts.  
45 Gong, "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China." 
46 Yaxin Wang, "Sifafubai' xianxiang de yizhong jiedu [An Interpretation of 'Judicial Corruption']," Sixiang 
zhanxian 31, no. 4 (2005). p.50. fn.2. 
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Lastly, the database includes only cases for which official investigations had been 
completed and which were reported by official sources with specific allegations. Among 
the 350 judges, only two were acquitted on the grounds of “lack of evidence.”47   Due 
compliance to the criminal procedure in the process of investigation has been considered 
in the data-selection. This resulted in the elimination of two cases, in one, the evidence 
was unreliable due to having allegedly been procured by forcible means; in the other, 
there was competing evidence that the prosecution had acted out of revenge against the 
defendants, even though the prosecuted corrupt acts of the defendants may also have 
occurred. 48  For the remainder of the cases, compliance to the Chinese Criminal 
Procedure Law can only be generally assumed to have been observed, in the absence of 
any observable indication to the contrary. 




Since most of the data was obtained from the media, the configuration of the cases is as 
much an indication of the slant of media coverage and different propaganda policies of 
different regions as of the frequency of actual instances of corruption. Due to the lack of 
up-to-date studies, and more importantly due to the scarcity of data, this chapter must, 
inevitably, remain methodologically exploratory as well as tentative in its findings and 
conclusions. The lack of scientific sampling of the data means the result may be skewed 
by media bias and my selective and hence possibly imbalanced exposure to the media 
coverage.  
 
It has proved laboriously difficult to generate a sizable database from official press 
releases, the main source of information that is currently available for this kind of 
research.49  However, the representativeness of the database could be much improved if 
other reliable means of data collection could be accessed and used to expand the case 
coverage.  
 
47 In this case, two judges from Gansu High Court were prosecuted for bribe-taking because their family 
members had purchased apartments from a litigant’s company at a below-market-value price while the 
litigant’s case was pending in their court. One judge was also given a mobile phone by the same litigant. In 
their defense, one judge argued that he had no knowledge of the purchase while the other argued that the 
price-benefit was not illicit because the judge’s father-in-law was an employee of the litigant’s company. 
The court acquitted the judges on the ground of “unclear facts” and “insufficient evidence”. For details, see 
“Two Gansu High Court Judges Became Suspects of Bribery in Their Adjudication of A Civil Case”. 
http://news.tom.com/1002/20040703-1058395.html.  
48 I would like to thank Christiane Wendehorst, who raised the issue at the 2nd Annual Conference of 
European China Law Association in Turin, Italy, in 2008, where an earlier version of this chapter was 
presented. 
49 Media case reports have been used as the major source of data for statistic analysis in the following 
research studies on corruption: Guo, "Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis." Alan P. L. 
Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77 
(1983). Wenhao Cheng, "An Empirical Study of Corruption within China's State-Owned Enterprises," The 
China Review 4, no. 2 (2004). 
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2.2. Corruption in China’s courts - scope and prevalence 
 
How serious is corruption in China’s courts?  This has been the most frequently asked 
question during my research. The scale of corruption in the courts can be gauged by 
reviewing published data released by official sources. However, it is impossible to 
measure the actual scale with accurate quantitative data since many corrupt acts remain 
undetected. Since statistics concerning court affairs are officially considered as 
“confidential (jimi)” or even “absolute confidential (juemi)” state secrets,50  access to 
original court data of any kind is extremely difficult to obtain, let alone data concerning 
corruption. The most visible index is the total number of court personnel who were 
investigated and punished for misusing or abusing adjudicative or court enforcement 
power for private benefit, as presented in SPC working reports each spring. 
 
 
Table 2.1 The SPC National Figures for Court Personnel Investigated for Corruption51 
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
No. of cases 
investigated 
850 1094 962 1051 NA 2512 1450 1292 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  
No. of cases 
investigated 




According to SPC reports, the number has continuously declined since 1998. Compared 
to the total of more than 190,00052 judges in the country as a whole, the figure of 218 
corruption incidents for the year of 2007 appears moderate.53  However, as shown in 
Table 2 some of the data released by local courts through the local media cast doubt on 
the accuracy of the SPC figures in Table 1. For example, the number of court personnel 
                                                 
50 “[Regulation on Strengthening Judicial Statistics of People's Courts]," ed. The Supreme People's Court 
(1985). Part IX. Art. 29. 
51 Note: “Punished” refers to both criminal punishments and administrative sanctions. All numbers refer to 
court personnel only (so do not include corrupt prosecutors or police). The national figures for 2007 and a 
few local figures refer to judges only. The figure of investigated and punished judges released in the SPC 
Report (2004) is 794, but 468 in the SPC Report (2008). I assume that this discrepancy is a typo and that 
the larger number 794 refers to the number of investigated and punished court personnel rather than judges 
only. Sources: The SPC Annual Reports 
52 Jingwen Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report 
(1979-2004)] (Beijing: People's University,2007).p.19. 
53 Yulin Fu, Randall Peerenboom, "A New Analytical Framework for Understanding and Promoting 
Judicial Independence in China," in Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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investigated in 2006 for corruption in just five provinces (out of 32 provincial-level 
administrative regions) is 585, or more than twice the SPC’s total nationwide figure.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Annual Figures for Court Personnel Investigated and Punished (chachude) for 
Corruption54   
 
Year Local figures released by local courts  National figures 
released by the SPC 
2007 252  
4 provincial regions: Shaanxi, Hebei, Jiangxi, Hubei; 
3 cities: Nanjing (Jiangsu), Linfen (Shanxi), 
Shizuishan (Ningxia) 
1 basic court: Beilin District of Suihua city (Jilin) 
218 
2006 697 
8 provincial regions: Shanxi, Henan, Ningxia, 
Hunan, Liaoning, Hubei, Hainan, Shanghai 




8 provincial regions: Liaoning, Hainan, Zhejiang, 
Shanxi, Henan, Guangdong, Jilin, Shanghai 
378 
2004 298+3156 
5 provincial regions: Hunan, Hainan, Fujian, Jilin, 
Liaoning 
1 city: Guilin (Guangxi) 
461 
2003 884 
9 provinces: Shanxi, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Henan, 
Anhui, Hainan, Jiangsu, Hubei, Xinjiang 
1 city: Cangzhou (Hebei) 
794 
2002 386 




                                                 
54 Note: Some of the statistics from local courts only roughly correspond to the full calendar year as listed 
in the left column. For example, some figures only represent the results of an anti-corruption campaign in a 
particular month. Some figures start and end in the middle of the calendar year. In two cases, the figures 
also cover the first half of the next calendar year; this is indicated where applicable. All data and sources 
are on file with the author. 
55 The figure for Guangdong province covers 2005 and the first half of 2006. 
56 The figure for Liaoning Province covers 2004 and the first half of 2005. 
57 Sources: The SPC Annual Reports and local media reports on file with the author. 
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The origin of this discrepancy is difficult to explain. There is relatively little incentive for 
the local courts to inflate the number. Do the local courts perhaps “shrink” the numbers 
before they are submitted to the SPC, or does the SPC manipulate the data after collecting 
it from the local courts? Irrespective of the correct explanation for the discrepancy, it 
appears that the actual level of corruption in courts is more serious than the SPC reports 
suggest.  
 
Furthermore, when looking at these numbers, it should be borne in mind that the 
detection of corruption in the courts is usually, if not always, tied to a particular case. 
When a judge is caught for corruption in one case, previous cases tried by the same judge 
will not normally be examined. It is only when a suspect confesses to other as yet 
undetected corrupt acts in exchange for lenient punishment that this case-by-case 
approach is modified to some limited extent. However, the total number of unlawful and 
unethical acts in a corrupt judge’s career can never be accurately ascertained, especially 
for those had been corrupt for many years before being caught. 
 
2.3. Type A - extreme cases involving physical violence 
 
Corrupt conduct involving physical abuse of the victim mainly refers to those acts that 
deprive the victim of her/his physical liberty, such as the illegal seizure and detention of 
litigants. There were six such cases among the total of 350. In a notorious case in 
Jiangxian County, Shanxi Province, the former vice court-president of the county court 
Yao Xiaohong instructed his subordinates to beat a litigant to death just because the 
litigant attempted to challenge Yao’s arbitrary decision.58 In another case in Rongcheng 
County, Hebei Province, Yin Hexin, the then chief of the economic division of the county 
court was “hired” by two plaintiffs to “enforce” payment of debt from their disputant, 
who resided in another province. Having accepted 10,000 yuan “litigation fee” Yin and 
his colleagues kidnapped the defendant from his home. Struggling and shouting for help, 
the disputant was handcuffed from behind and covered with the judges’ clothes over his 
head. Hours later, the disputant was found suffocated to death.59  In at least four cases, the 
judges committed violent corrupt conduct at the request of friends or relatives. At the 
moment of detection, all six judges served in basic-level courts, five of at the county 
level.  
 
There are too few cases in this category to conduct a more segmented analysis. In reality 
there are most certainly more cases of this type, though not necessarily all with fatal 
                                                 
58 “How Can A Court Become the ‘Palace of Hell’? (1999)”, 
http://www.cyol.net/cyd/zqb/19990715/GB/9560^Q515.htm.  
59 “To Make Money Court Issues Quota to Judges, To Collect Debt Judges Killed Human Life (1998)”, 
http://www.gmw.cn/01shsb/1998-07/27/GB/688^SH14-215.htm.  
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consequences. Nonetheless, the comparatively low representation of this type of 
corruption in this database may suggest that the use of physical violence is not typical for 
corruption in China’s courts. The explanation for the violence in these cases, both in 
terms of its existence and its low representation in the database, may well be that the 
courts enjoy only limited policing power via the so-called “judicial police”(sifa 
jingcha), 60  whose formal purpose is to uphold court orders and assist in enforcing 
asset-related judgments. This feature of the distribution of power also separates 
corruption in courts from that in other law enforcement institutions, such as the 
procuratorates and the police, which enjoy a wider range of policing powers involving 
restricting an individual’s physical freedom, and in which the deprivation of a victim’s 
liberty is the principal form of corrupt conduct.  
 
2.4. Type B - corruption without exchange (non-bribery) 
 
Corruption in this and the next category does not involve violence. However, the absence 
of physical force does not necessarily imply an absence of any kind of force, coercion or 
threat. Instead, some acts in this category involve the use of symbolic power, which 
extracts deference through the presence of symbols of court power, such as a court 
document or a court official riding in a court vehicle. It is this kind of power, imbued 
with the threat of coercion, that enables some judges to compel voluntary submission or 
cooperation from their subjects in order to obtain their corrupt gain without needing to 
resort to physical violence or intimidation. Judges from basic courts continue to dominate 
this type of non-bribery corrupt conduct (47 out of the total of 79 judges). Six judges 
were from high courts and 26 from intermediate courts. 
 
The main form of corrupt conduct in Type B is theft. 69 judges were punished for 
embezzlement and/or misappropriation of court funds or seized assets. Nine judges were 
found guilty of fraud (four of them also conducted embezzlement and/or 
misappropriation). Six judges, including one, who also conducted embezzlement, were 
involved in serious incompetence and negligence at work, such as losing case-files and 
failing to hold an open trial for 19 years.61  Since there is no clear indication in the 
available materials that the judges had received external incentives to be deliberately 
negligent (though this is generally more likely), “effort-saving” is assumed to be the 
private benefit in these five cases.  
 
Among the 69 embezzlement and misappropriation cases, it is not surprising to find that 
more than one third took place in enforcement divisions, where large volumes of seized 
                                                 
60 Regulation of Judicial Police in People's Courts, The Supreme People's Court (1997) 
61 “Hainan Lingao Court Failed to Hold Open Trials for A Small Case for 19 Years (2006)”,  
http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2006-07-29/09219601648s.shtml.   
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assets are administered. In these cases courts largely failed in discharging their mandated 
role as guardian of the seized assets for litigants. Instead, easy opportunities for 
embezzlement and misappropriation were nurtured by the lack of monitoring, especially 
monitoring by the litigants to whom the assets belong. Tan Yongxing, an enforcement 
judge in Longgang District (Basic) Court, Shenzhen City, misappropriated 13 million 
yuan for gambling in a year, and had gambled away nearly half of it when he was 
caught.62  Li Zhengda, an enforcement judge in Jilin High Court embezzled 40 million 
yuan over eight years. Despite complaints from litigants, the investigation somehow only 
started after he had retired from his job and was about to leave the country.63   
 
Other than the enforcement judges, 4 court accountants and 20 court presidents or vice 
presidents were also apprehended for embezzlement or misappropriation. Both 
accountants and court administrative leaders have easy access to the public coffers. 
Cheng Wei, an accountant in Tianjin Maritime Court, had successfully embezzled 1.69 
million and misappropriated 140 million yuan, mostly from court accounts of seized 
assets. Cheng ultimately left a 100 million yuan “black hole” at Tianjin Maritime 
Court.64  There is no information about how the loss in these cases was settled with the 
litigants to whom these assets actually belong. It is surprising, though, that within Type B 
only one judge came from the case registration division, which is responsible for 
collecting litigation fees, the principal source of court income.  
                                                
 
Apart from theft, seven judges were accused of usurpation of assets through deception 
and/or illegal seizure. One judge from Heishan County Court in Liaoning Province 
swindled 990,000 yuan from a gullible buyer, who believed the judge’s story of a fake 
court auction. 65  In Hunan Province two judges loaned money to a construction 
sub-contractor who had been commissioned by a corporate developer. Knowing that the 
developer had deep pockets, the judges raised the interest rate of the loan to 20 times 
above the market rate, which the sub-contractor obviously would not be able to pay. The 
judges then brought a lawsuit against the sub-contractor in their own court in the name of 
an acquaintance, rendered a court decision in their favor and enforced the judgment by 
freezing the account of the corporate developer.66   
 
 
62 “Thrown Millions in Gambling Judge Became Prisoner (2000)”, 
http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/gb/content/2000-12/07/content_42133.htm.  
63 “Exploiting Loopholes, Jilin High Court Li Zhengda Embezzled Millions (2006)”,  
http://news.qq.com/a/20060216/000869_1.htm. 
64 “No. 1 Biggest Judicial Corruption Case in Tianjin Involving More Than yuan 100Million (2006)”, 
http://news.163.com/06/0418/14/2F0ES2P30001124J_3.html. 
65 “Liaoning Heishan County: Judge Chewed Receipt, Court Denied Responsibility (2004)”, 
http://house.people.com.cn/xinwen/article_04_10_12_2340.html. 
66 See case digest in Shigui Tan, Zhongguo sifa gaige yanjiu [A Study on Judicial Reform of China] 
(Beijing: Law Press China, 2000). p.123. 
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In two cases, judges seized assets from non-litigants just by dressing up in court uniforms 
and showing fake court documents. Li Shengyin, a county-court judge from Hebei 
Province, used a forged court order to appropriate assets worth seven million yuan from a 
bankrupt state-owned enterprise under the eyes of the factory guards. They “invented” a 
contractual dispute case with the enterprise after the usurpation, using remote relatives as 
plaintiffs and forging evidence.67 
 
2.5. Type C - corruption through exchange 
 
In this sub-category, corruption occurs in the form of an exchange. In this chapter 
‘exchange’ is not limited only to monetary transactions, or jinqian case (cases influenced 
by monetary bribes), as in the SPC classification. It also includes exchanges performed in 
the form of a favor under the principle of reciprocity. Oftentimes such favors are not 
immediately or directly associated with a monetary value or payback. Nonetheless, these 
favors necessarily have great value for the recipients.  
 
For example, Su Jiafu, the former chief of the criminal division of Gutian County Court, 
Fujian Province, confessed that he acquitted three defendants on a rape charge not just 
because he was offered the 6000 yuan. Rather, it was also because one of the defendants 
turned out to be the son of the director of the local police bureau, who had done a favor to 
Su before in a battery case involving Su’s brother. Su considered that it was time for him 
to return the favor.68  Su acquitted the defendants by recognizing the victim’s cries as a 
form of sexual consent against all other contesting evidence. This is a typical example of 
what the SPC terms a “renqing case,” a case influenced by an exchange of favors. 
Sometimes, the litigant does not yet have an established reciprocal relationship with the 
judge when the litigation is brought to court. In such circumstances, a favor exchange is 
often conducted through an intermediary, the so-called guanxi, a person who is familiar 
with both parties and guarantees that the favor is properly registered and returned. 
Jinqian, renqing and guanxi cases are all denounced by the SPC and all three fall into the 
category of corruption through exchange in this chapter.  
 
This section is arranged along the three phases of litigation, which also correspond to the 
three major functional court divisions: case registration (li’an), adjudication (shenpan) 
and enforcement (zhixing). A summary of litigation procedure in China’s courts provides 
the context for this discussion. 
 
                                                 
67 The case drew media attention only when the employees of the state-owned company held a public 
protest and physical conflict ensued with the local police. An investigation by the local Procuratorate 
followed. Xinhuanews Net, Fazhi News, 12 December 2003, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-12/12/content_1228524.htm. 
68 Tan, Zhongguo sifa gaige yanjiu [A Study on Judicial Reform of China]. p.123. 
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2.5.1. Brief introduction to litigation procedure in China’s courts 
 
In the 1990s, the SPC launched an institutional reform, dividing courts into several 
divisions according to the chronological order of the litigating process. Before this reform, 
courts were only divided according to the nature of the case69  and each court division 
was mandated to complete the entire process from case registration, court hearing, panel 
adjudication, and issuance of verdict to enforcement of the judgment. Under the previous 
system, the judge who registered a case might well be the same judge who heard and 
decided the case and who enforced the judgment. This concentration of power is believed 
to have increased opportunities for corruption in courts.70   
 
Under the reform, a further division of power was carried out resulting in three separate 
court divisions: case admission/registration, case adjudication and judgment enforcement. 
Each performs different functional judicial power. 71  At the same time, a separate 
adjudicative supervisory division (shenpan jiandu ting) was also established, charged 
with correcting glaring mistakes and injustices in closed cases using a special 
procedure.72   
 
The normal sequence of the litigation procedure is as follows. The plaintiff brings his 
statement of action to the case registration division (li’anting), where the case will be 
examined and archived and the litigation fee will be decided. Once the litigation fee is 
received, the case will then be assigned to the responsible adjudication division 
(shenpanting). The adjudication division will hold court hearings and issue the judgment 
after deliberating in a panel – either a small collegial panel set up within the 
court-division (heyiting) or a grand collegial panel (shenpanweiyuanhui) set up at the 
court-level - depending on the nature of the case. A few cases can be handled according 
to a simplified procedure and are subject to the decision of a single judge instead of a 
panel.73   
 
A victorious plaintiff can go to the enforcement division of the first instance court to 
apply for enforcement if the defendant fails to perform his obligation voluntarily.74  The 
enforcement division will examine the application and decide whether the enforcement 
                                                 
69 Namely, whether the case is civil, criminal or commercial. The Organizational Law of People’s Courts 
(1979), Ch.2. 
70 Shouguang People's Court (Shandong Province), "'Dali'an' jizhi de yunxing moshi yu chengxiao [The 
Operational Model and Effect of the 'Grand Case-Registering' Mechanism]," Sifa shenpan dongtai yu 
yanjiu [Research on Judicial Development] 1, no. 1 (2001). pp.95-7. 
71 Jianxin Ren, "Anuual Report of the Supreme People's Court,"  (1998). 
72 Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report (1979-2004)]. 
p.189. 
73 Civil Procedural Law (1991). Ch. 12-13. 
74 Civil Procedural Law (1991). Art. 207. 
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will be carried out. Within two years after the court judgment has taken effect, if evidence 
of serious injustice can be provided, litigants are entitled to apply for zaishen, a 
re-examination and re-trial of a closed case at the adjudicative-supervisory division. The 
procedure can also be initiated by the court that had rendered the judgment, its superior 
court or the procuratorate.75   
 
Among the 350 judges included in the database, 304 were involved in corruption through 
exchange in the form of either specific monetary payment or unspecific reciprocity. 179 
judges were bribed for their favorable decisions in the adjudicative procedure; 91 were 
bribed for the same in the enforcement procedure and 7 in the case registration 
procedure.76 
 
2.5.2. Adjudication phase 
 
179 judges rendered perceptibly favorable court decisions to the favor-seeking parties in 
exchange for monetary bribes or other forms of favors. Usually, judges would render 
perceptibly favorable decisions to the party from whom they had taken or expected to 
take bribes, against the interest of the other party. However, a few especially “greedy” 
and manipulative judges77 managed to take bribes from both parties and yet made both 
believe that they had been treated favorably. The most infamous example is Meng Laigui, 
the then Chief of the Adjudicative-Supervisory Division of Shanxi High Court. Meng had 
conducted the so-called “eating from the defendant after having eaten from the plaintiff 
(chile yuangao chi beigao)” in 10 out of 21 cases, in which Meng had taken bribes.78  
Most of these cases underwent lengthy mediations presided over by Meng, who took 
advantage of asymmetric information of the litigants to play off the two sides and 
manipulate their expectations.79   
 
Among the 179 judges who were bribed in the adjudication phase, at least 57 took bribes 
in criminal cases, and 111 in civil cases.80  Among the 111 civil cases 95 were about 
contractual disputes and tort. Court insolvency cases, in particular, always seem to attract 
                                                 
75 Civil Procedural Law (1991). Art.177, 185. 
76 The remaining 27 judges conducted corrupt exchange in court administrative affairs, for example, taking 
bribes from subordinates in exchange for promotion or taking bribes from bidders in exchange for court 
procurement contracts. 
77 For example, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-01-20/180136143s.shtml and 
http://news.tom.com/Archive/1002/2003/7/17-35160.html. 
78 “Corrupt Judge Meng Laigui ‘Eating from Defendant After Having Eaten from Plaintiff’ (2007)”,  
http://news.163.com/07/0703/03/3IEPKLR200011229.html.  
79 For similar practice, see the case of Cheng Kunbo, the former court-president of Huanggang 
Intermediate Court. "Faguan de fubai tongmeng [Corrupt Coalition of Judges]," zhongguo xinwen zhoukan 
[China Newsweek], Apr. 19, 2004. 
80 In some cases, there was no information concerning the type of case in which bribery took place. In 
other cases, judges took bribes in multiple cases, civil and criminal, and hence are counted twice. 
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a high volume of bribes. Having just passed the Bankruptcy Law and obviously lacking 
experience of such cases, the SPC established a pilot program in the Shenzhen 
Intermediate Court and Tianjin High Court. Both courts wound up with high-profile 
corruption scandals. Some lawyers revealed that in these cases the court insolvency 
proceedings are opaque, which makes it difficult for creditors to supervise and allows 
great discretion to the court in choosing the members of the insolvency committee.81  In 
these scandals, where high volumes of assets are at stake, corrupt exchanges develop not 
only between judges and the creditors/debtors in exchange for a manipulated price of the 
auctioned items; but also between judges and professional service providers, such as 
auctioneers, asset-assessors and lawyers, in exchange for court commissions. The SPC 
was alerted by similar practices detected in many other courts.82    
 
No case reviewed in this research concerns administrative litigations. However, one case 
involving corruption in an administrative review procedure may be worth of mentioning. 
Lou Xiaoping, who served as the deputy director of the Justice Bureau of Hainan 
Province, was prosecuted for taking 400,000yuan from a farm manager who had applied 
for an administrative review of a decision made by Sanya City concerning the 
confiscation of his land. Consequently, Lou rendered a decision in the farm manager’s 
favor. When the bribery was detected six years later, Lou had already been appointed as 
the vice president of Hainan High Court. Lou was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
11 years for bribe taking and for illicit enrichment, namely, having a significant increase 
of his assets which he can not reasonably explain in relation to his lawful income.  
 
The low volume of administrative actions in China’s courts in general83  might be the 
direct explanation for the low incidence of administrative cases in the database. 
Nonetheless, Lou’s case is special because we would normally assume that biased 
decisions in administrative disputes would be rendered only in favor of governmental 
institutions. However, as Fu has shown, that there seems to be less corruption between 
plaintiffs and courts in administrative cases is more likely to be because most of the 
plaintiffs have no money or status.84  If the plaintiff has substantial resources, as the farm 
manager in Lou’s case, the decision may also be tilted in the plaintiff’s favor.  
                                                 
81 “Five Former-judges from Shenzhen Intermediate Court Suspected of Corruption, Three Sentenced 
(2007)”, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-03-24/093512601837.shtml and “Several Judges from Tianjin 
Courts Fall Due to Corruption (2008)”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2008-07/29/content_8834976.htm. 
82 The SPC referred to the practices as the “blowing wind of insolvency cases (guaqile pochanfeng)”. See 
"Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Strengthening the Adjudicative Ability and Raising 
the Standard of Adjudication (2005)," Note.13. 
83 Detailed statistics can be found in Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal 
Development Report (1979-2004)]. Ch.4. 
84 Hualing Fu, "Putting China's Judiciary into Perspective: Is It Independent, Competent, and Fair?," in 
Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law, ed. Erik G. Jense, Thomas C. 
Heller (2003). p.212. 
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2.5.3. Enforcement phase  
 
It is conspicuous that 79 judges had conducted corrupt exchange in the enforcement 
phase. A law graduate, after having worked as an intern in a local law firm for a year, 
said in an interview, “I thought the operation of the adjudication procedure was dark. But 
now I realize that the darkness only begins when it comes to judgment enforcement.”85 
 
In practice, both plaintiffs and defendants can bribe the enforcement personnel in order to 
either expedite or delay the procedure, depending on which party is making the request. 
To help the plaintiffs, exceptional measures can be employed to facilitate the enforcement, 
including advanced enforcement (xianyu zhixing),86  seizing assets that are located outside 
of one’s jurisdiction (yidi zhixing ),87  designating a specific court to enforce a particular 
case not necessarily within the court’s jurisdiction (zhiding zhixing) and requesting that a 
case be transferred from lower courts to a superior court for the purpose of enforcement 
(tiji zhixing).88  Some enforcement personnel, after taking bribes from the plaintiff, were 
also caught seizing assets from third parties unrelated to the litigation.89   
 
Other than accelerating the procedure, plaintiffs also bribe enforcement judges in order to 
prioritize their court award in litigation involving multiple creditors. For example, after 
taking 100,000 yuan a former judge from Hunan High Court satisfied a creditor’s court 
award by appropriating the amount from the defendant’s account that had been frozen in 
another pending case for the benefit of a different plaintiff.90  A lawyer expressed his 
                                                 
85 Interview L013.1. More complaints and remarks from lawyers about court malpractice in the 
enforcement procedure can be found at “Truth of zhixingnan” 
http://12203.1cnlaw.com/Essay_Topic.htm?fn=20080927091446; “Judges, why don’t you enforce the 
judgment when the defendant is solvent”; http://club.pchome.net/topic_1_15_1814718__.html; “Lawyer 
out of solutions”, http://www.acla.org.cn/forum/printthread.php?Board=fzsp&main=702008&type=post 
86 In one case, a well-connected plaintiff had her claimed assets seized and delivered even before the trial 
started through the xianyu zhixing (advanced enforcement ) procedure (xianyu zhixing). Court Judgment 
(2006) [Huaihua Intermediate Court No.52], Ruanling People’s Procuratorate vs. Tang Jikai 
87 In the so-called “Changhang incident” in Hubei province, several judges from Shiyan Intermediate 
Court once seized assets worth of millions from someone over whom the court had no jurisdiction and who 
had never been informed about let alone heard in the framed litigation. It was later found out that the judges 
had shares in the plaintiff’s pledging business. “A Fraud Case Led to Discovery of Greedy Judges", 
Worker's Daily Tianxun Online, 29 Nov. 2003. More such examples include Li Zhengda, former judge 
from Jilin High Court; Wu Chunfa, former judge from Guiyang Intermediate Court; and the group 
corruption case of judges from Wuhan intermediate court, including former deputy court president Ke 
Changxin.  
88 A more detailed local study about yidizhixing and tijizhixing written by a judge from Chongqing High 
Court is on file with the author.  
89 See the report " Anci District Court of Langfang City Illegal Enforcing Non-Litigant's Property " Legal 
Daily, Jan. 11, 2002; “Enforcement Staff Ignore Defendant's Property for Months but Freeze Property of 
Owners Not Related to the Litigation”, Guangming Daily, Nov. 25, 2005.  
90 Court Judgment (2005) [Hunan High Court final No.129] Loudi People’s Procuratorate vs. Wang Kuang 
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concern in an interview that a court award was unlikely to be realized automatically if the 
plaintiff does not provide a monetary incentive to the enforcement judges, especially 
when there are many creditors and much is at stake.91   
 
In some cases judges also accede to requests from losing defendants to stall the 
enforcement, temporarily or indefinitely. As a matter of common sense, requests from 
defendants for inaction or delayed action are much easier to satisfy than requests from 
plaintiffs for proactive enforcement, since the latter would naturally require more effort 
and more resources. Another approach to the stalling of enforcement is to start a zaishen 
case, the exceptional retrial procedure mentioned above. Under the Civil Procedure Law, 
once a zaishen application is granted, enforcement proceedings are suspended.92  A judge 
in Sichuan High Court was once paid 160,000yuan by a defendant for this “service”.93  
 
The enforcement procedure is likely to become precarious when both the plaintiff and the 
defendant seek to influence the judge. In a contractual dispute between two real estate 
developers in the capital city of Guangxi Province, the disputed apartment building was 
seized and re-seized several times, leaving the primary victims, the real estate buyers, 
totally unprotected.94   
 
That enforcement procedures are particularly fertile ground for corruption stems in part 
from litigants’ increasing willingness to pay as the fulfillment of their objectives draws 
closer. In addition, excuses for judges’ corrupt conduct are easy to find. For example, 
when stalling the enforcement procedure after bribes have been taken from defendants, 
judges can justify their inaction by resorting to subterfuges such as local protectionism, 
the lack of vehicles and human resources, the lack of cooperation from the defendants 
and the lack of authority.95  On the other hand, if “tough enforcement” is meted out, the 
                                                 
91 Interview L014.1.  
92 “Opinions on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law (1991)”, The Supreme People’s Court. Art. 
206. 
93 “Two Judges From Sichuan High Court and Chengdu Intermediate Court Were Sentenced for 
Bribe-taking (2005)”,  
http://www.justice.gov.cn/epublish/gb/paper147/5/class014700001/hwz672714.htm. 
94 “A Guangxi Court Released Seized Assets, Plaintiff Got Nothing in Eight Years after Winning the 
Litigation (2006)”,  http://news.sohu.com/20060802/n244576787.shtml. 
95 After taking money from a defendant, Ke Changxin, the former vice-president of Wuhan Intermediate 
Court, instructed to stall the enforcement of the defendant’s case. The plaintiff resorted to the 
court-president, who then pressed the vice-president to proceed the enforcement procedure. Ke instructed 
both the defendant and the enforcement personnel. On the day of enforcement when the court personnel 
arrived at the defendant’s residence, the defendant resisted the court order and threatened the enforcement 
personnel by slaughtering a live rooster in front of them and hanged it on his door. The enforcement 
personnel withdrew from the scene immediately. See “Jiekai wuhan zhongyuan de heixiazi [Uncover the 
‘Black Box’ of Wuhan Intermediate Court]”, Minzhu yu fazhi [Democracy and Rule by Law], Vol. 6, Issue 
1, 2004.  
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conduct can be described as a demonstration of the court’s endeavors to realize litigants’ 
rights and enhance its authority.96   
 
Court auction procedures, administered by enforcement divisions, are especially prone to 
corruption. In three cases involving three judges, who had taken 22 bribes in total during 
enforcement procedures, 11 bribes were from plaintiffs, 4 from defendants and 7 from 
auctioneers. In the database as a whole, 14 judges were punished for taking bribes either 
from auctioneers in exchange for the court commission or from buyers in exchange for a 
manipulated lower-than-market price of the auctioned item.   
 
2.5.4. Case registration phase  
 
This research uncovered only seven judges from case registration divisions (li’anting) 
who had engaged in corrupt exchange. Two were from intermediate courts and five from 
high courts. The seemingly low corruption rate in this court division, especially in the 
lower courts, is not surprising. With litigation fees constituting a major portion of the 
income for many lower-level courts, charging litigants an additional “entry fee” on top of 
the litigation fee would risk deterring litigants from going to court all together, resulting 
in a loss of litigation fees for the court and consequently corruption opportunities for 
judges in other court divisions. To ensure that courts are the ultimate dispute-resolution 
institution, the Civil Procedure Law also clearly provides that “a court must accept a case 
if the plaintiff has indicated a specific defendant, the dispute and his claims”97  and appeal 
is provided as a “right” of litigants.98  Both leave comparatively little discretion to judges 
for manipulation, especially in the case of an application to appeal.  
 
No litigant in the investigated cases was found paying monetary bribes to judges in order 
to obtain an appeal. In contrast, acceptance into the zaishen procedure is notoriously 
troublesome and is more likely to involve monetary bribes. 99  Since zaishen is an 
exceptional procedure, its acceptance is strictly controlled, to ensure the authority, 
effectiveness and predictability of court judgments. This creates a large gap between the 
demand for zaishen from litigants and the supply of this procedure by the courts. At the 
same time the screening criteria for acceptance are vague and leave substantial room for 
                                                 
96 The aforementioned former enforcement judge Li Zhenda from Jilin High Court was even awarded a 
medal for his “contribution” to the court. These reasons were also mentioned in an interview with a judge 
and two other interviews with lawyers. 
97 Civil Procedure Law (1991) Art.108. 
98 Civil Procedure Law (1991) Art.147. 
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manipulation.100  Within the data sample, five judges responsible for reviewing zaishen 
cases were found to have taken bribes. Two of them reportedly boasted in identical terms 
to the bribing litigants, saying “Your case had reached its last stop here in my 
division”.101    
 
It should be noted that first-instance case registration is not trouble-free for litigants and 
lawyers. Although it is not a procedural phase characterized by serious bribery, 
complaints abound as to the phenomena “difficult [surly] court personnel; difficult to 
obtain entry into the court system; and difficult to get things done in the courts” 
(liannankan, mennanjin, shinanban),102  which have been repeatedly denounced by the 
SPC.103  Typical behaviors include the arbitrary refusal to permit the filing of a case. A 
young lawyer once had the registration of an action rejected because, according to the 
chief of the registration division, “the length of the contract was too short”.104  Several 
complaints of this kind were posted online against the Chaoyang District Court of Beijing. 
On one occasion, as revealed by lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan in his blog, the court rejected a 
medical negligence case because the lawyer did not provide the proof of cremation of the 
deceased in addition to the death certificate. In another case involving a contractual 
dispute, lawyer Liu, after having provided the detailed postal address of the defendant, 
was told that the case could not be registered if he could not provide a special geographic 
code for that address, which is only commonly known to the police.105  In an extreme case, 
                                                 
100 Because of the abundant judicial problems emerged in the procedure, the Civil Procedure Law was 
amended  in 2008, aiming to improve the transparency and efficiency of the examining procedure over 
zaishen application. See “New Civil Procedure Law:  Examination of Zaishen Application Better 
regulated, More Transparent and More Efficient”, People’s Courts Daily, Apr. 12, 2008. For further study 
on the zaishen procedure, see Yulin Fu, "Minshi shenpan jiandu zhidu de shizhengxing fenxi [An Empirical 
Analysis of the Supervisory System of the Adjudicative Process in Civil Litigations]," in Falü Chengxu 
Yunzuo De Shizheng Fenxi [A Positive Analysis to Practice of Legal Procedures] (Beijing: Law Press 
China, 2005).  
101 See supra note 41 on the case of Meng Laigui. See also 
http://www.chinavalue.net/Media/Article.aspx?ArticleId=9149&PageId=1.  
102 A couple of examples can be found at http://www.xici.net/b641398/d39976989.htm and 
http://chinahunyin.com/list.asp?unid=482.  
103 For details, see reports on the SPC’s Guifan sifa xingwei zhuanxiang zhenggai huodong [special 
rectification compaign on regulating judicial behaviours].  
104 Interview L013.1. Similar complaints from lawyers can be found at “Descriptions and explanations of 
li’an nan”, http://www.9ask.cn/blog/user/fyhaolvshi/archives/2008/41476.html and “Lazy Beijing judges”, 
http://www.acla.org.cn/forum/printthread.php?Board=44&main=682368&type=post.  For a summary of 
the problem of “li’annan”, see the interview with Professor Xu Xin in China Adjudication Magazine: 
"Jiejue "liánnan" yao lizu zhongguo guoqing [To Resolve the Problem of Difficulty in Case-Registration 
One Needs to Consider the Current Situation of the Country]," zhongguo shenpan [China Adjudication] 
2007. An electronic copy can be found in the interviewee’s blog: 
http://www.fatianxia.com/blog_list.asp?id=8057.  
105 See the blog of Liu Xiaoyuan lawyer: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49daf0ea010005iw.html. Similar 
complaints about mis-handling of case registration applications by the same court can be found in 
“Resolving the impasse of li’annan” http://club.news.sohu.com/r-fazhi-78818-0-0-10.html.  
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a lawyer was even assaulted by a judge in Tianjin Nankai District Court, when the lawyer 
tried to challenge an unjustified rejection.106 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that the rejections are hardly ever made in written form,107 
making it difficult for litigants or lawyers successfully to challenge such rejections. 
According to a report in the Legal Daily, one lawyer was left with no option but to appear 
in court accompanied by a notary officer to witness the rejection so as to secure evidence, 
an innovative as well as desperate measure.108   
 
On the other hand, some court users report that if the litigant or lawyer has the right 
connections or “guanxi” in courts, the registration procedure can be surprisingly smooth 
and efficient. A lawyer proudly revealed in his blog that with the help of his “judge 
mates” (faguan xiongdi) he had once completed all court procedures and had a 
defendant’s bank account frozen in less than two hours from the moment he began to 
draft the plaintiff’s statement of case.109  In another instance, Zhan Xiaoyong, the son of a 
former court president of the Hunan High Court, once successfully completed the 
notoriously difficult zaishen acceptance procedure on the same day, just a few hours after 
the announcement of the verdict of the appeal.110     
 
2.6. General findings and interpretation 
 
The first general finding of this chapter is the striking dominance of Type C corrupt 
conduct, corruption through exchange without any direct physical impact on the victim. 
Among the total of 389 corrupt acts (some judges were detected and punished for, for 
example, both embezzlement and bribe-taking) committed by the 350 judges, 303 acts, 
                                                 
106 The report on this incident stated that when the administrative court division of Tianjin Nankai Court 
rejected a class-action law suit, the lawyer representing the plaintiffs attempted to challenge the court’s 
rejection by asking for an explanation, and refused to leave the court. During the argument, the then chief 
of the administrative court division came to the scene and tried to strangle the lawyer with his hands. This 
notorious incident was widely disseminated because the judge shouted at the lawyer and litigants that “wo 
jiushi fayuan; fayuan jiushi wo [I am the court and the court is me].” For details, see “Tianjin Judge 
Assaulted Lawyer: Investigation Team Suggested Removing the Judge from Court Leadership (2006)," 
Huaxia Shibao [Huaxia Times]. 
107 There are also many complaints from lawyers and litigants that court clerks took evidence from them 
without issuing any acknowledgement about whether, when and what has been submitted by litigants or 
their representatives and received by courts. This practice makes it difficult to hold courts responsible when 
files are found to be missing. For details, search “fayuan bu gei shouju (no acknowledgement of receipt of 
evidence by courts)” at www.baidu.com.  
108 “First Public Notary Case of Securing Evidence for the Act of Registering a Case in Court (2007)”, 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0705/2007-08/12/content_678775.htm. 
109 The webpage of this story has been removed from the website but is on file with the author. 
110 The information was disclosed as a piece of “side-information” in the defendant’s statement of Ao 
Wanquan, a former judge and deputy chief of the economic-case court-division in Hunan High Court, who 
was later prosecuted for bribe-taking.  
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that is 78% of all, belong to Type C, corrupt exchange. This result is to be expected 
because Types A and B normally leave traces of evidence of corruption, such as missing 
assets or a direct victim, which makes the conduct riskier and its practitioner more 
vulnerable to exposure. Bribery and favoritism are instead based on a voluntary 
agreement between the exchange parties either in terms of a monetary transaction or an 
unspecified reciprocation, from which both parties benefit. This creates a sense of 
equilibrium, which sustains secrecy and makes the corrupt conduct more difficult to 
detect. Indeed, this form of corruption is widespread not just in the courts but in Chinese 
public institutions in general, as illustrated in Guo’s recent work.111 
 
This dataset also suggests that judges from intermediate and high courts appear to be 
more likely to engage in Type C corruption than in Types A and B. In fact, no judge 
serving in high courts or above in this database was involved in corruption described in 
Type A. Physical violence is rare, and found mainly in basic courts, suggesting that upper 
courts judges have a higher sense of professionalism and a self-identity that inhibits such 
behavior. Higher court judges also appear to be less likely than lower court judges to 
engage in theft or misappropriation of funds. Judges from higher courts represent 8% of 
such Type B cases in the dataset, while intermediate court judges account for 33%.  
 
In contrast, for Type C, exchange-based corruption, high-court and intermediate-court 
judges accounted for 17% and 47% respectively. However, this finding does not 
necessarily suggest that fewer cases of corrupt exchange occur in lower courts than in 
higher courts. It is more likely that punishable corrupt-exchange activities in higher-level 
courts are more visible than those committed by judges in lower courts. Greater sums or 
promises of reciprocal favors are likely to be required in order to influence judges in 
higher courts (overseeing higher stakes cases). This in turn makes these cases more 
visible: the media and the relevant judicial disciplinary committee are generally more 
likely to focus on cases in which judges accept large bribes from litigants or their lawyers 
in major cities, rather than on cases where litigants try to influence judges in remote 






                                                 
111 Guo, "Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis." 
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The second and related finding is that very few high-court judges in the cases digested in 
this research committed the crime of rendering a court decision in violation of the 
prescription of law (wangfacaipanzui). In other words, few high-court judges were 
engaged in corrupt activities which resulted in overt miscarriages of law, such as 
rendering favorable decisions for litigants by forging court documents or instructing 
litigants to forge evidence or commit perjury. Among the 79 corrupt exchanges 
committed by basic court judges, the ratio between corrupt exchange with and without 
resulting in overt miscarriage of law is 1:1.5. In contrast, the ratio drops to 1:11 and 1:48 
in intermediate courts and high courts respectively. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon could be that the complexity of cases presented in higher courts leaves more 
room for manipulation of discretion. Another possible explanation is that higher court 
judges are generally better educated and experienced in interpreting the law, and hence 
more capable of exploiting the law for corrupt purposes. 
 
On the other hand, “collective corruption” cases (chuan’an yao’an) are more often found 
in higher courts, such as the corruption scandals in the provincial high courts of Jilin, 
Hunan, Liaoning, Tianjin and intermediate courts of major cities, including Changsha, 
Wuhan, Shenyang and Shenzhen. These scandals are characterized by collusive and 
sometimes organized corrupt conduct of judges from different court divisions and from 
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courts at different levels, who shared “clients” and the resulting corrupt benefits.112  In 
some of these courts, corruption was so deep-rooted that corruption scandals continued to 
resurface even after the courts had gone through anti-corruption purges and the corrupt 
judges had allegedly been removed and replaced.113  
 
Figure 2.3 
Numbers of Corruption Cases of Different 







High Court Intermediate Court Basic Court
With overt miscarriage of law Overt miscarriage of law not observed
 
 
The third general finding is that the occurrence of bribery relating to court-management 
affairs is closely correlated to the position of the offender. 15 judges took kickbacks from 
contractors in court construction projects; of these, 13 were court presidents at different 
levels. 12 judges, all of whom were court presidents, including four from high-courts, 
took bribes from their subordinates for court appointment and promotion.114  This finding 
is not surprising given that the decision-making power over court finances and personnel 
management is concentrated exclusively in the hands of top court leaders. This finding 
reinforces the conclusion of Ren and Du’s work, namely that “first-in-command” 
                                                 
112 For example, in the Changsha scandal, corrupt cooperation was found among judges from Hunan High 
Court and Changsha Intermediate Court. In the Wuhan scandal, cooperation existed among judges between 
Wuhan Intermediate Court and Shiyan Intermediate Court. The recent investigation against Huang 
Songyou, the former vice-president of the SPC, also indicates that there was cooperation between the SPC 
and the Guangdong High Court. 
113 Such incidences have been found in the following courts: Fuyang Intermediate Court, Wuhan 
Intermediate Court, Shenzhen Intermediate Court and Jilin High Court. 
114 The four courts are Liaoning, Hunan, Heilongjiang and Guangdong High Courts. 
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officials in other public institutions are highly susceptible to corruption as a result of the 
concentration of power.115 Meanwhile, as the data discussed in this chapter show, the 
distribution of corruption in litigation-related affairs, although still dominated by 
functional leaders (161 out of 273 are judges above the rank of deputy division chief), is 
more dispersed among all judges. Indeed, within the dataset 126 judges without any 
leadership function were found conducting exchanges with litigants or lawyers while 
performing either adjudicative or enforcement functions.  
 
The fourth general finding is that, at least on the basis of the datasets reviewed for this 
chapter, the number of detected cases of corruption committed in the litigation process, 
including the adjudication and enforcement phases, has increased steadily in recent years 
compared to cases of corruption conducted in other court-management-related areas. 
Notably, since 2005 the number of corruption cases detected in the enforcement divisions 
has equalled that found in the adjudicative divisions. It suggests that corruption in the 
litigation process, especially in the enforcement phase, is becoming at the very least more 
visible in media reports. Data collection methods will need to be improved in order to 
determine whether this also indicates an increase of the actual occurrence of corruption 
incidents in these procedural phases and court divisions.  
 
Nonetheless, this trend would seem to coincide with the implementation of a series of 
SPC instructions aiming at strengthening the capacity of the enforcement divisions in 
higher courts.116  The most important of these instructions was the decision taken in 2000 
to establish enforcement bureaus.117  This decision in fact raised the administrative rank 
of the enforcement divisions and of their top administrative leaders, thereby turning the 
enforcement divisions into the most powerful divisions in the courts.118  In contrast, the 
less powerful case registration divisions attract only petty forms of corrupt-exchange, 
which is mainly achieved through “work-to-rule” practices, discharging the minimum 
amount of work possible and following the rules to the letter so as to impede progress 
rather than achieving the aim of the rules. The only exception to this pattern is the zaishen 
procedure, in which the acceptance of a case has an immediate benefit and value to 
applicants and hence is able to attract and justify the more “serious” bribes.  
 
                                                 
115 Jianming Ren, Zhizhou Du, "Institutionalized Corruption: Power Overconcentration of the 
First-in-Command in China," Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2008). 
116 "Announcement of the Supreme People's Court Concerning Issues Related to the Reform of 
Enforcement Divisions of People's Courts (2000)", SPC.  
117 Since the reform, the administrative rank of the chief of the enforcement court-division has been a 
half-rank higher than those of other court-divisions. "Announcement of the Supreme People's Court 
Concerning Issues Related to the Reform of Enforcement Divisions of People's Courts ",  (2000).  
118 Interview Z019.   
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Figure 2.4 




































The last general finding is that although corrupt exchange can occur in either civil or 
criminal litigation, civil and particularly commercial litigation dominates. Among the 
cases studied, the number of corrupt-exchange activities detected in the adjudicative 
phase in civil litigation doubles that found in criminal litigation. Taking account that the 
average first-instance case-intake ratio between civil and criminal litigations in China is 
about 7.5:1,119 the amount of corrupt activities taken place in criminal litigations, as 
suggested in this dataset, is much higher than what should be expected. Since the method 
for data-collection in this research is not ideal, here one can only speculate the causes to 
this result. A possible explanation is that in criminal cases the defendants are more 
willing to bribe because of the high stake involved. It could also be explained as that 
requests from bribers in criminal cases are easier to be granted because the resistance 
from the antagonists in criminal cases is weaker than that in civil cases. After all, in civil 
cases what is requested by one party has to come from the other party; however in 
criminal cases if a judge grants a bribing defendant, for example, a shorter term of 
                                                 
119 Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report (1979-2004)]. 
p.207. 
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imprisonment, protest would be much weaker either from the victims120  or the public 
prosecutors.121  The data also shows that more corruption was detected in commercial 
litigation (95 cases) than in non-commercial civil cases most probably because 
commercial litigation involves in much greater material interests, which more readily 
justify and better accommodate the costs of more “expensive” bribes as well as the higher 
transactional costs associated with illegal transactions.  
 
As demonstrated above, corruption, by definition, shadows power. This is also 
demonstrated by the absence of corruption cases in courts involving the enforcement of 
judgments in criminal cases, over which courts do not enjoy the full competence. In such 
cases, whether a person is jailed, for how long or whether she/he has her/his property 
taken away may well be tainted by corrupt decision-making by individuals from other 
law-enforcement institutions rather than the courts. In fact, as emerged in some of the 
investigated cases, resourceful defendants and their families may seek out opportunities 
for favored treatment through bribing prison-administrators, which is akin to litigants in 
civil and commercial litigation bribing judges in courts. Such practices range from 
obtaining practical privileges in prison122  to more substantive preferential treatment, such 
as grant of probation, bail on medical leave and sentence reduction.123  In some prisons, 
the “cost” of a bribe is clearly correlated to the amount of the reduction of sentence.124 
                                                 
120 According to Huang’s conversation with a basic court judge, what crime victims care most is the civil 
compensation. Criminal punishment is and should not be their [the victims’] concern, said the judge. 
Jialiang Huang, "Falü zai jiceng gayuan zhong de shijian luoji [Logic of Law in Operation in Lower Courts 
in China]," in Beida Qinghua Renda Shehuixue Shuoshi Lunwen Xuanbian [Selected Theses for 
Master-Degree in Sociology from Peking University, Qsinghua University and Renmin University] ed. 
Yefu Zheng, et.al. (Jinan: Shandong Renmin, 2006). pp.28-29. 
121 To judge from the annual working reports of the Supreme Procuratorate, the performance of public 
prosecutors is evaluated mainly by the number of prosecutions and convictions. 
122 See the report on Ma Jianguo, the convicted former governor of Jinniu District, Chengdu City. While 
serving his sentence in a local prison, he kept several prison administrators on his payroll. In return, Ma 
enjoyed the freedom of wearing his own clothes, having meals brought in, using his mobile phones to run 
his company businesses, and even attending banquets held for him in the city. 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-09-08/072010953673.shtml. Another example concerns the convicted 
local gang leader Liu Wenyi, who was granted a reduction of sentence and released on the ground of 
“significant technology contribution” to the prison. It was later found out that the so-called “contribution” 
was his purchase of a heating boiler for the prison. In addition to the boiler, Liu also “contributed” money 
to the deputy director of the prison and other prison administrators. See 
http://www.china.com.cn/law/txt/2007-11/08/content_9196874.htm.  
123 The shrewd businessman Zhou Zhengyi, who was directly linked to the fallen Shanghai Mayor Cheng 
Liangyu, bribed four prison administrators in order to obtain a sentence reduction. The effort only failed 
because of the high-profile nature and political sensitivity of his case in relation to the former mayor. See 
http://www.why.com.cn/epublish/node4/node12488/node12489/userobject7ai99708.html.  For a review of 
these and similar malpractices, see Shixing Jiang, "Jianyu ganjing zhiwu fanzui yufang duice [Prevention 
and Counter-Measures against Professional Crimes Committed by Prison Cadre-Officers]," in Zhongguo 
Zhiwu Fanzui Yufang Diaocha Baogao [Investigative Report on Professional Crimes and Its Prevention of 
China], ed. Criminology Research Society of China (2004).  pp. 381-2.  
124 A report revealed that the price of a one-year sentence reduction in the Dalian prisons was known to be 
12,000yuan. Jiaxun Lü, Hu Qishu, "Dui Liaoning Dalianshi sifa jiguan gongzuo renyuan zhiwu fanzui 
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The change of habitat of corruption is because the enforcement of criminal judgments 
involving the punishment of imprisonment is administered by the Ministry of Justice and 
its branches rather than courts. 125  Courts retain, however, the discretion to grant 
probation, enforcement without imprisonment and to render pecuniary penalties,126  a 
field which in practice is far from corruption-free.127  Customary practices had been found 
in some courts, where a fixed amount observation fee for a sentence suspension 
(huanxingkaochafei) is collected semi-officially from criminal defendants and the profits 




Based on the data analyzed in this research, corruption has been found flourishing in the 
central court divisions, at almost all levels of the judicial system, involving all types of 
judges, regardless of whether the litigation was civil or criminal. Distinctions remain in 
terms of the prevalence of corruption of different types. By classifying corruption in 
China’s courts into three types, this chapter attempts to demonstrate that each type 
exhibits different features depending on their particular context in courts at different 
levels and in different court divisions. On the basis of the data collected, extreme cases 
involving physical coercion and overt miscarriage of law appear mostly and in a mostly 
highly visible manner in courts at the lowest level. More “subtle” forms of corruption 
seem more conspicuous in higher courts. Among court-divisions, corruption is distributed 
unequally as well. According to the cases studied, corrupt-exchange activities are mostly 
concentrated in the adjudicative divisions of the courts. However, corruption has also 
grown rapidly in the enforcement divisions, making the enforcement and adjudicative 
divisions almost indistinguishable in terms of the salience of corruption. By contrast, due 
to their structural constraints, case registration divisions appear to be less prone to corrupt 
practices.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
qingkuang diaocha ji yufang [Investigation and Prevention of Professional Crimes Committed by Personnel 
in the Justice System in Dalian City, Liaoning Province]," in Zhongguo zhiwu fanzui yufang diaocha 
baogao [Investigative Report on Professional Crimes and Its Prevention of China], ed. Criminology 
Research Society of China (2004).  p.353. 
125 Law of Prisons of the People’s Republic of China (1994). Art.10  
126 Criminal Law (1997) Ch. 3 and Ch. 4. 
127 Liu Yaming, "Zhiwu fanzui anjian shiyong huanxing qingkuang diaocha fenxi [An Investigation and 
Analysis of the Use of Suspended Sentence in White-Collar Crimes]," Network of prevention of 
white-collar crime  (2004). http://www.yfw.com.cn/shownews.asp?id=36265.  
128 “Rendering suspended sentences after taking money from defendants is illicit adjudication (2007)”, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/pl/2007-03-26/154612617436.shtml. In most cases investigated for this research 
no distinction was made between reducing a substantive sentence and granting probation or enforcement 
without imprisonment. But in at least two cases judges were charged for taking bribes from relatives of the 
defendants for granting enforcement without imprisonment. See also see Yaxin Wang, "'Sifafubai' 
xianxiang ce yizhong jiedu [An Interpretation of 'Judicial Corruption']," Sixiang zhanxian 31, no. 4 (2005)  
p.50. fn.2  
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This chapter also shows that judges heading various administrative court divisions and 
sub-divisions constitute a major group of corruption offenders in the dataset employed. 
Possessing multiple functional powers, judges in this group are able to conduct corruption 
through exchange in various types of court affairs, ranging from the rendering of biased 
decisions in litigation, the granting of court commissions, the assignment of court 
procurement contracts, to the appointment and promotion of judges. That bribery has 
played a role in the appointment and promotion of judges, especially in four high-courts, 
is a matter for concern. It is not difficult to imagine the effect on litigation in these courts 
under a leadership which was inclined to retain judicial posts for sale. This phenomenon 
suggests that at least in some courts corruption is not just an isolated event but has instead 
become part of an organizational culture. This is further confirmed by outbreaks of 
corruption recurring in certain courts which had ostensibly already been “purged” of 
corrupt judges. The following chapters will provide more in-depth studies of corrupt 
behavior in China’s courts, especially of corrupt exchange, the most vigorous and 


































Chapter 3 Corruption as a contracting process – The 
general analytical framework 
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3.1. Introduction 
  
In the limited volume of previous studies on corruption in China’s courts, Keyuan Zou 
attributed the problem non-discriminatively to virtually all known court deficiencies.129  
Ting Gong firstly made a distinction between “political corruption” in courts, referring 
judges rendering partial judgments under political pressure, and “personal corruption”, 
referring to corrupt conduct on judges’ own initiatives. Gong then attributed the “political 
corruption” to the lack of judicial independency and the “personal corruption” to the lack 
of accountability of judges.130 Xin He, however, argued that judicial independency would 
not reduce corruption in China’s courts since there was no reasons to believe that judges 
could be better trusted than other Chinese officials in exercising their public power 
honestly. Instead, He postulated that insufficient court funding was the main cause.131 
Based on personal court experience, Nanping Liu insisted that it is poor reasoning in 
court rulings that has led to the overspreading corrupt practices in courts.132   
 
All the factors identified in the afore-mentioned studies have indeed represented certain 
elements of the environment in which corruption is conducted. However, their association 
with the environment in which corruption takes place does not necessarily mean they are 
the causes of corruption. In order to articulate the linkage between these factors and 
corruption in China’s courts, one has to probe into the corrupt conduct itself, an important 
step that is missing in the current studies. This is exactly the primary task of this thesis, 
which is to investigate how corruption participants carry out corrupt conduct in the 
litigating process in courts and what factors in particular are attributable to their 
completion and success.   
 
In order to gain the full picture of how corruption is conducted, this thesis needs an 
analytical framework, which provides the basic understanding of the corrupt conduct and 
can be used as an instrument to organize and analyze data. Next in the introduction of this 
chapter, I will provide a brief picture of the analytical framework developed and applied 
in the thesis. Then in the main body of this chapter I will elaborate about the main 
contents of the framework, how it is applied in this research and the general findings. In 
the conclusion the implications from the general findings will be mentioned.  
 
Inspired by Lambsdorff’s pioneer work, which examines the transactional costs of 
corruption as illegal transaction, this thesis developed a self-contained analytical 
                                                 
129 Zou, "Judicial Reform Versus Judicial Corruption: Recent Developments in China."  
130 Gong, "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China." 
131 He, "Zhongguo Fayuan De Caizheng Buzu Yu Sifa Fubai [Lack of Financial Funding and Judicial 
Corruption in China's Courts]." 
132 Nanping Liu, "Trick or Treat: Legal Reasoning in the Shadow of Corruption in Prc," North Carolina 
journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 34 (2008). 
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framework based on the conceptual idea of treating corruption as a contracting process. 
By analyzing the empirical data collected in this research, this thesis identifies four 
sequential phases of the contracting process, namely, initiation of the exchange, 
negotiation of the exchange, contractual performance of the exchange and enforcement of 
the exchange in case of non-compliance. The immediate benefit of this analytical 
framework is that it will be able to break up the complicated phenomenon of corruption 
into several distinguishable but chronologically connected fractions. Such a treatment 
will divide the corrupt conduct into several static frames, of which in-depth examination 
can be performed. Meanwhile this analytical framework will also be able to restore the 
dynamics of corruption, which is consisted of a series of inter-related actions. In other 
words, this analytical framework has the potential to permit a precise diagnosis of what 
have caused the corrupt conduct in China’s courts but also an illustration on whether and 











Chart 3.1. Corruption as a contracting process 
 
It is necessary to point out that the four phases taken together represent an “ideal” picture, 
a model of the contracting process. In reality some of the sequences may be carried out 
simultaneously and some, for example, the enforcement phase, may not take place at all. 
Nevertheless, each of the four phases has distinct and independent functions. By 
employing this analytical framework, this chapter will answer the following questions. 
Firstly, how are corrupt deals made in the litigating process from the perspective of 
corruption participants? Secondly, according to the corrupt conduct observed in each 
phase, which phases are most decisive to the successful completion of the contracting 
process and what factors are most decisive to the successful completion of such phases? 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this chapter focuses on bribery, which, for the sake of 
simplicity, is used interchangeable to “corrupt exchange” and “corruption”. Bribe is 
defined as a tangible or intangible inducement, offered or given to a person of entrusted 
power in order to influence this person’s decision in the process of exercising his power 
for the interests of the provider of the inducement. 
 
Empirical data used in this paper consist of firstly focused interviews of legal 
practitioners, particularly lawyers, during 2005-2009. The second source of data is 288 
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publicly reported bribery cases taken place in China’s courts. Information concerning 
these 288 cases comes from media reports of court-trials or press releases from courts or 
related investigated bodies, principally the procuratorates or the discipline inspection 
commissions of the local Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter the CCP).133  21 of these 
cases are supported by court files, such as court judgments and statements by prosecutors 
or defendants. Collected between 2005 and 2008, the 288 cases correspond to a total 
number of 273 individual judges and 15 court officials without judicial functions, 
including 3 court clerks, 1 court accountants and 11 court bailiffs. In each of these cases, 
corrupt conduct had been detected and punished in accordance with the CCP 
anti-corruption disciplinary regulation or the Chinese criminal code. For all the cases, the 
author assumed that due investigative procedure had been observed in the investigation 
and prosecution unless there is information indicating the opposite.134  The empirical data 
also include, with no less significance, numerous online diaries and essays concerning 
malpractices in China’s courts, of which only factual accounts are extracted and 
employed in the analysis of this chapter. It is important to note that what is presented in 
this chapter shall, by no means, be understood as a general picture of all litigation in 
China’s courts. Corruption may not take place at all and for many reasons. However, this 
paper concentrates on what happens when it does take place. 
The rest of the paper is structured in four parts corresponding to the four phases of the 
contracting process as mentioned earlier, i.e. initiation, negotiation, contractual 
performance and enforcement in case of non-compliance. 
 
3.2. Phase One - initiation 
 
Initiation in corrupt exchange refers to the stage where one party exhibits and 
communicates his intent to corrupt exchange to the other potential exchange party. Such 
an opening is a prerequisite for any exchange to take place. However, in corrupt 
exchange, constrained by the illegality of corruption, neither the briber nor the bribed can 
exhibit their intent to exchange by openly advertising their businesses. Any direct enquiry 
would also be risky since potential counterparts may not be inclined to corruption and 
even prefer denouncing the request.135  Therefore, to convey one’s corrupt intent to the 
other party without incriminating oneself becomes the first task of corruption 
participants.  
                                                 
133 These sources include the legal sections of Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), 
Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu 
yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an 
internet-based magazine run by the Supreme Procuratorate. They also include the legal channels of two 
major internet news websites in China: www.sina.com and www.xinhuanet.com. 
134 The author discovered and discarded one case, in which a convicted judge claimed through his family 
member on internet that he had been tortured during the investigation. There is no official response to this 
claim from the court or the procuratorate concerned. 
135 Lambsdorff, "Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law." p.223. 
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Based on the cases digested, this research found that corrupt judges are less keen in 
taking the initiative in the initiation phase. In only 12 of the 288 cases was it the judge 
who initiated the corrupt exchange by soliciting bribes from litigants or lawyers. All 12 of 
these judges served in the lowest first-instance court, also called basic courts (jiceng 
fayuan), four in urban areas and eight in rural areas. In these cases, corrupt judges 
promised to perform certain court services for litigants or lawyers as an item for sale. For 
example, Zhang Qijiang, a former judge in a urban basic court in Henan Province, 
promised to render a litigant a favorable judgment on two conditions. The first is that the 
litigant pays 10,000 yuan to hire a lawyer. As to the second condition, the judge said: 
“Nowadays it would normally cost an ‘operational expense (huodong jingfei)’ of 
50,000-80,000yuan to deal with a claim beyond a million yuan, such as yours. Since we 
used to be colleagues, I will give you a discount and only take 50,000yuan.”136   
 
However, implicit solicitation from judges is much more common. Implicit solicitation 
means that instead of explicating the demand for a bribe, a judge takes certain actions to 
compel the court-user to take the initiative and offer the judge a bribe. In such 
circumstance, it is difficult to tell whether it is the judge or the court-user who had taken 
the initiative.137  According to the data collected, the most common approach of implicit 
solicitation is to deliberately slow down the work-pace. A lawyer said: “A judge can slow 
down the litigating process at any stage of the litigation and hence provoke you to open 
your mouth and offer to bribe”.138  Indeed “tuo (to delay acting)”, together with “na 
(grabbing)”, “ka (obstructing)” and “yao (demanding)”, are the four types of commonly 
recognized corrupt behavior of court staff as well as of personnel working in many other 
public institutions.139  This practice is frequently seen, for instance, in the procedure for 
the enforcement of judgments administered by courts, in which delayed action or inaction 
has almost become the normal practice.140   
 
According to the data studied, another common approach of implicit solicitation is to 
emphasize one’s discretional adjudicative power to bring damages to the potential 
                                                 
136 "'Jietiaoan' Zhong De Faguan [the Judge in the 'Iou Case']," China Youth Daily, 21 September 2005. 
Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-09/21/content_3519571.htm  
137 This pattern of the frequent appearance of implicit solicitation is also identified in Fuliang Zhan, Tanwu 
Huilu Fanzui Jiqi Zhencha Shiwu [Crime of Embezzlement, Bribery and Practical Issues Involved] (Beijing: 
Renmin, 2006). p.207. 
138 "Investigating the 'Corruption Collusion' in the Shenzhen Intermediate Court," Phoenix Weekly 33, no. 
238 (2006). 
139 Yuanqiong He, "Zhanzai Tianping De Liangduan - Sifa Fubai De Boyi Fenxi [Standing on Both Ends 
of the Scale - an Analysis of Judicial Corruption from the Perspective of Game Theory]," zhongwai Faxüe 
19, no. 5 (2007). p.572. Liu, "Trick or Treat: Legal Reasoning in the Shadow of Corruption in Prc." p.191.  
140 For more detailed description of such practices, see Ling Li, "Corruption in China's Courts," in Judicial 
Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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exchange party.141  During a visit at a judge’s office in an urban basic court, a law-firm 
intern witnessed the following scene. Upon a lawyer’s request for an update of a case he 
represented, a female judge told the lawyer that she could apply either of two particular 
regulations and accordingly decide the case in favor of or against the interest of the 
lawyer’s client. The lawyer immediately took out 500yuan from his wallet and put the 
cash into the judge’s handbag lying on her desk.142   
 
Nonetheless, in more cases it is the court-user, who takes the initiative to communicate 
the corrupt intent with judges by providing the latter private inducement. In these cases, 
the court-user has acquainted with the judge through previous encounters or through an 
introduction from an intermediary. Corrupt exchange taking place in this manner is 
usually referred to as “guanxi-practice” and officially recognized as “guanxi-case” and 
“favor-case” by the SPC.143  In this type of cases, the judge takes a rather passive role, 
who refrains himself from taking the initiative but only decides whether or not to endorse 
the initiative of the briber. In these cases, bribers move first by offering banquets, 
entertainments or other forms of gratuities, during which a certain level of mutual 
understanding of the exchange is expected to establish between the briber and the 
to-be-bribed. In the process, the briber takes a rather proactive role in making 
appointment to meet the judge privately, offering gifts, closing the psychological distance 
and consolidating the trust,144  which sets the ground for the next phase of the contracting 
process, namely, the negotiation of exchange terms. Such practices are evidently more 
salient in cases involving judges of higher ranks and from higher courts. According to the 
cases studied in this research, high-profile corruption committed by high-ranking judges 
had always been conducted with caution. Their bribers were either close friends or people 
introduced by close friends or family members.145   
 
Compared with the high-group judges, the main explanation to the eagerness of the 
low-group judges in engaging in the corrupt exchange is their structural lack of corrupt 
opportunities. Courts at the lowest level, especially those in rural areas are generally 
suffering from insufficient caseload and accordingly enjoy less corrupt opportunities. The 
average number of first-instance case-intake in the people’s tribunal is 86 cases/per 
tribunal; while the average intake of only first-instance cases in the rest of the courts (incl. 
basic courts and above) is 946 cases/per court plus the average of 1,353 appeals and 
                                                 
141 Interview C011. 
142 Interview Y017. 
143 See the annual working report of the SPC in 1994 and onwards. 
144 Interview T028. 
145 For example, see the scandal of Shenzhen High Court in 2007, the scandal of Tianjin High Court 
involving three judges in 2008, the scandal of Jilin High Court in 2007, the scandal of Hunan High Court in 
2005 and the most recent case of Huang Songyou, former vice-president of the SPC. 
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retrial cases in the appeal courts (intermediate courts and above).146  Within a court, 
judges of lower-ranks enjoy less judicial discretion and hence less corrupt opportunities 
compared to judges of higher-ranks. Equally importantly, the case-intake in lower courts 
is also different from that in higher court in terms of the significance of the claim. 
According to Chinese procedural laws, the significance of the case, either in terms of its 
economic or other cognitive value to litigants, is an important criterion for the allocation 
of jurisdiction to courts at different levels.147  The general rule is that higher courts take 
cases involving higher economic value or more severe crimes.148  Also, higher courts can 
direct caseloads by setting the bar of case registration according to the economic value of 
the plaintiff’s claim in civil and commercial cases.149  For example, to reduce the caseload, 
an intermediate court can raise the bar and divert more cases to basic courts. To increase 
the caseload, the court can lower the bar and include more cases from basic courts.150 
The consequence of this situation is that the litigants assigned to the low-group judges 
generally have low-claims and hence have less capacity and willingness to bribe because 
of the limited value involved in these cases.151  This situation provokes the low-group 
judges to be more active so as to capitalize their judicial power when the opportunity 
presents itself.  
 
Another explanation to this behavioral pattern is that the low-group judges are less 
deterred by the legal and moral barriers preventing the initiation of corrupt exchanges 
compared with judges from the high-group. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the 
low-group judges’ potential to profit economically from corrupt exchange is limited. 
                                                 
146 The statistics are based on the Table 4-01, 4-02, 4-06 in Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao 
(1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report (1979-2004)].     
147 Civil Procedural Law (2007) Chapter II, Section 1. "Reuglation on Jurisdiction of First-Instance Civil 
and Commercial Cases," ed. Supreme People's Court (2008). Criminal Procedural Law (1997). Article 18, 
19, 20. 
148 For example, in the same year of 2006, the average economic value of claims is 22,436,850yuan per 
case of all civil cases tried in the SPC, 13,335,227yuan per case of all civil cases tried in the High Court of 
Shaanxi Province and 98,041yuan per case in average in intermediate courts and basic courts in the same 
jurisdiction of Shaanxi Province. Sources of the statistics: Annual Report of the SPC (2006) and Annual 
Report of Shaanxi High Court (2006). 
149 Interview of a basic court judge. R034. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Recent research showed that the vast majority of the basic courts are short of cases so much so that they 
are actively “looking for cases (zhao anyuan)” by attempting to locate and persuade perspective litigants to 
bring cases to their courts. According to Ran’s research, only 10% of basic courts have an overload of 
case-intake. The rest are actually having a shortage of case-intake. However, the average amount of 
caseload for each judge is highly unbalanced among courts. For example, some courts complained about 
the overload of cases. One extreme case is Bao’an District Court of Shenzhen City, which reported an 
annual caseload of 577 per judge. However, the average annual caseload per judge was only 22 (based on 
statistics of 2001) according to Zhu et al. For the report on Bao’an District Court see 
http://news.163.com/09/0316/08/54GTTNSP0001124J.html For the national average figure, see Zhu, 
Jingwen, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report (1979-2004)]. 
Beijing: People's University, 2007. p.196. 
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Since the economic value of the bribe is an important threshold for criminal and 
disciplinary punishment, the petty forms of bribery conducted by the low-group judges 
generally attract less attention from anti-corruption institutions.152  In other words, the 
low-group judges are less deterred by the legal risk compared with their colleagues in 
higher courts. In the same vein, judges from the low-group also face less moral censure 
barriers compared to the judges of higher rank in higher courts. It is therefore not 
surprising to find that among all the cases digested in this research, the judges, who have 
committed bribe-solicitation or extortion, all belong to the low-group.153   
 
Apart from being more passive in the initiation phase of the contracting process of 
corruption, compared with the low-group judges, the high-group judges are more 
selective in choosing their exchange counterparties. Wu Zhenhan, a former president of 
Hunan High Court, was charged for taking 33 bribes worth of 8.8 million yuan. All the 
bribers were introduced to Wu through his family members.154  Similarly, the recently 
convicted president of Beijing Xicheng District Court Guo Shenggui took most of the 
bribes from litigants or lawyers through his brother.155  Another example is the case of 
Yang Duoming, a former vice court-president of Guangxi High Court. One of his 
convictions was for having taken a bribe from a subordinate in exchange for Yang’s 
endorsement of the latter’s promotion. Interestingly, the subordinate did not give the 
bribe to Yang directly himself, even though they shared the same work place. Instead, the 
subordinate asked a judge from a distant local court, who was known having a close 
relationship with the vice-president, to deliver the bribe.156   
 
In the corruption scandals in Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Wuhan Intermediate Court, 
and more recently, in Wuxi Intermediate Court, Tianjin Intermediate Court and Tianjin 
High Court, bribe-taking judges had mainly interacted with lawyers, with whom they 
                                                 
152 Focusing on high-profile cases (da’an yao’an) has been dominating the anti-corruption policies since 
Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. In a speech in 1989, Deng requested the anti-corruption institutions to “expose 
at least 10-20 major cases”. Such a deterring strategy has been implemented by the following Chinese 
leaderships. For more details, see a collected volume of official speeches edited by Wang Deying, a former 
vice-director of the Central Disciplinary and Inspecting Committee of the CCP. Deying Wang, Juebu 
Yunxu Fubaifenzi You Cangshenzhidi - Tupo Da'an Yao'an De Shijian Yu Sikao [Nowhere to Hide - 
Practices About and Reflections Upon Successful Detection of Major Corruption Cases] (Beijing: 
Fangzheng, 2001). See also Jianghui Li, "Jiceng Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Zuzhi Jianshe Wenti Zouyi [a 
Discussion on the Issues of Organization-Building of Grassroot Discipline Inspecting Institutions]," 
Diaocha yanjiu, 24 August 2007. Available at http://www.qinfeng.gov.cn/Html/2007-8-24/101259.Html  
153 See the beginning of this section, the 2nd paragraph. 
154 The P.R.C. vs. Wu Zhenhan, Criminal Judgment, No. 858 [2006], the 2nd Intermediate Court of Beijing. 
155 Heyan Wang, "Xijie Beijing Xichengqu Fayuan Qianyuanzhang Guo Shengui an [a Detailed Analysis 
of the Case of Former President of Beijing Xicheng Court, Guo Shenggui]," Caijing 2007. 
156 "Yang Duoming Shouhuian Jishi [a Report on the Bribery Case of Yang Duoming]," Minzhu yu fazhi, 
16 August 2005. Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-08-16/14337512522.shtml  
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maintained long-term exchange relationship.157  In the scandal of Wuhan Intermediate 
Court, as much as 44 lawyers were involved in bribe-giving.158  Some corrupt judges 
never “dealt” directly with litigants but certain lawyers, revealed by an insider after the 
Shenzhen Intermediate Court scandal, which brought down five judges, including the 
vice-president of the court.159  Despite that the costs of the bribes are eventually borne by 
litigants, such practices are considered as “the rule of the game”.160     
 
The involvement of lawyers as intermediaries in the corrupt exchange has greatly reduced 
the search costs for both litigants and judges. From the perspective of litigants, the costs 
of searching for the “right” judge could be prohibitively high. The trust-building process 
that is demanded in corrupt exchange with judges from the high-group is especially 
time-consuming and requires premeditated network-building and -maintenance, which 
constitutes a high volume of transactional costs. In addition, a litigant normally can not 
predict when and where future litigation will take place until a dispute presents itself. 
Therefore, such networking conduct is difficult to plan in advance for litigants. However, 
all the afore-mentioned challenges can be contained well by lawyers if they specialize in 
the profession. The main reason is that the transactional costs involved in networking are 
mainly fixed costs, more like a one-off entrance fee.161  Therefore, for a lawyer, the costs 
of each exchange with one specific judge or one specific group of judges decrease as the 
number of the exchange with the same judge or same group of judges increases. This is 
exactly the reason that many corrupt lawyers specialize in specific courts and with 
specific judges.162  Evidently, this specialization allows the lawyers to conduct exchange 
repetitively with certain judges and reduces the transactional costs by sharing them 
                                                 
157 Also see "Lüshi Xinghui Faguan - Yizhong 'Sifayawenhua' De Jiedu [Lawyers Bribing Judges - an 
Interpretation of the 'Judicial Sub-Culture']," Nanfang Dushi Bao, 1 Feburary 2009. 
158 See http://news.qq.com/a/20061013/001034.htm.  
159 According to an informant, the investigated judges would never respond to the initiatives taken by 
litigants. "Investigating the 'Corruption Collusion' in the Shenzhen Intermediate Court." An in-house lawyer 
once confided in me that litigants are usually excluded from attending the banquets hosted by their lawyers 
for judges so as to conceal the identities of the judges. Interview T028. An anonymous judge also made this 
point in an online essay posted on the popular legal forum hosted by the Tianya Internet Community 
(tianya shequ). Yishuimenke, "Zhongguo Faguan Shencun Zhuangkuang Zhi Yuanshengtai Diaocha [a 
Participating Observation of the Lives of Chinese Judges],"(2006), 
http://www.tianya.cn/techforum/content/219/2225.shtml. 
160 "Investigating the 'Corruption Collusion' in the Shenzhen Intermediate Court." 
161 Matthias Schramm, Markus Taube, "On the Co-Existence of Private Ordering and a Formal Legal 
System in the Pr China," (Duisburg University, 2003). p.187. 
162 Interview C011. L013. L015. Also, Chen Zhuolun, one of the top ten model lawyers in Guangdong, had 
a long-term close relationship with Yang Xiancai, former director of Guangdong High Court, who was 
closely associated in corrupt exchange with Huang Songyou, former vice-president of the SPC. Lawyers in 
the inner circle shared the knowledge that certain cases would not stand a chance in Guangdong High Court 
without Chen’s representation. http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090528/05156281815.shtml The news 
coverage on the recent corruption scandal in Chongqing High Court revealed similar collusive practice 
between Wu Xiaoqing, former director of Chongqing High Court and Hu Yanyu, Wu’s mistress, who had, 
ironically enough, also been awarded a top ten female model lawyer in Chongqing before the uncovering of 
the scandal. For related news report, see http://news.sohu.com/20091201/n268604288.shtml. 
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among various clients. In addition, the involvement of intermediaries, in particular 
lawyers, serves as the insulation between the briber and the bribed, hence protecting both 
from being incriminated by the other. With the lawyers as the go-between, negotiation 
becomes easier as well. Lawyers can also help judges to launder the bribes and litigants 
to stand auditory scrutiny of the expenses spent on bribing.163   
 
The disadvantage of employing intermediary services is that such services entail direct 
costs. Such costs are more readily justifiable for high-profile litigants and the high-group 
judges, whose safety concern and opportunity costs of time overweigh the cost of 
middle-men. In contrast, the low-group judges, who are less constrained by safety 
concerns or the opportunity costs of time, appear more likely to conduct corrupt exchange 
with litigants directly. In fact, some of these judges specifically discourage litigants from 
hiring lawyers because they considered that they deserve and could gain more corrupt 
profits if lawyers are not involved in the corrupt exchange and hence the judges can cut 
the handling costs of the intermediaries.164  Moreover, a judge in a rural village or small 
town is much more accessible for a litigant compared with a judge sitting in, say, a high 
court in a metropolitan city. For example, in one of the cases studied, a group of plaintiffs 
in a class lawsuit went to bribe the judge directly during the first-instance litigation in the 
county court. When the case was appealed to the prefecture intermediate court, the 
villagers started to look for lawyers to broker the corrupt exchange.165   
 
3.3. Phase Two - negotiation 
 
First of all, it is import to mention that in many cases negotiation may already take place 
at the initiation stage, for example, when a judge expresses his corrupt intent by putting 
forward a specific request or when a litigant initiates corrupt exchange by offering a 
specific bribe. In this framework, negotiation is differentiated from initiation not in terms 
of chronicle sequence but in terms of function. To be more specific, negotiation refers to 
the process whereby corrupt participants attempt to settle what each shall give and take or 
perform and receive in a transaction between them.166  Negotiation in corrupt exchange 
has a different form compared with negotiation in legal transactions because of the need 
to conceal the corrupt intent. Instead, the usual basic steps of negotiation in corrupt 
                                                 
163 Interview C011. L014. Also see the case of Lou Xiaoping, former president of Hainan High Court, who 
once received a bribe worth 400,000yuan. Lou instructed a lawyer to issue a receipt of the same amount to 
the briber, on which the bribe was itemized as litigation fee. See Hainan Provincial Procuratorate, Hainan 
Branch vs. Lou Xiaoping, Criminal Judgment, No.112 [2004]. Hainan Intermediate Court.  
164 Interview R034. L013. 
165 Jie Liu, "Yiqi Hetong Jiufen Yinqi De Sifa 'Heishao' [a Judicial 'Black Whistle' in a Contractual Dispute] 
" Dangfeng yu lianzheng 2002. Available at 
http://www.qinfeng.gov.cn/admin/pub_journalshow.asp?id=100393&chid=100075  
166 Leigh Thompson, "Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues," 
Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990). p.516. 
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exchange include 1) the briber decides the amount of the bribe to offer; 2) the bribed 
decides whether to accept, reject the offer or counteroffer. Acceptance generally implies 
that the bribed has agreed to render certain services favorable to the briber. Sometimes, 
the exact content of the service is addressed in precise terms and sometimes it is only 
vaguely addressed by the briber, such as “Please treat our case favorably”.  
  
However, it does not mean that the bribed has no say on the amount of the bribe. Instead, 
the bribed judges have plenty of opportunities to negotiate about the amount of the bribe 
in the contractual performance phase as the litigation proceeds and the judge’s perception 
of the cost and value of his service evolves. For example, in a commercial litigation in the 
Luexian County Court of Shaanxi Province, a judge divided his delivery of the corrupt 
service into several phases, which typically include registering the case, holding the trial, 
rendering judgment and enforcement of the judgment in case of non-voluntary 
performance of the losing party. The judge would not move to the next phase until the 
litigant had performed first, which include hosting banquets and/or arrange holiday trips, 
including visits of prostitutes for the judge.167 A similar example is Zhong Naixin, 
former deputy chief of the enforcement division of Shenzhen Intermediate Court. Zhong 
once considered a bribe of 100,000yuan offered by the enforcement applicant was 
disproportionately low compared with what the applicant expected to benefit from 
Zhong’s service. He suspended the delivery and halted the enforcement procedure. Zhong 
said to the applicant: “The enforcement entails costs, which is a lot.” He then indicated 
his exact demand – an additional bribe of 300,000yuan.168  An alternative and popular 
approach of renegotiation by the bribed is to provide the briber with a bundle of paid bills, 
typically for fares, banquets, gas and other services, and demand reimbursement.169  
According to the data collected, such requests to raise the bribe were usually satisfied by 
the bribers unless the request becomes extremely excessive and exploitive.   
 
This research also finds that once the corrupt intent has been communicated and agreed 
upon, the exchange is rarely aborted due to the exchange parties’ difference on exchange 
terms. It seems that the bribed often accept what is offered them unless the bribe is 
extremely insignificant. 170  For example, Wu Zhenhan, the afore-mentioned former 
president of Hunan High Court, reportedly refused a bribe of 5,000yuan because it was 
too little.171  The high rate of successful completion of corrupt exchange negotiation can 
                                                 
167 "Faguan Piaochang Dangshiren Maidan [Judge Visit Prostitute Litigant Foot the Bill]," Yantai Evening 
Post, 31 July 2004. Available at http://www.shm.com.cn/ytwb/2004-07/31/content_180550.htm  
168 Shigui Tan, Sifa Fubai Fangzhi Lun [Preventing Judicial Corruption] (Beijing: Law Press, 2003). 
pp.95-6. 
169 Interview C011. T028. 
170 Among the eight interviewees, who admitted incidences of bribing judges, none had reported rejection 
of bribes. 
171 "Hunan Yuan Gaoyuan Yuanzhang De Fanzui Daolu [Path to Criminal: Story of the Former President 
of Hunan High Court]," Liaoning Fazhi Bao, 24 December 2004. 
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be attributed to two reasons. The first reason is the existence of a “wide positive 
bargaining zone”,172  which has facilitated the agreement. A positive bargaining zone is 
the price range which is marked by a bottom and a ceiling price of negotiators 
respectively (also known as reservation price), permitting each of them to benefit from 
settling at any price within that range. Since the respective reservation prices remain 
concealed during negotiations, the wider the range, the more likely the price offered by 
one party will fall in that range and hence be accepted by the other. For example, 
assuming that 1) a judge is willing to deliver a corrupt service at an inducement of a nice 
bottle of wine (say, worth 1,000yuan); 2) a litigant is willing to pay for a corrupt service 
as long as the price is less than half of the expected benefit; 3) the litigant expects a net 
benefit of 1 million from a favorable judgment. The bargaining zone will be between the 
price of a bottle of wine and 0.5 million. It means any gift or amount of bribe offered by 
the litigant will be accepted by the judge as long as it is worth more than 1,000yuan. A 
mutually accepted price, at which both exchange parties are better off, is more likely to 
be reached when the bargaining zone is, say, between 1,000 and 500,000yuan than 
between 1,000 and 1,100yuan.  
 
The range of this bargaining zone in corrupt exchange is normally wider than that in 
lawful transactions. In lawful transactions, the item for sale usually involves production 
costs, which are virtually zero in corrupt exchange. The main costs of the corrupt service 
delivered by corrupt judges are the costs of perceived risk, which includes the risk of both 
legal and moral sanction. One’s perception of the risk of legal sanction is low when the 
apprehension rate of corruption is low, even though the related punishment might be 
severe. When judicial ethics has not taken root and corrupt practices are pervasive, the 
moral sanction is not necessarily targeted at the corrupt conduct but very often at the 
monopolization of the corrupt opportunities and profits. Hence, a corrupt judge can 
effectively reduce this moral risk by engaging in reciprocal collaboration and sharing the 
corrupt profits with his peers. 173  Consequently, in corrupt exchange, the seller’s 
reservation price is comparatively “cheap”. Meanwhile, the services delivered by corrupt 
judges are usually of great value to the bribers, which constitutes a high reservation price 
for buying. A large gap between the minimum price to sell and the maximum price to buy 
creates a wide bargaining zone, which makes consensus easier to reach.   
 
The second reason for the ease of negotiation in corrupt exchange is that the corrupt 
service offered by judges as the object of exchange is consumer-specific, time-dependent 
and perishable. Selling a service is unlike selling a good. For the latter if the seller misses 
one selling opportunity, he may still have another opportunity to sell the good to another 
customer. However, if one misses an opportunity to sell a service to a customer, one loses 
                                                 
172 Thompson, "Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues." p.517.  
173 Interview C011. 
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that opportunity since the service cannot be stored and carried forward to another 
customer.174  Therefore, in most situations, turning down an offer of a bribe from a 
litigant constitutes a net opportunity loss for a judge. It is understandable, therefore, that 
corrupt judges usually accept what are offered them and only negotiate through 
withholding the deliveries of the services expected by the bribers. The bribers, on the 
other hand, simply do not have many choices of their exchange parties due to the 
monopolistic position of judges in delivering the court services. Consequently, bribers, 
who are locked in the exchange relationships by their initial investments and constrained 
by their limited bargaining power, tend to be submissive to judges’ demands for more 
bribes. Meanwhile, safety-conscious judges would nonetheless seek to secure a 
sustainable exchange by limiting their desire for a higher price within the bargaining zone 
so as not to provoke the litigants to drop out from the exchange relationship.  
 
For example, in a criminal litigation in the Intermediate Court of Bengbu City, the 
defendant, a judge charged of bribe-taking, and the prosecutor contested on whether a 
bribe of 8,600yuan was extracted by the defendant or voluntarily offered to him by a 
litigant. The court ruled that the bribe was extracted. The reason of this ruling is that the 
litigant only benefited 18,600yuan from the corrupt service delivered by the judge and it 
is against the common sense of the litigant to voluntarily offer almost half of expected 
benefit as the bribe unless it is imposed upon him.175  A survey among 85 bribers revealed 
similar results. In the survey, all respondents considered that the bribe should not be more 
than half of the expected benefit. More specifically, 56.2% of them considered that a 
figure equals to 10% of the expected benefit would be acceptable; while the rest of the 
respondents are willing to offer an amount between 10% - 50% of the expected 
benefit.176 
                                                
 
Data examined in the course of this research also reveal that the negotiating approach can 
be affected by the closeness of the relation of the negotiating parties. Same as in any 
types of exchange, the negotiation of corrupt exchange will be influenced by the 
negotiator’ perception of and attraction to the other party, his or her intelligence, 
 
174 This feature is also termed as “asset specificity”. The asset offered in corrupt exchange is referred to as 
“idiosyncratic assets” by Husted in his seminal work bringing the concept of transactional cost to the 
analysis of corruption. According to Husted, corrupt transactions “often involve investments in human 
capital with little salvage value outside the particular transaction or relationship”. Therefore, one cannot 
recover let alone benefit from the investment if one cannot perform and deliver corrupt services. See 
Husted, "Honor among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World 
Countries." p.21. For discussions on this feature of services in a more general sense, see Russell Wolak, et. 
al., "An Investigation into Four Characteristics of Services," Journal of Empirical Generalisations in 
marketing science 3 (1998). p.27. 
175 Bengbu People’s Procuratorate, Bengshan Branch vs. Dong Xiaohui, court judgment No. 162 [2006], 
Bengbu Intermediate Court, Anhui Province. 
176 Gufeng Huang, Rui Li, "Haizhuqu Jianchayuan Dui Xinghui Renyuan De Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao [a 
Survey Report of Bribe-Giving Conducted by Haizhu District Procuratorate],"  (2006). 
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sociability, expertise, skill, ability, cooperativeness, competitiveness, trustworthiness, 
fairness and other attributes that the negotiator makes to explain and to predict the 
behavior of his bargaining opponent.177  When the negotiator likes, trusts and is ready to 
engage in future exchanges with his opponent, he would be more flexible on the 
exchange terms. 178  Far-sighted bribers, aiming for long-term exchange relationship, 
would not request the repayment of their bribe(s), even when the bribed fails to deliver 
the promised service for contingent reasons.179  Instead, such a briber would insist that he 
continues to be owed thereby demonstrating his generosity, trust and commitment to the 
relationship with the bribed. This in turn will nurse reciprocal trust and ease the 
egotiation in future exchanges.  
corrupt scandal taken place in the Hunan High Court 
ncovered similar practices.182   
.4. Phase Three - contractual performance  
                                                
n
 
When a sufficiently strong bond has developed between the briber and the bribed, trade 
can even develop into joint venture based on the integration of interests.180  Such a 
joint-venture structure requires a one-off negotiation on the distribution of the gained 
from future corrupt ventures and hence avoids the higher transactional costs that would 
otherwise have to be spent in each transaction. Such arrangement is more common when 
the briber expects to conduct regular exchange with the bribed, for example, such as 
between lawyers and judges for client-referring, and between auction houses and courts 
for court commissions. Negotiation in such relational exchange is more straightforward 
and explicit. For example, in two written agreements between a few court leaders of the 
Urumqi Railway Intermediate Court and an auction firm and an asset appraisal firm 
respectively, the parties agreed that the former guaranteed to procure court service 
contracts to the latter firms against a commission fee of 30% and 40% of the value of the 





In petty forms of corrupt exchange, the entire contracting process is usually completed in 
a short span of time, when some of the phases are compacted in one and swiftly switch 
from one to another. For example, when a police officer accepted a 20yuan banknote 
 
177 Thompson, "Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues." p.518. 
178 Dean G. Pruitt, "Strategic Choice in Negotiation," American Behavioral Scientist 27, no. 2 (1983). 
pp.181-3. 
179 Interview M033. 
180 It is also known as variable-sum or integrative negotiations, when the exchange parties’ interests are 
compatible. Thompson, "Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues." 
p.516. 
181 Limei Shi, Jianjun Shi, "Wutie Zhongyuan Shexian Danwei Shouhui an De Qishi [Revelation of the 
Case of Bribe-Taking of Wutie Intermediate Court]," Zhengyi Net, 28 August 2007. Available at 
http://www.jcrb.com/xueshu/wysf/200806/t20080613_21334.html  
182 Beijing People’s Procuratorate, 2nd Branch vs. Wu Zhenhan, Criminal Judgment, No. 858 [2006], the 
2nd Intermediate Court of Beijing.  
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offered by a traffic rule offender in exchange for dropping a ticket, the contracting 
process, including the initiation, the negotiation (if necessary) and the performance of 
bribe-giving and bribe-taking, the contractual performance of the briber is merged with 
the initiation. Likewise, the contractual performance of the bribed can combine 
egotiation. The entire contracting process can complete in a couple of minutes.  
 into two parts, focusing on the performance of the 
ribers and the bribed respectively.  
 Contractual performance of bribers – delivery of the bribes 
able and left immediately. Without any more drama, this time, the 
nvelope stayed.184 
                                                
n
 
For corruption taken place in courts, the contractual performance, however, is much more 
complicated, especially when the exchange involves greater volume of bribe and more 
complex corrupt services. Adding to the challenge is the enhanced difficulty to conceal 
the corrupt conduct. Unlike the previous phases, the performance phase is the only phase 
in the contracting process, during which corruption participants need to engage outsiders, 
either being institutions or individuals, in order to perform their contractual obligations. 
This is the only phase, therefore, during which corrupt conduct is more likely to be 





Evidently, the main contractual obligation of a briber is to deliver the bribe without 
exposure. A briber shall deliver the bribe to the bribed with the fewest witness, not only 
for the safety concern of the briber himself but also for the concern of the bribed. In a 
class action in the Intermediary Court of Shenmu City, Shaanxi Province, four 
litigant-representatives were to deliver a bribe of 2,000yuan to a judge.183  Considering 
that it would be awkward for the judge to take the money in front of the four of them, two 
litigants decided to wait outside. The other two visited the judge’s residence. To their 
surprise, when one of the litigants put the money packed in an envelope on the table, the 
judge appeared infuriated and threw the envelope together with the two litigants out of 
his home. Confused, the two litigants gathered with the other two for a group discussion. 
Soon an understanding was reached. They believed that the judge threw them out because 
they were being too indiscreet. Two was still too many. This time only one litigant was 
selected to go in again. Infuriated as the judge was, he did not refuse to open the door and 
let the litigant in for the second time. The litigant uttered nothing. He went in, dropped 
the envelope on a t
e
 
Envelope, as a container, is ideal for the delivery of cash-bribes. It is low-profile. It is 
light. It hides well if fits. One lawyer interviewee told me that he once visited a judge to 
 
183 For more details of the case, see 
http://www.qinfeng.gov.cn/admin/pub_journalshow.asp?id=100393&chid=100075. 
184 Ibid. 
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deliver a bribe. They met in the corridor in the court building outside the judge’s office. 
The judge wore a shirt. The lawyer inserted an envelope into the judge’s chest-pocket. 
Only by then the lawyer noticed that the envelope was a bit shorter than the length of the 
banknotes. Consequently, the envelope sat in the judge’s pocket with the edges of the 
banknotes exposed, calling for attention. It was understandably an awkward moment. 
After a few seconds of hesitation, the lawyer took the first move. He nipped the envelope 
out and slipped it into the judge’s trousers pocket.185  Sometimes, envelopes are inserted 
in case-files and delivered to the bribed judges at the latter’s offices or other public 
places.186  When the bribe is too voluminous, it can be wrapped with newspaper and 
elivered to the bribed in paper shopping bags.187   
 surprise the bribed but to protect the bribed from being caught in the 
xchange scene.  
                                                
d
 
How exactly to deliver the bribe and when largely depends on the briber’s understanding 
of the preferences of the bribed. The manner of delivery is more accommodating when 
the bribed has a low perception of both the legal and moral risks of the exchange. 
However, the delivery will require more subtle design when the bribed is particularly 
sophisticated and discreet. For example, some bribers deliver the bribes to the bribed at 
wellness clubs by placing the bribe in the private locker.188  Evidently, the purpose of 
doing that is not to
e
 
For bribers, the safe delivery is not only about managing the scene of delivery but also 
about covering the track of bribing from auditors. In China, expenses spent on 
entertaining officials, for example, the costs of hosting banquets, visiting entertainment 
venues, purchasing gifts and reimbursing holiday trips, are generally acceptable as 
“operating costs”. However, for cash-bribes, private individuals or enterprises and 
state-owned enterprises or institutions experience different level of auditory scrutiny. 
Benefited from loose monitoring, bribers, who run private businesses, are less refrained 
from bribing in cash. For them, such expenses can be registered in the book as “operating 
costs” or “public relation costs (gongguanfei)”. Some “reckless” bribers mark the book 
entry with blunt honesty and indicate clearly on whom a particular amount has been spent. 
However, private bribers are more profit-maximization oriented and hence are more cost 
conscious. Bribers, who are state-owned enterprises (SOE) or governmental institutions, 
are less cost-conscious but are subject to more stringent auditory rules.189  Therefore, 
SOE litigants are more open to gift-bribes instead of cash.190  Litigants, who are or 
 
185 Interview C011. 
186 Ibid. Interview T028. 
187 Tang Jikai vs. Ruanling County People’s Procuratorate, Criminal Judgment, 2nd Instance, No. 52 [2006]. 
Huaihua Intermediate Court, Hunan Province. 
188 Interview C011. 
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represent SOE or governmental institutions, are also capable to provide other non-cash 
inducement, such as landing a job for the relatives/friends of the bribed judge191  or 
ommissioning public procurement contract to relatives/friends of the bribed judge.  
ape in Su’s 
ry of private 
ducement based exactly on the same rationale as in “corruption proper”. 
 
                                                
c
 
For example, Tang Jikai, former vice-president of Changsha Intermediate Court, once 
asked for a favor from the president of a local hospital, which had a pending case in 
Tang’s court. The favor was to grant a public procurement tender of the hospital to a 
friend of Tang. Tang did not receive anything from the hospital directly but 50,000yuan 
commission fee from his friend.192  In some other cases, the inducement is so personal 
and intangible, which seems contentious even to be labeled as “bribe”. For example, Su 
Jiafu, a county court judge in Fujian province obtained a favor from the director of the 
local police bureau, who treated Su’s brother favorably during a police investigation in a 
battery case. Not long after, the police director’s son was prosecuted for r
court. Being grateful for the previous favor received from the police director, 
Su rendered an acquittal in front of strong evidence against the son.193  Under the current 
anti-corruption legal framework, such favor exchange, when it is not manifested with 
money, equity or other tangible properties, is not recognized as an indictable offense, 
unless the exercise of public power has broken other laws.194  For example, in the 
previous case, Su Jiafu was not prosecuted for bribe-taking but for rendering a sentence 
beyond one’s discretion based on private interests (xusi wangfa zui and wangfa caipan 
zui).195  In other words, if Su had, for example, imposed a more lenient sentence to the 
son within his discretion instead of acquitting him, he would not have been indicted. This 
toleration of favor-exchange provides plenty of room for safe delive
in
 
191 Interview C011. 
192 Tang Jikai vs. Ruanling County People’s Procuratorate, Criminal Judgment, 2nd Instance, No. 52 [2006]. 
Huaihua Intermediate Court, Hunan Province. Similar practices are also found in the case of Xu Yafei, 
former vice-president of Hubei High Court. For details, see 
http://www.1488.com/gb/Popular/lawnews/Default.asp?lawnews=203.  
193 Shigui Tan, Zhongguo Sifa Gaige Yanjiu [a Study on Judicial Reform of China] (Beijing: Law Press 
China, 2000). p.123. 
194 According to the Chinese Criminal Law (1997), Art. 385, bribe is defined as caiwu (money and objects 
of value). In practice, it had been usually interpreted as money and tangible properties until the 
promulgation of a new anti-bribery law, which include equities and a few other types of benefits as bribe. 
Nonetheless, the form of the bribe is still limited to objects of value. According to the research office of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, it is “unrealistic” to extend the range of bribe and to cover any benefits, 
tangible or intangible. See Guangyu Zheng, Tanwu Huilu Duzhi Qinquan Zuian Dingzui Zhengju Jiexi [an 
Interpretation and Analysis of the Evidence for the Conviction of Crimes of Corruption] (Beijing: China 
Procuracy, 2002). p.64. Guoqing Chen, ed. Xinxing Shouhui Fanzui De Rending Yu Chufa [Recognition 
and Punishment of New Types of Crime of Bribery] (Beijing: Law Press,2007).pp.178-9.  
195 Chinese Criminal Law (1997) Art. 399. Zheng, Tanwu Huilu Duzhi Qinquan Zuian Dingzui Zhengju 
Jiexi [an Interpretation and Analysis of the Evidence for the Conviction of Crimes of Corruption]. 
pp.199-202. 
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Bribes delivered in the form of intangible services bear less legal risk. However, such 
service is limited in terms of its economic value and is not sufficient as a reward for the 
bribed for corrupt services worth of tens of thousands or even millions of yuan. In such 
high-profile corrupt transactions, the involvement of intermediaries, especially lawyers, is 
particularly important. Lawyers can help the constrained bribers to cover the paper trail 
of the bribe by including it in the legal consultancy fee, which is legitimate expense that 
can be claimed by the briber as operating costs. The lawyers will then share his 
consultancy fee with judges on his own initiative or upon requests of the judges.196   
 
How a bribed judge launders the bribe after having received it is not yet an urgent 
concern since public officials are not required to disclose their assets. In addition, there 
are plenty of loopholes in the financial system, which allow the bribed to accumulate and 
convert their illegal proceeds to other forms of assets or to launder it in the stock markets 
or through other business investments.197 
 
ii. Contractual performance of the bribed – delivery of corrupt services 
 
Contractual performance of the bribed is much more intricate than the performance of the 
briber. It is because the performance of the bribed, namely, the delivery of the corrupt 
service, requires the corrupt judge to transform his corrupt intent into an institutional act 
of the court concerned. This conduct very often involves a series of actions, visible to 
other judges, uncompromising litigants and other observers. 
  
In general, corrupt services in litigation are delivered in two approaches. The first 
approach requires overt and active rule-breaking. Its typical conduct includes applying or 
threatening to apply physical force against the antagonist of the briber in order to satisfy a 
specific demand of the briber, such as, to honor and collect a debt.198  Corrupt services 
can also be delivered by tampering with evidence, juggling or even fabricating court 
documents. Wang Shengjie, former judge of Shangqiu intermediate court, tampered with 
                                                 
196 Interview L013. C011.  
197 One example is Ma De, the protagonist of the biggest office-selling scandal in 2004, which involved 
265 officials and eventually brought the fall of Han Guizhi, a former vice party-secretary of Liaoning 
Province. The investigator found that Ma’s son had opened a bank account using a forged ID, into which 
Ma had transferred as much as 20,000,000yuan of illicit income. See "Quanguo Zuida Maiguan an Diaocha 
[an Investigation of the Biggest Office-Selling Case]," News Weekly 2005. 
198 Just to name a few, for the case of Zhou Wenguang, a former judge of Shenqiu County Court, see Jia 
Song, et. al., "Jianli Wangfa Faguan Cheng Qiutu [Violating the Law for Benefits, Judge Became 
Prisoner]," Jiancha fengyu [Procuracy affairs] 2001.For the case of Li Zhengda, a former court official in 
Jilin High Court, see Liguo Wu, "Zhixingyuan Zuan Zhidu Loudong Jingtun Qianwan [Enforcement 
Official Took Advantages of Loopholes of Court Regulations and Grabbed Ten Million Rmb]," fazhi yu 
xinwen [Rule by law and news] 2006. For the case of Yin Hexin, a former divisional director of Rongcheng 
County Court, Hebei Province, see Jirong Luo, Qiang Xin, "Yiqi Faguan Zhizao De Feifajujin an [an 
Illegal Detention Commited by Judges]," Hebei Daily 1998. 
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a land certificate to help a litigant to win a case.199 During the course of this research, at 
least two courts were reportedly detected for having fabricated litigations for banks so 
that the banks could use the court decisions to claim and write off certain loans as “dead 
accounts (daizhang huaizhang)”, which enabled the management of the bank to usurp the 
repayments of the loans collected from the uninformed debtors.200   
 
It would be difficult to provide an exhaustive list of this type of corrupt conduct. 
However, all these practices share one thing in common, which is a high level of risk, 
since the conduct concerned evidently involved visible rule-breaking and is hence 
relatively easy to detect. Such conduct is therefore more readily adopted by those 
risk-taking judges, who lack the necessary discretion and legal knowledge to maneuver 
the law so as to keep their corrupt conduct in the safe range.  
 
Slightly more cautious corrupt judges would refrain from the afore-mentioned conduct. 
Instead, minimum compliance with procedural rules will be observed. For example, they 
will seek to keep the necessary paperwork in order, including the required application 
forms, letters of proof, certificates, professional reports etc, while knowingly avoiding to 
check the authenticity of these documents and the legality of the manner in which they 
were produced and obtained. Lü Zonghui, a former judge in Jingmen Intermediate Court 
was once approached by the relative of a defendant, who had committed murder and was 
expected to receive a death penalty. Lü implicitly instructed the defendant’s relative to 
“get” a report of good conduct (ligong), which is the only circumstance that a stay of 
execution could be rendered according to the law. The relative bribed a police captain, 
who then staged an interrogation of the defendant. In the interrogation, the defendant 
reported a piece of fake “intelligent information”, which was fed to him by the captain in 
                                                 
199 See the case of Wang Shenjie, a former vice divisional director of Shangqiu Intermediate Court, Henan 
Province, available at http://www.cnr.cn/hnfw/xwzx/yw/200711/t20071130_504642041.html   
200 An example is what happened in the scandal of Jinzhou Communication Bank. In 2002 three 
accountants in the Bank discovered that the Bank management was usurping the Bank’s reserve fund by 
forging court decisions in corrupt collaboration with three courts. Based on fabricated evidence brought by 
the Bank, the courts issued court decisions without informing the defendants, let alone holding court 
hearings, to demonstrate that the Bank had failed to collect their loans after having exhausted all legal 
means. Based on the court documents, the Bank was able to claim and write off the “dead and bad 
loans(daizhang huaizhang)” worthy of 0.2 billion yuan, which enables the management to usurp the 
repayments of the loans collected from the uninformed debtors. The scandal exposed three courts in 
Jinzhou City, Liaoning Province (available at http://news.qq.com/zt/2005/boguscase/ ). Similar practices 
were detected in the case of Wang Guozhi, a former judge in a basic court of Renzhou City, who fabricated 
28 such court judgments (available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/news/1080411.htm ), and the case 
of former president of Guangde County Court of Xuancheng City, Anhui Province, who fabricated more 
than a hundred of such judgments (available at http://news.sohu.com/20050523/n225666902.shtml). For 
more in-depth analyses of the impact of these court-bank collusive practices, see Yingmao Tang, Liugang 
Sheng, "Minshangshi Zhixing Chengxu Zhong De "Shuanggao Xianxiang" ("Two High" Phenomenon in 
the Enforcement Procedure of Court Judgment in Civil and Commercial Cases)," falv yu shehui kexue (Law 
and Social Science) 1 (2006). 
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advance. The defendant’s report was considered as good conduct and the captain issued a 
statement accordingly to the court. The judge readily admitted the statement as mitigating 
evidence and, based on it, rendered a stay of execution. Similarly, in Wuhan Maritime 
Court, two judges knowingly accepted fake documents provided by a plaintiff and 
rendered a decision as the latter requested. The decision netted the judges 200,000 yuan 
“gratitude fee” and the plaintiff a profit of 2,100,000yuan as a result of tariff evasion.201  
Accountancy firms, law firms and forensic institutions frequently engage in such 
deceitful practices.202  Even public notaries are occasionally found fraudulent in their 
practices.203  Such practices are especially pervasive in the administration of prisons.204 
Bribed prison-warders accepted forged medical reports and reports of good conduct and 
thereby granting medical-release or reduction of sentence to prisoners. 205  In Jilin 
province, a notorious gang-leader, Liu Wenyi, was granted a reduction of his sentence on 
the ground of “technological achievement”. The achievement turned out to be that Liu 
had paid to install a heating system in the prison apart from bribing the administrative 
staff.206   
 
The second approach to deliver corrupt services in courts does not require overt 
rule-breaking. Instead, it is based upon the judge’s capacity to exercise a wide margin of 
discretion and the ability to manipulate such discretion. One often quoted example of the 
wide discretion is that of sentencing in criminal cases. Taking the crime of bribe-taking 
                                                 
201 "Wuhan Haishi Fayuan Liang Faguan Tanzangwangfa Bei Panxing [Two Wuhan Maritime Court 
Judges Sentenced for Corruption]," Wuhan Morning Post, 14 April 2004. 
202 For a more focused study on the role of intermediary institutions in corrupt practices, see Yueqin Lin, 
"Shehui Zhongjie Zuzhi De Fubai Zhuangkuang Yu Zhili Duice Yanju [Corrupt Practices of Intermediary 
Institutions and Its Policy Control]," (Chinese Social Science Academy 2009). 
203 For example, see the report on Zhixin Public Notary Office in Shenzhen City, available at 
http://news.sohu.com/25/06/news203070625.shtml  Also in the Changhang Case in Shiyan city, a few 
judges illegally seized a company’s assets for a pledging house, in which they had shares, through 
fabricated documents, including a forged public notary certificate issued by a notary officer. Report of the 
case is available at http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2004-01-06/09141515748s.shtml  
204 At the time of writing, the SPC issued a new regulation, according to which an open public hearing 
must be held for all court decisions on probation and sentence reduction in criminal cases concerning 
white-collar crimes. See http://news.163.com/09/0711/07/5DU5KFT90001124J.html.  
205 Li, "Corruption in China's Courts." Also see Sheng Wang, "Zoulun Jianguan Changsuo Zhiwu Fanzui 
De Yufang [Prevention of White-Collar Crimes in Prisons and Other Custodial Institutions]," in Zhongguo 
Zhiwu Fanzui Yufang Diaocha Baogao [Investigative Report on Professional Crimes and Its Prevention of 
China], ed. Criminology Research Society of China (2004). pp.373-7. Jiaxun Lü, Hu Qishu, "Dui Liaoning 
Dalianshi Sifa Jiguan Gongzuo Renyuan Zhiwu Fanzui Qingkuang Diaocha Ji Yufang [Investigation and 
Prevention of Professional Crimes Committed by Personnel in the Justice System in Dalian City, Liaoning 
Province]," in Zhongguo Zhiwu Fanzui Yufang Diaocha Baogao [Investigative Report on Professional 
Crimes and Its Prevention of China], ed. Criminology Research Society of China (2004).pp. 352-7. For 
more such cases, see also Yifei Gao, "Heimu Xia De Zhengyi - Shenshi Qianguize Xia Yihua De Sifa 
[Justice under the Black Sky - Examining the Dissimilized Judicial System under the Hidden Rules]," 
Xueshu Zhonghua(2005). 
206 "Odd Prison-Release of Jilin Gang-Leader after Only Serving 3 Years for a Sentence of Imprisonment 
of 20 Years," Xin Wenhua Newspaper, 9 December 2008. 
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for example, the discretion on sentencing ranges from a term of imprisonment of three 
years to seven years in cases involving a bribe of 5000-50,000yuan, from a term of 
imprisonment of five years to a lifetime imprisonment in cases involving a bribe of 
50,000-100,00yuan, and from a term of imprisonment for at least 10 years to the death 
penalty in cases involving a bribe beyond 100,000yuan. Guidance to the exercise of this 
discretion is extremely general. 207  In civil litigation the discretion is even wider, 
unlimited by the bars that are set by law in criminal cases. Misuse or abuse of such 
discretion has become such a widespread practice that in a national court congregation 
concerning civil litigation affairs, former SPC President Xiao admonished courts to do 
their uttermost to have the discretion more tightly regulated.208 
 
Other than in substantive matters, discretion also exists in procedural matters. For 
example, this research found that some corrupt judges took advantages of the 
pro-mediation policy209  in civil litigation to promote their corrupt interests without overt 
rule-breaking. Typical conduct is to withhold trial or to refrain from reaching a court 
decision in the name of performing mediation while attempting to cajole one litigant to 
compromise to his antagonist, who has bribed the judge. Such tactics can be employed 
through the entire litigating process, even including the enforcement procedure after a 
court judgment has been issued. For example, a litigant posted on his blog that when he 
rejected a judge’s proposal for mediation in an enforcement procedure in a county court, 
the judge said, “Mediation can be conducted at any stage of the litigation”. Eventually, 
the plaintiff was compelled to agree to suspend the enforcement, compromising on the 
rights that had already been granted to him by the court judgment.210  Similar practice was 
recently uncovered in the SPC. In order to compromise a court ruling through 
“enforcement mediation (zhixing hejie tiaojie)”, a defendant lawyer paid 100,000yuan to 
a SPC judge, who worked in the case-registration division, to broker a corrupt deal with 
the judges in the enforcement division.211   
                                                 
207 Chinese Criminal Law (1997) Art. 383, 385. 
208 Yang Xiao, "Yao Jin Zuida Keneng Guifa Faguan De Ziyoucailiang Quan [Making the Uttermost 
Efforts to Regulate Judges' Judicial Discretion]" (speech at the The 7th National Congregation on the 
Adjudicative Affairs in Civil Cases, 2007) available at 
http://business.sohu.com/20070109/n247498786.shtml  
209 According to the Civil Procedure Law (1991) Article 86, the court should preside mediation and 
promote settlement as much as possible. According to the national statistics, in average 58% of civil 
litigations were concluded by settlement through court mediation annually since 1979 to 2004. Statistics is 
derived from Table 4-17 in Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (1979-2004) [China Legal 
Development Report (1979-2004)]. 
210 A plaintiff revealed on an internet bulletin board about her court experience in Fanchang County Court, 
Yueyang City, Hunan Province in 2007. Available at 
http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/Content/law/1/62130.shtml under the username of “duzi ai shang ceng 
lou”.   
211 The SPC report did not reveal whether and how much bribe had been offered to the enforcement judges. 
"Zuigaoyuan Tongbao Liu Qi Weifan 'Wugeyanjin' Dianxing Anli [the Spc Announce Six Typical Cases of 
Judges Violating the 'Five Prohibition' Regulation]," Xinhua Net, 6 May 2009. 
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Two judges revealed the secret behind this type of “forced mediation” in an interview, 
“Who would take the trouble to mediate … unless the judge has to take care of one 
party’s interests that are difficult to justify according to the law”.212 Mediation has the 
advantage as a safe approach to deliver an unlawful service because it is based on a 
seemingly voluntary compromise of the victim rather than a forced act, which might 
result in overt rule-breaking. Meng Laigui, the afore-mentioned former head of the 
adjudicative and supervisory division of Shanxi High Court, had a special preference for 
mediation. He took bribes from both litigants in ten cases,213  most of which underwent 
lengthy mediations. In these cases, by holding separate mediation sessions with one party 
at one time, Meng took advantages of asymmetric information, playing off both sides, 
manipulating their expectations and making both believe that they were favorably 
treated.214  This so-called back-to-back (beikaobei) mediation strategy has been widely 
adopted in many courts, which, in assistance with other institutional defects, can be easily 
abused by judges for corrupt purposes.215 
 
In terms of contractual performance of the bribed, a good delivery is a safe delivery. 
Delivery that conceals its illegality is important for corruption to survive and thrive. 
When a corrupt service is delivered through manipulation of discretion, it is difficult for 
the other litigating party or monitors to challenge the decision unless evidence of bribery 
is established. It is vital to point out here that the distribution of discretion varies greatly 
among judges, which has a direct and deep impact on the patterns and dynamics of 
corruption in China’s courts. Allocation and administration of the exercise of such 
discretion is the main theme of decision-making in China’s courts. A more 
comprehensive study on this topic will be presented in Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
3.5. Phase Four - enforcement in case of non-performance 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of Section 3.4, in petty forms of corrupt exchange, the 
exchange parties perform almost simultaneously, which makes the enforcement phase 
unnecessary. The enforcement becomes imperative when the exchange parties do not 
perform simultaneously. It means that the party that performs first risks non-performance 
by the other party. This risk becomes greater in corrupt transactions because of its lack of 
                                                 
212 Interview R034. C011. 
213 “Corrupt Judge Meng Laigui ‘Eating from Defendant After Having Eaten from Plaintiff’ (2007)”,  
http://news.163.com/07/0703/03/3IEPKLR200011229.html.  
214 For similar practice, see the case of Cheng Kunbo, the former court-president of Huanggang 
Intermediate Court. "Faguan de fubai tongmeng [Corrupt Coalition of Judges]," zhongguo xinwen zhoukan 
[China Newsweek], Apr. 19, 2004. 
215 Jingfu Ran, et. al., "Fayuan Tiaojie De Xianzhuang Wenti Yu Duice Yanjiu [Current Situation, 
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support from legal enforcement institutions.216  Difficulties in producing evidence, such 
as written contracts, receipts etc., which can prove the existence of a corrupt agreement, 
constitutes additional obstacles for possible legal resolution.217  For corrupt exchange in 
courts, very often, a time gap separates the contractual performance of the briber and that 
of the bribed simply because the corrupt service to be delivered by the bribed usually 
involves a series of actions, which requires gradual, continuous and non-retractable 
investment of resources, and hence cannot start and finish “on the spot”.  
 
Generally, the exchange party with less bargaining power is compelled to perform first. 
In corrupt exchange in courts, judges are more inclined to and capable of requiring the 
briber to perform first due to their stronger bargaining position. The usual practice is to 
take a down payment to protect the judge from premature contract cancellation by the 
briber.218  According to the cases studied, it is almost always court-users, who provide 
down payment to the bribed judges, as an assurance of the briber’s commitment to the 
exchange relationship. For example, Wu Zhenhan, the afore-mentioned former president 
of Hunan High Court, had been charged for taking bribes from 10 bribers. Each of the 
bribers had provided down payments to Wu before Wu delivered the service.219  Judges, 
whose positional power is not strong enough to request down payment, would at least 
synchronize their performance with that of the briber by withholding their performance 
until the bribe is delivered. For example, some judges simply withhold from rendering the 
judgment just to wait for the briber to perform first.220 
 
The briber, however, should be able to calculate the right amount of the down payment, 
which should be neither too insignificant to assure the judge nor too significant to bear as 
a possible financial loss in case of non-performance of the bribed judge. As a solution, 
the full amount of the bribe is typically delivered in two parts in practice. The first part is 
the down payment delivered at the beginning of the contracting process. The rest is to be 
delivered after the bribed has fulfilled his obligation. In litigations involving claims of 
great value and prolonged litigating process, the number of installments may rise. For 
example, Huang Guozhen, former vice-president of Fushun Intermediate Court, Liaoning 
Province, had taken as many as nine installments totaling 920,000yuan from one litigant 
in one case and six installments totaling 1,200,000yuan from another litigant in another 
case.221   
 
                                                 
216 Lambsdorff, "Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law." p.227. 
217 Ibid. p.227. 
218 It is also termed as a “hostage” by Lambsdorff. Ibid. p.229. 
219 The Procuratorate vs. Wu Zhenhan, Criminal Judgment, No. 858 [2006], the 2nd Intermediate Court of 
Beijing. 
220 Interview C011. 
221 See http://gmyfz.yzdb.cn/2007-8/babaiwan.htm.  
 68  
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
Installment can reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior to a certain extent but cannot 
completely prevent such conduct from taking place. In case that one exchange party 
behaves opportunistically, the most common sanction applied by the other party is to 
denounce the non-performer in his social network222  and to refuse cooperation and even 
to create obstacles for the non-performer in their future encounters.223  Occasionally, 
particularly vengeful participants apply more extreme sanctions. For example, Zhang 
Qijiang, former judge of Xinxiang Intermediary Court in Henan Province, once solicited 
50,000yuan from a litigant in exchange for a judgment in the latter’s favor. However, the 
litigant only provided the judge an IOU and promised to cash the IOU when the judgment 
was delivered. Eventually, the judgment was delivered but not to the satisfaction of the 
briber, who refused to pay the bribe. Determined to retaliate, the judge brought a suit 
against the litigant in a neighboring court dressed up as a loan dispute based on the IOU 
note. The litigant, who did not mention the corrupt nature of the IOU in the trial, lost the 
case. Compensation awarded against him amounted to almost a million yuan including a 
horrendously high penalty interest award. Armed with the court award, the judge 
bankrupted the litigant, who was driven into homelessness.224 
 
When a briber is “cheated” by a non-performing judge, remedial measures such as private 
denunciation and termination of future cooperation are not as effective as they are for the 
“victimized” judges because judges generally have a more advantageous structural 
position than court-users in their exchange relations. A judge can always wait and choose 
to exchange with the next litigant; whilst a court-user has much less options in choosing 
the judge. Nonetheless, the bribers enjoy a certain degree of advantage if they choose to 
retaliate through public denunciation of the corrupt act because the anti-corruption law is 
more lenient to the briber than to the bribed. It means that a briber is quite likely to be 
exonerated of bribery if he confesses and brings the bribed to the anti-corruption 
authorities.225  For example, in the notorious scandal of Shenzhen Intermediate Court, its 
former vice-president Pei Hongquan was allegedly denounced by a lawyer, Pei’s 
long-time partner in a series of corrupt exchanges, because of a dispute over the 
distribution of corrupt profits totaling 20 million yuan. The lawyer proposed 50:50 while 
Pei insisted for a share of 90%. In view of a breaking partnership, the lawyer denounced 
Pei to the party disciplinary committee. With the incriminating evidence that the lawyer 
provided, Pei was convicted for bribe-taking and illicit enrichment and sentenced to life 
                                                 
222 Also termed as “reputation” in Lambsdorff, "Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the 
Law." p.230. 
223 It is also called as “repetition” in Ibid. p.231. 
224 "'Jietiaoan' Zhong De Faguan [the Judge in the 'Iou Case']." 
225 For more details about the differentiated legal treatment between bribers and the bribed, see Ling Li, 
"'Performing' Bribery in China - Guanxi-Practice: Corruption with a Human Face " Journal of 
Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (forthcoming in 2011). 
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imprisonment. There is no report about the punishment of the lawyer. 226  Another 
example is that of Guo Shenggui, former president of Beijing Xicheng District Court. 
Guo once accepted a painting worth of a million yuan from the family of a criminal 
defendant in exchange for an acquittal. Guo denied the charge of embezzlement but held 
the defendant guilty for misappropriation. The defendant’s family was disappointed and 
attempted to reclaim the painting but failed. It was revealed during the investigation that 
Guo had offered the painting to a superior of his as a present. The defendant’s family 
denounced Guo to the authority, which triggered a full-fledged investigation against the 
latter. The briber was not punished.227 
 
It is noteworthy that public denunciation is only bribers’ last resort. After all, the 
denunciation would not refund the bribe to the briber. In addition, a denunciation does 
not always result in the fall and punishment of the denounced. Sometimes, the 
denunciation might even generate greater damages to the denouncer, if the denounced 
enjoys strong political privilege and protection. For example, when Jia Yongxiang, 
former president of Shenyang Intermediate Court, received confidential letters 
denouncing Liang Fuquan, former vice-president of the same court, Jia did not carry out 
an investigation against Liang but forwarded the letters to the latter as a favor. Liang 
reciprocated Jia’s favor with a cash payment totaling 36,000yuan.228  In another case, Pan 
Yile, former vice-president of Guangxi High Court, also obtained protection from the 
anti-corruption authority and intercepted a denouncing letter. Pan even read out the letter 
to the denouncer on the phone and threatened to revenge.229 
 
To summarize, despite of the lack of support from formal legal institutions, corrupt 
exchange is largely self-enforceable. It is partly because most corruption participants 
consider the exchange as fair trade, of which a level of general reciprocity is expected 
and honored. The self-enforceability is also because of a certain form of checks and 
balances established between the briber and the bribed. For bribers, the threat of public 
denunciation of the corrupt act produces strong deterrent effects, which compel 
safety-conscious corrupt judges to be trustworthy and “fair”.230  For the bribed, their 
                                                 
226 "Lüzheng Jiaren Liaofan 'Mingxing Fagua' [a 'Star Judge' Fell in the Hand of a Beautiful Female 
Lawyer ]," Dang de shenghuo 2007. 
227 Wang, "Xijie Beijing Xichengqu Fayuan Qianyuanzhang Guo Shengui an [a Detailed Analysis of the 
Case of Former President of Beijing Xicheng Court, Guo Shenggui]." 
228 The Journal of China Disciplinary Inspection, Shenyang 'Mu Suixin, Ma Xiangdong' an Chachu Jishi [a 
Journalistic Report on the Investigation and Conviction of the Cases of Mu Suixin and Ma Xiangdong] 
(Beijing: Fangzheng, 2002).pp.151-2. 
229"Rang Falü De Tiankong Geng Chunjing - Pan Yile Luowang Ji [Purify the Sky of Law - a Report on the 
Conviction of Pan Yile]," People's Daily, 16 July 1998. Available at 
http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/9807/16/current/newfiles/c1010.html  
230 Interview L014. More elaborate discussion on the importance of trust in corruption can be found in Eric 
M. Uslaner, "Trust and Corruption," in The New Institutional Economics of Corruption, ed. J.G.Lambsdorff 
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advantageous bargaining power enables them to compel the bribers to perform first so as 
to minimize possible damages from opportunism. This deterrence-oriented enforcement 
mechanism functions effectively, which has greatly compensated the lack of enforcement 




By examining the four phases of the contracting process of corruption, the analytical 
framework presented in this chapter allows us to re-enact how corruption is carried out 
and develops in its full cycle. It helps us to zoom in the observed conduct and to gain a 
closer understanding of the “logic” of corruption, based on which further 
cause-and-effect analysis can be developed. This framework, as a simplified model, 
certainly cannot be expected to cover every scenario of corruption. Instead, in reality, as 
mentioned in the previous sections, some corrupt exchange takes a more simplistic form 
in which certain phases are shortened or congregated; some takes a more complicated 
form, in which certain phases are expanded and mixed with other phases. Nonetheless, 
this framework has identified four basic phases in the contracting process, which are 
pivotal to the success of corruption. An examination of what factors have contributed to 
the efficient and successful completion of the contracting process will bring us closer to a 
more precise understanding of the cause-and-effect of corruption.  
 
For example, this chapter finds that the high success ratio of negotiation in corrupt 
exchange is largely due to the wide bargaining zone, which is inherent in all corrupt 
exchange. This wide bargaining zone is derived from the fact that a considerable 
proportion of the costs of the object of corrupt exchange are exempted from the exchange 
parties but borne externally either by a specific third party or by the anonymous public. 
This factor is built in the nature of corrupt exchange and hence can only be contained to a 
certain extent but cannot be removed. 
 
At the enforcement phase, this chapter finds that most corrupt exchange are able to 
complete their full cycle with the assistance of the preventive enforcement measures such 
as the down payment and the “rationed” delivery without being hampered by the lack of 
legal enforcement support. This self-enforceability of corrupt exchange is particularly 
enhanced by the current asymmetric Chinese anti-corruption policy, which is in favor of 
bribers over the bribed. This favorable discrimination has compensated the bribers’ 
disadvantage in the corrupt exchange relationship, in which the bribers are often exposed 
to the risk of opportunism by being compelled to perform first. The “pro-briber” policy 
constitutes an effective threat of retaliation for the benefit of bribers, which facilitates 
                                                                                                                                                 
et. al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). For discussion on the role of trust in cooperative relations 
in general, see Diego Gambetta, ed. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (1988). 
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contractual compliance from the bribed as well. Thus, a form of checks and balances is 
achieved, which compels compliance from both parties and smoothens the otherwise 
problematic enforcement phase.  
 
This chapter also finds that the initiation phase is of particular importance to the success 
of corrupt exchange, though the “style” of initiation may differ depending on the 
relational structure between the potential briber and the bribed. Being constrained by a 
low case-intake and hence fewer exchange opportunities yet encouraged by lower 
exchange barriers, judges and other court officials in lower courts from poorer regions 
(the “low group”) are generally less inhibited to expressively communicate their corrupt 
intent, if so minded. As the litigating process moves up in the hierarchy of the court 
system, initiation of corrupt exchange becomes more subtle and more complicated. 
Communication of corrupt intent relies more on inferences and signals and requires a 
trust-building procedure known as guanxi-practice. At the high-end of the spectrum are 
judges holding executive positions in high-ranking courts, such as intermediate courts in 
capital cities and those above in the hierarchy. The combination of more exchange 
opportunities and higher legal, moral and cognitive barriers in conducting corruption 
compels judges from this “high group” to be more cautiously selective in choosing both 
the time and the partner for conduct of corrupt exchange. Connection or guanxi becomes 
absolutely necessary so as to protect exchange safety. Professional intermediaries are 
more frequently employed, who shield the judges from being directly incriminated by 
discontented bribers. More details of this initiation phase and the role of the 
guanxi-practices will be presented in chapter 4. 
 
At the performance phase, the absence of an effective and comprehensive anti 
money-laundering system makes it easy for bribers to transfer bribes to the bribed in 
various forms.231  When the corrupt exchange takes the form of favor exchange, which 
does not involve a straightforward payment of money or other tangible assets, the bribe is 
almost immune from detection. As for the corrupt judges, the requested court service can 
be delivered in one of two different approaches, depending on the individual judges’ 
different risk attitudes and also their capacity to exercise and manipulate discretion. The 
risky approach, that often results in overt and active rule-breaking, is taken by corrupt 
judges, who are risk-taking, enjoy little discretion and are incapable of manipulating the 
discretion within certain limits. When the second approach of delivery is taken, which is 
through manipulating judicial discretion either on substantive or procedural issues 
without overtly breaking the rules, the corrupt act remains hidden unless the bribe is 
detected. Delivery of corrupt services themes the contracting process of corrupt exchange 
                                                 
231 Ning Yu, "Fanxiqian Baogao: 350 Jia Jigou Bei Chachu [Anti Money-Laundering Report: 350 
Financial Institutions Punished]," Shanghai Zhengquan Bao, 5 September 2008. "Anti Money-Laundering 
Report 2007,"  (Central Bank of China, 2008). 
 72  
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
not only because the corrupt service is the main object of exchange, but also because in 
this phase the bribed has to interact with the formal institutions in order to fulfill his 
contractual obligations. The high volume and frequency of the occurrence of corrupt 
exchange in China’s courts indicates that certain features of the current judicial system in 
the country enable judges to perform their duties largely unchecked. What exactly are 
















Chapter 4 Understanding the initiation phase – 
Unveiling the “guanxi-practice” 
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In the autumn of 2003, five judges from three different courts in China received identical 
letters from Zhai Xuejun, a lawyer, who recently started to practice law in Beijing. The 
letter read, “I would like to have friendly cooperation with you…to share the litigation 
resources and the profits. You are welcome to introduce me to litigants in cases that you 
preside over…under the following conditions: 1) the claim of the dispute is more than 
300,000yuan; 2) the litigant has not retained a lawyer or it is possible to have that lawyer 
replaced; 3) the litigant is likely to win the case or to have the damages claimed by the 
other party reduced…I will let you share 40% of the retainer as your commission fee 
[author’s translation].” Attached to the letters was the lawyer’s business card. A couple of 
months later Zhai was summoned by the Beijing Bureau of Justice, to which the letters 
had been forwarded by the judges. Not long thereafter an administrative decision was 
reached by the Bureau disbarring Zhai on the ground of violation of the Chinese 
Lawyers’ Law.232  After the event, one of the judges, who had handed in the letter, said in 
an interview: “When I received the letter, I found it funny at first but then felt it was over 
the top. I knew many people tried to engage in guanxi-practice with judges. But the way 
this lawyer did it is really exceptional.”233  Apparently, what caught the judge’s attention 
was not the lawyer’s attempt to bribe but the “way” it was conducted. It makes one 
wonder: what makes Zhai’s “way” “exceptional”? What is “the way” in which bribery is 
supposed to be conducted and what makes the so-called guanxi-practice special? 
 
These are the questions that are seldom asked and addressed in scholarly literature on 
corruption in China. Most existing literature focus on the causal relations between 
corruption and the external political, economic and social environments, such as 
decentralization,234  marketization,235  anti-corruption design,236  judicial dependence237 
                                                 
232 See "Subtle Entanglement between Judges and Lawyers," 21 Century Economic Report, 30 Jun. 2005. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Yufan Hao, Michael Johnston, "Reform at the Crossroad: An Analysis of Chinese Corruption," (Dept. 
of Political Science, Colgate University, 1995). 
235 Ibid. Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2004). Ting Gong, "Forms and Characteristics of China's Corruption in the 1990s: Change with 
Continuity," Communist and Post-communist Studies 30, no. 3 (1997). Tak-wing Ngo, "Rent-Seeking and 
Economic Governance in the Structural Nexus of Corruption in China," Crime, Law and Social Change 49 
(2008). 
236 M. Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong 
(Havard University Press, 2004). Andrew Wedeman, "Win, Lose, or Draw? China's Quarter Century War 
on Corruption," Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2008). F. Sapio, "Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention 
in China," China information 22, no. 1 (2008). Stephen K. Ma, "The Dual Nature of Anti-Corruption 
Agencies in China," Crime, Law & Social Change 49 (2008). Qianwei Zhu, "Reorientation and Prospect of 
China's Combat against Corruption," Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2008). 
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and political privilege. 238  The enabling role of corrupt participants seldom attracts 
academic attention. Enabling in this context means that once the motivation of corruption 
has been established, corruption actors can also strategically plan their conduct to 
overcome the legal, moral and cognitive barriers, which are supposed to obstruct 
corruption. In order to investigate this enabling factor, one has to look into the interacting 
process of corrupt exchange at the micro-level. This is exactly the point of departure of 
this chapter. To put it in the overall analytical framework of this thesis, this chapter deals 
with, in particular, the beginning of the contracting process of corrupt exchange, namely 
the initiation phase, which is laid out in the previous chapter. More exactly, this chapter 
will seek to answer the following questions: 1) how exactly does corruption, notably 
bribery, start between a briber and the bribed; 2) why is corruption being conducted the 
way it is, and in particular, what role does guanxi-practice play in the process and why?  
 
It is necessary to point out here that the relationship between guanxi-practice and 
corruption has been debated for a long time, dividing China scholars. However, there 
seems much less argument about the significance of corruption and the salience of 
guanxi-practice as two separate social phenomena in China. Neither is there disagreement 
that the two phenomena are somehow connected. Differences of opinion stem from the 
fact that some scholars believe that guanxi-practice is “part of [the] cultural root” of 
corruption,239  fuelling the country’s rampant corruption;240  whereas others insist that 
guanxi-practice is distinct from corruption. 241  The latter group of scholars find 
guanxi-practice distinguishable from corruption since corruption is where two parties 
“enter into an impersonal relationship” and are “geared up to short-term immediate 
gain”;242  while guanxi-practice instead is “geared towards the cultivation of long-term 
mutual trust and the strengthening of relationships”243  and hence adds “an element of 
                                                                                                                                                 
237 Hao, "Reform at the Crossroad: An Analysis of Chinese Corruption." p.19. Olivia Yu, "Corruption in 
China's Economic Reform: A Review of Recent Observations and Explanations," Crime, Law & Social 
Change 50 (2008). p.174. 
238 Shuntian Yao, "Privilege and Corruption: The Problems of China's Socialist Market Economy," 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 61, no. 1 (2002). Ke Li, et.al., "Institutionalized Corruption 
and Privilege in China's Socialist Market Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Pacific Economic 
Review 10, no. 3 (2005). Xiaobo Lü, Cadres and Corruption, the Organizational Involution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Hilton Root, "Corruption in China: Has It 
Become Systemic?," Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996). 
239 Yu, "Corruption in China's Economic Reform: A Review of Recent Observations and Explanations." 
p.170. 
240 Gold, "An Introduction to the Study of Guanxi." p.3. 
241 P. Steidlmeier, "Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Management of Business Relationships in 
China," Journal of business ethics 20, no. 2 (1999). Alan Smart, "Gift, Bribes and Guanxi: A 
Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993). 
242 Carol A.G. Jones, "Capitalism, Globalisation and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal 
Change in China," Social & Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (1994). p.205. Such opinion is also most famously held 
by Mayfair Yang. See  
243 Ibid.  
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humanity to otherwise cold transactions”.244  Following this line of argument, some 
scholars believe that guanxi features “a culture of civility” 245  and functions as a 
“stabilizing alternative”246 or some kind of social glue fostering social harmony and 
solidarity247  and “complementing” the incomplete legal system248 . This chapter, by 
investigating how corruption takes place, will also seek to answer the question where and 
how corruption and guanxi-practice connect, and hence will also endeavor to provide new 
insights hitherto missing in the above discussion.   
 
Empirical data used in this chapter come from four types of sources. The first is formal 
and informal focused interviews of some 100 hours’ duration about unreported everyday 
corrupt practices. These interviews were conducted by the author during 2005-2008. The 
second is court documents or press release about cases involving bribe-taking, 
bribe-receiving or intermediating of bribery. The third source consists of numerous online 
diaries and essays concerning individuals’ personal experience of corrupt practices. Last 
but certainly not the least, this chapter also draws examples from Celadon (Qingci, in 
Chinese), a quasi-autobiography authored by an “insider”. This last source, the book 
Celadon needs a special introduction. The book contains the story of the rise and fall of 
an owner of an auction house, who obtained lucrative auction commissions from courts 
through “guanxi-practices”. Matching the story of the protagonist, the author Hu Gang 
(pen name Fushi), was convicted for bribing three judges with the sum of 490,000yuan in 
exchange for court auction commissions in 2003.249  Hu wrote Celadon in his cell during 
his one-year incarceration.250  After publication, the book attracted a large readership for 
it captured “the delicacy” between business and guanxi-practice, which is “worshiped and 
adeptly utilized by businessmen” in contemporary China.251  In an attempt to verify the 
objectivity of the episodes this chapter drew from the book, the author enquired Hu Gang 
by email, to which Hu responded as follows, “…the episodes you mentioned are fictional 
                                                 
244 Gold, "An Introduction to the Study of Guanxi." p.3. 
245 Ming-cheng M Lo, Eileen M. Otis, "Guanxi Civility: Processes, Potentials, and Contingencies," Politics 
& Society 31, no. 1 (2003). p.143. 
246 Jones, "Capitalism, Globalisation and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in 
China." p.215. 
247 Lo, "Guanxi Civility: Processes, Potentials, and Contingencies." Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, "The Gift 
Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 (1986). ———, 
"The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship," The 
China Quarterly 170 (2002). 
248 P.B. Potter, "Guanxi and the P.R.C. Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity," in Social 
Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi, ed. Thomas Gold, et. al. 
(2000). pp.194-5. 
249 Information is obtained from the court judgment of the criminal case against one of the judges Wang 
Kuang. Court Judgment, Loudi People’s Procuratorate vs. Wang Kuang, 2nd instance, Criminal Division, 
Hunan High Court [2005] No.129.  
250 Chenggong, "yige paimaihang laobao de mimi yu chanhui [The Secret and Confession of a Boss of an 
Auction House]," nanfang zhoumo [Southern Weekly], 28 Feb. 2007 
251 Fushi, Qingci [Celadon] (Changsha: Hunan Wenyi, 2006). Cover page.  
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as well as representative and objective as real life examples … there are probably no 
other alternatives to obtain real life examples [with detailed information about the 
performance of bribery] unless you have access to interrogation records of the 
investigative bodies … guanxi-practices in court litigation embody more of the hidden 
social codes of conduct, which most often can only be comprehended in mind but 
difficult to articulate”.252  Just as Hu had predicted, during the course of this research the 
author could not find any other source of documentation, which records the intricate 
interactions between bribers and the bribed more meticulously than Celadon does. 
Nevertheless, the author has attempted to mitigate the limitation inherent in this source of 
data by employing many real-life examples to confirm the conduct described in the 
Celadon. However, reliance on examples from a quasi-autographical text to underpin 
some of the arguments deployed in this chapter remains its main limitation.  
 
In this chapter, corruption is defined as the misuse of entrusted power in exchange for 
private benefits. Among all types of corrupt activities, the focus of this chapter is bribery, 
which has become the most common as well as damaging type of corruption in China in 
recent years.253  Through out this chapter, “bribery” is used as being synonymous with 
“corruption”. In order to avoid possible confusion which is likely to rise because of the 
equivocal nature of the term “guanxi”, this chapter uses “guanxi-practice” as an 
amalgamated concept representing the conduct and the process of conduct of soliciting, 
receiving, offering or delivering a service by one party to another, which satisfies the 
following conditions: 1) the service involves the exercise of entrusted power by one party, 
resulting in favorable treatment to the other, which also means that at least one of the 
parties is endowed with entrusted power, most notably, from a public entity; 2) the 
service is delivered either as a reciprocation to a favor previously received from the other 
party or as an act to generate proper reciprocation from the other party in the specified or 
unspecified future. “Guanxi-exchange” is occasionally used interchangeably with 
“guanxi-practice”. The equivalent Chinese expressions of this concept include most 
phrases, in which “guanxi” is used as an entity on which an agent can act upon, such as 
“gao guanxi”, “la (to pull) guanxi”, “zou (through) guanxi”, “tuo (to present something 
through) guanxi” or “guanxi yunzuo (operation of guanxi)” rather than a quality of 
relatedness, such as “xing guanxi (sexual relationship) or “tongxue guanxi (classmate 
relation)”.  
 
The rest of chapter is structured in three parts. The first two parts draws the picture of 
how corruption at the micro-level takes place between bribers and the bribed through 
guanxi-practice and gift-giving. The third part answers the question why corruption takes 
                                                 
252 Email communication with Fushi, 4 June 2009. 
253 Guo, "Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis." p.357.  
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place in the way described in the previous sections and what role guanxi-practice plays in 
the process and why. 
 
4.2. Guanxi-practice in bribery - one example 
 
If Zhai’s approach to bribing was deemed too bizarrely “exceptional” to be acceptable by 
the judge, as shown in the story introduced at the beginning of this chapter, what, one 
must ask, would a supposedly acceptable approach consist of? To answer this question, 
one would need to have direct access to the bribery scene. This requirement would, 
however, constitute an insurmountable challenge to the researcher since the type of 
corrupt exchange investigated in this chapter is conducted in clandestine environment, 
which means that the only witnesses of the exchange are also participants of the exchange. 
The second-best solution is to rebuild the scene from the practitioners’ narrative. In doing 
that, one needs to be careful in choosing the relevant form of material, providing the 
narrator maximum space for elaboration and truthful reenactment. Celadon, the 
quasi-autobiography introduced above provides us such a rare opportunity. Centered on 
the life of Zhang Zhongping, a successful auctioneer, the book draws a vivid portrait of 
how this allegorical protagonist managed his business through guanxi-practices with 
court officials. Like its author, the protagonist of Celadon, Zhang, runs an auction house 
in a provincial capital city. Zhang’s business primarily comes from court commissions. 
The italicized text is the author’s own summary of one episode from the book.  
 
Zhang knew through his contacts that Hou is the judge directly responsible 
for a pending auction commission. Zhang wants to obtain Judge Hou’s 
endorsement. But at this moment, Zhang is hardly an acquaintance of this 
judge. During one of his regular visits in the office of the enforcement 
division Zhang learned that Judge Hou had a drinking habit. Today Zhang is 
delivering to the judge a full case of “health-preserving” liquor featuring a 
mysterious aphrodisiac formula presented in fine porcelain. The liquor case 
is heavy and Judge Hou’s apartment is on the 7th floor of a residential 
complex without a lift. Zhang could have had his assistant deliver the gift. 
However, he decided to make it personal. When Zhang finally showed up at 
Judge Hou’s doorstep, panting and puffing, the judge was a little surprised 
and immediately invited Zhang in. Putting down the case, Zhang explained, 
“It is a gift to me from a friend who runs a liquor manufactory. I don’t drink. 
So I want someone who would actually enjoy it to have it.” Judge Hou asked: 
“How much does it cost?” Zhang said, “The product has not been put on the 
market yet. So I don’t know the price. But I do know that it cost my friend 
millions just for the trademark and the formula.” Hou said nothing. During 
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the visit Zhang did not mention a word about the court commission. On the 
same visit Zhang noticed that Hou was quite concerned about his son’s 
calligraphic performance. After the visit, Zhang managed to persuade a 
famous calligraphist to agree to see the son. Soon the tutorship is arranged. 
Zhang paid the tuition fee without asking the judge for permission. The judge 
did not say much. He just patted Zhang on his shoulder.  
 
After having made this tutor arrangement, Zhang is treated almost like a 
family member by Judge Hou’s wife. He can pay casual visits to the judge’s 
home without an appointment. During one such visit, Zhang asked for two 
pieces of calligraphic exercise of Judge Hou’s son, which he put up to an 
artwork auction held by a company run by his former colleague. He then 
asked a friend to bid for the calligraphy as he instructed. A few days later, 
Zhang visited Judge Hou again and brought an envelope. Zhang explained it 
was some money he earned for Xiaoping, Judge Hou’s son. The envelope 
contains 3,600yuan in cash. Judge Hou appeared angry and said, “Are you 
kidding me?” Zhang responded: “I am not kidding. It is indeed the market 
price of Xiaoping’s calligraphy.” Judge Hou said, “Tell me the truth. Are 
you behind this operation?” Zhang said, “How is that possible? The auction 
was not even hosted by my company.” Zhang showed Judge Hou the auction 
certificate and added: “I’ve even deducted 10% off the income on your 
behalf as auction commission fee. It can stand any investigation.” Zhang put 
the envelope on the table. Judge Hou asked no further questions. 
 
It was only before Zhang was about to leave that Judge Hou raised the topic 
of the court auction. “The court would soon decide to which biding auction 
house to give the auction”, the judge said, “The selection procedure is not 
clear yet…” Then the judge revealed the name of the manager of the auction 
applicant. Zhang immediately proposed, “How about we go fishing together 
another day, you, me and Manager Yan (the auction applicant) … There will 
be no agenda and no business talk. We just go out and breathe some fresh 
air. What do you say?” Hou said, “Boss Zhang, it is not like that I am 
consulting you on anything… I have never said anything about the auction … 
you arrange whatever you want.” Zhang said, “Of course, of course.”254   
 
Compared with the story introduced at the beginning of this chapter, auctioneer Zhang’s 
career shared many common characteristics with that of lawyer Zhai. They both started 
their business from scratch, so to speak. Both moved to a new business and a new city. 
                                                 
254 Fushi, Qingci [Celadon]. Ch 8.  
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They both faced the same problem – a lack of clients. Their work was centered on the 
same institution – the courts. And they both committed the same illicit conduct – seeking 
to acquire businesses opportunities from judges in an unethical and unlawful manner. 
Their respective performance, however, is worlds apart. So are the outcomes. Firstly, 
lawyer Zhai offered the judge a future conditional profit-return, while Zhang provided 
unconditional gratuities to the judge ahead of any future arrangements. Secondly, lawyer 
Zhai sent a proposal for an illicit business deal via post to a group of judges, who hardly 
knew him personally; while Zhang deliberately avoided uttering, let alone putting down 
in written form, any words that might incriminate his judge. In short, lawyer Zhai took 
corruption as a simple and straight-forward market transaction while auctioneer Zhang 
embarked on a painstakingly elaborate process building trust, deploying gifts and 
gratuities before entering the transaction. In an interview, Hu Gang, the author of 
Celadon, revealed that he had spent half a year to build trust with a high-court judge 
before he was given the first court commission.255In colloquial Chinese language, this 
strategic trust-building process is exactly what guanxi-practice is about.  
 
4.3. Guanxi-practice and gifts 
 
According to a survey among 100 persons, who were prosecuted for bribe-giving, 94.2% 
stated that they would “warm up the relationship” first before they would bribe with 
money.256  The “warm-up” always starts with the offerings of gifts or other gratuitous 
services for the benefit of the bribed and at the expense of the briber. Gifts foster a sense 
of indebtedness,257  as experienced guanxi-practitioners often say: “The thing is half done 
once the gift is accepted”.258  When an official accepts a gift, it normally means that the 
official is willing to repay the debt to the gift-giver in their future encounters. Gift-giving 
has, therefore, almost become an expert skill of experienced guanxi-practitioners, such as, 
the protagonist of Celadon.259  In analyzing this process of gift-giving, it is worthwhile to 
introduce the following themes.  
 
                                                 
255 See http://www.csonline.com.cn/news/chsh/200608/t20060806_504840.htm  
256 According to the survey report, 85 of the 100 persons responded. The survey was conducted by Haizhu 
District Procuratorate in Guangdong Province in collaboration with the Clean Politics and Governance 
Research Center of Qsinghua University. Gufeng Huang, Rui Li, "Haizhuqu Jianchayuan Dui Xinghui 
Renyuan De Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao [Survey Report of Bribe-Giving Conducted by Haizhu District 
Procuratorate]," (2006) 
257 Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. Ian Cunnison (New York: Norton, 1967). 
258 This is a statement that the author heard very often during her fieldwork in China. 
259 Popular self-help books can be easily found on how to have your gifts accepted. By searching on the 
online bookstore, www.dangdang.com, the key word “gift-offering (songli)” hits 203 results. If one puts in 
the words “lingdao(superior)” and “songli(gift-giving)” in the search column of www.baidu.com., 
suggested topics include “how to give gifts to [your] superior”, “what gifts to give to [your] superior”, 
“what to say when presenting a gift to [your] superior”, “skills of gift-giving to [your] superior” etc. 
 81 
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
4.3.1. Choosing a “gift” 
 
A good gift draws the bribed into a relationship. A poor one repels the bribed and invites 
rejection. Zhang’s first gift to Judge Hou, the case of liquor, is an example for a good gift. 
First of all, the gift is valuable. “It costs millions just for the trademark and formula”. Yet, 
the fact that the product has not yet been put on the market results in a sense of ambiguity 
in terms of its value, which can be employed as a defense for any possible future 
corruption investigation. Zhang’s meticulous deliberation impressed the judge, who 
responded in the book, “You really used your brain in choosing this gift. If people from 
the procuratorate ask about it, we can simply say I am helping you to conduct a 
pre-market customer evaluation”.260  Zhang’s second gift, the tutorship for Judge Hou’s 
son, was probably the most appreciated. It is not only because the service is of great value 
to the judge but also because it demonstrates Zhang’s “sincere” care for the judge’s 
family. Since then, the trust in the relationship between Zhang and the judge reached a 
high level. Zhang’s third delivery, consequently, that of the cash, is no longer perceived 
as threatening and disturbing.  
 
Evidently, what constitutes a good gift varies from case to case and from time to time. 
What was popular as a gift in the 1960s, such as a basket of eggs or a piece of fine cloth, 
will now be considered contemptible inappropriate even in rural villages. Twenty years 
ago banqueting in VIP chambers of restaurants used to be a popular inducement on its 
own. Nowadays it only serves as a “get-to-know-each-other” exercise. 261  The 
contemporary increase of the economic value of gifts seems to be commensurate with the 
increase of the GDP. In recent years it is international luxury items that frequently appear 
in the evidence lists in corruption prosecutions.262 At the time of writing, prosecutors in 
Chongqing City found more than 100 items of international designer’s clothes and 200 
pairs of expensive shoes in the residence of a local official, who took bribes worth 
1,600,000yuan. 263  According to some studies, the rapid rise of consumption of 
luxury-products in China, being the third largest in the world,264  is partly attributable to 
the spreading of corruption.265   
 
Choosing a good gift is not always easy. From a briber’s viewpoint, the first issue to be 
decided is how much should be spent on the gift. It should not be too expensive so as to 
                                                 
260 Fushi, Qingci [Celadon]. Ch.2. p18. 
261 Interview T.028. 
262 Just to name two examples, see the case of Wang Xuebing, former Chairman of China Construction 
Bank, and the case of Mu Suixin, former Mayor of Shenyang City, Liaoning Province.   
263 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-12/16/content_10510994.htm.  
264 It is estimated that China will consume 29% of the world’s luxury goods by 2015, making it second 
only to Japan. http://seekingalpha.com/article/81603-luxury-products-in-china.  
265 See http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=128850&p_qry=SARS.  
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contain the briber’s risk of economic loss in case the bribed official fails to deliver the 
expected service in the future. It certainly should not be too cheap to invite rejection 
either. A rule of thumb is that the value of the gift should be proportional to the value of 
the service that one has in mind requesting. Two packs of cigarettes will unlikely go 
down well if one desires to obtain a public procurement contract worth millions. In fields 
where corruption takes place regularly, bribes are taken as regular kickbacks, the rate of 
which is more or less commonly understood by the “insiders”.266 
 
Once its value has been decided, the choice of the gift becomes easier to make. After all, 
the best gift is the gift most appreciated by its recipient. China is no longer an economy 
of acute scarcity. Ordinary commodities can hardly please sophisticated officials, who 
already enjoy various privileges and benefits. Some bribers spend a lot of time on 
investigating and discovering personal preferences of targeted officials. An interviewee 
told me in confidence: “One has to have some kind of hobby”. 267  Many do. Mai 
Chongkai, former president of Guangdong High Court, was able to perfect his 
performance in golf-playing after having played on numerous golf-courses across the 
country, all as treats from his favor-seekers.268  Hao Heping, the main character in the 
notorious national drug-safety scandal in 2007, once accepted three golf-club 
membership cards with a total value of 500,000yuan from pharmaceutical manufacturers 
in exchange for favors in license application.269During an anti-corruption campaign in 
2000 in Guangdong province, 270  the location of 70 golf courses, 271  135 golf-club 
payment-cards were confiscated from officials and five officials were asked to resign 
from their honorary positions in various golf associations.   
 
Mahjiong, a popular gambling game in China, is also often used as a setting for bribing. 
For a long time, mahjiong-playing has become a routine program of guanxi-practice after 
banquets. It is a service provided by almost all tea-houses, nightclubs or other 
entertaining establishments. While playing the game, bribers can bribe, for instance, by 
deliberately losing to the targeted official. Bribers call this game-playing as yewupai 
(game-for-business)272 , since it is not really a gambling contest if one party contrives to 
lose. The only problem with this approach to bribing is that the bribed could also attribute 
                                                 
266 For example, according to an internal analytical report on judicial corruption by Huang Jianliang, a 
journalist of The Procuratorate Daily, some “customary practice (hanggui)” has developed among 
participants of corruption in courts. For instance, the distributing ratio of profit gained from court auctions 
is known to be 4:3:3, which means that 40% goes to judges involved, 40% goes to the auction house and 
30% is spent on expenses of running costs and the cost to “dadian” other officials on contingent issues. 
Excerpt of the report can be seen at http://news.sohu.com/20061202/n246751848.shtml.   
267 Interview T.028. 
268 See http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/gdtodayimportant/200312200081.htm.  
269 See http://sports.sohu.com/20070612/n250528660.shtml.  
270 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2004-05/25/content_1489203.htm.  
271 Ibid. 
272 Celadon has an elaborated description of the scene in Chapter 3. 
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his winning to his own good luck or good skill rather than to the “generous help” from 
the briber. To avoid this kind of “misunderstanding”, experienced bribers would organize 
a game for the targeted official with others and provide the official with the 
betting-money, instead of participating and deliberately losing. If the official wins, the 
briber would insist that the official keep the win as “xinkufei”, meaning allowance for the 
labor.273  “Yingle shi nide, shule shi wode (whatever won is yours, whatever lost is mine)”, 
as the briber would say. Bribing-through-gambling has become so popular that this 
approach to bribing was recently recognized and incorporated in the criminal law against 
bribery.274  When some officials are no longer content with the challenge of traditional 
mahjiong games, they visit Macau, the closest place to mainland China, where 
professional casinos legally operate.275  One of the notorious gamblers is Ma Xiangdong, 
former deputy major of Shenyang City, Liaoning Province, who visited Macau 17 times 
in a period of two and half years. When he lost all his bets, he called in “help” from his 
briber. Once, when a briber once complained about the liquidity problem of his company, 
the deputy major, who was in charge of zoning and public construction, waived taxation 
worth of 12 million yuan for a construction project undertaken by the briber’s company. 
In exchange, Ma was able to “borrow” from the briber 500,000US$, all being spent in 
casinos.276  Not surprisingly, these big-spending officials soon became the favorite clients 
of those casino-owners.277 
 
In comparison to these gamblers, some officials are found amenable to artistic 
gratification. A few corporation executives once commissioned the State Orchestra to 
play a symphony composed by Wang Yi, former vice-chairman of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, who, “by accident”, discovered his “talent” in composing in his 
late 40s during a trip to the Tibet Plateau. 278  Compared with Wang’s hobby, art 
collection is more popular among “artistically minded” officials, which possibly 
coincides with a significant boost to antique and art markets in China.279 A director of a 
local police bureau in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province, had collected several hundreds 
                                                 
273 “Former Chief-prosecutor Bribe-taking in Gambling Games and Was Sentenced for 8.5 Years”, Aug. 
29, 2007. http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20061029/13707123_3.html. Also see the 
Defendant’s Statement in the public prosecution against Tian Zixiang, the Director of the Appraisal Center 
of Agricultural Machinery. 
274 “Guanyu Banli Shouhui Xingshi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinions on the 
Prosecution and Adjudication on Cases of Bribe-Taking]”, jointly issued by the Supreme People's Court 
and the Supreme Procuratorate in 2007. Art.5. 
275 See report at http://news.tom.com/1002/3291/2005121-1785942.html. Also see “Chinese Officials ‘lost 
millions’”, BBC News, Jan., 10, 2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7821747.stm  
276 Court judgment: Nanjing City Procuratorate vs. Ma Xiangdong, Criminal Division, Nanjing 
Intermediate Court [2001] No.110.   
277 See report at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/zhonghuawenzhai/2001-04-01/new/(12)%201.html.   
278 See the link http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-06-12/100069029.html  
279 For a brief history of the development of the art market in China since the economic reform, see 
http://www.china.com.cn/culture/txt/2008-11/30/content_16875708.htm.  
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of antique items as presents from “friends”.280 In a poorly monitored auction industry, 
pieces of art constitute a wise choice of bribe favored by some for their 
money-laundering function. The usual practice is that firstly the would-be bribed puts a 
piece of antique of little value up for auction and then the briber buys off the piece in the 
auction at the agreed price with the agreed terms of payment. 281  In another case 
discovered by prosecutors in Nanjing City, a real-estate developer bought off two 
paintings directly from an official, who was in charge of state confiscation of land. The 
appraised value of the painting was 3,000yuan, whereas the developer paid 
,000,000yuan.282   1
 
In general, gifts are preferred over pure money at the initial stage of guanxi-practice, 
when the trust is not yet strong. Meanwhile, a modern invention - shopping-card 
(gouwuka, basically a voucher in the shape of a plastic card with a magnetic stripe, on 
which information of the credit can be stored) - makes the perfect graft between money 
and gift.283  The State Council had issued a regulation prohibiting shopping-card issuance 
in 2001 but the cards are simply too popular to be banned in practice.284  Usually, such 
cards are issued by large shopping malls, which offer a wide range of product lines to 
satisfy diversified needs of card holders. During one of my interviews, an owner of an 
intermediating company excused herself in the middle of the conversation and told me 
she had to rush off to deliver some shopping-cards as presents of the upcoming Spring 
Festival to her “patrons”, who helped her in winning some public procurement biddings 
that her company represented.285 According to a local procuratorate, 92 percent of the 
officials prosecuted for bribe-taking in its jurisdiction in 2007 had accepted 
shopping-cards from bribers, among whom one had taken as many as 45 cards, worth of 
110,000yuan. None of these officials had rejected a shopping-card when it was offered 
them.286  Some officials are completely at ease when receiving piles of shopping cards but 
feel uncomfortable with money.287  A 5,000yuan bribe was rejected twice by a county 
official in Shandong Province but was accepted when the same amount was transferred 
                                                 
280 See http://www.zjol.com.cn/05zjc/system/2006/11/04/007969601.shtml.  
281 See http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/collection/yspmarket/20050413/11231513614.shtml; also see 
http://www.cnhubei.com/200502/ca691716.htm.  
282 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-02/26/content_7670023.htm.  
283 Shopping card is so popular that an online market of swapping and exchanging has been established in 
some cities. Just to name a few, http://shop.nnsky.com/zhuanti/card/card.asp (for shopping-cards
Nanning city); http://bj.fenlei168.com/F_M
 issued in 
aiMai/17B457S0Q0S0S0S0S0B0Z1.html (Beijing); 
http://sz.ganji.com/gouwuka/ (Shenzhen). 
284 See “Notification of the Termination of Issuance and Circulation of Shopping Vouchers” (2001), Issued 
by the Ministry of Economy and Trade, The People’s Bank and the Jiufeng Office of the State Council.  
ant Crimes (Gouwuka Yi Youfa Zhiwu Fanzui),"  
’ commentary at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-02/19/content_7627862.htm
285 Interview M.033. 
286 Jinzeng Lu, "Shopping-Card Induces Civil Serv
http://www.jcrb.com/200707/ca616445.htm. 
287 See prosecutors   
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into a shopping-card delivered by the same briber.288  Shopping-cards are accepted as a 
popular form of bribe because it provides its recipients the discretion to choose or 
consume the gifts at their own convenience. It is transferable and is accurate in value, 
which makes it much easier for both bribers and the bribed to register how much has been 
offered and accepted. In short, it is as good as money but without the latter’s projection of 
enality.    
.3.2. Addressing a “gift” 
ism is probably the most 
oticeable behavioral pattern in the performance of bribery. 





After a bribe has been chosen, the next step is the delivery. It is only at that point one 
would realize how to address the bribe becomes “an issue”. As Noonan detected, “there is 
no specific, unambiguous word for bribe” and “no common terms designating and 
denigrating the briber and the bribee”.289  Bribers with some common sense would 
understand that a bribe should not be addressed as a “bribe” or explained as an 
“inducement” for an illicit service, since those words project dashing instrumentality of 
the briber and illegality to its recipient, who is the last person a briber wants to offend. As 
demonstrated in the story between Zhang and Judge Hou in Celadon, the choice of 
language is all important. Some words shall never be used in any circumstances. Some 
can be used only in relation to certain persons, with whom a trusting relationship has 
been established. Risk and trust are both subjective perceptions, which respond to the 
slightest observation of behavior. This is certainly the case in the Chinese culture, where 
reading between the lines is a regular communicative practice.290  Therefore, when a term 
of reference to the bribe is required, euphemism is indispensable. In all the cases 
investigated in this research, terms such as “bribe (huijin)”, “bribery (huilu)” 
“bribe-giving/taking (xinghui/shouhui)” have never been employed by bribery 
practitioners for self-references. In this context, euphem
n
 
In the course of this research, the following common euphemisms have been found, for 
example, “yanjiuqian” (money for cigarettes and liquor), “yidian xiaoyisi” or “yidian 
biaoshi” (a little expression [of gratitude]) and haochu (benefits). Coded language is 
employed in circumstances, where a higher degree of discreetness is required. For 
example, in one scene of delivery, a briber pointed to a shopping bag and said to Tang 
 
288 supra note 54. 
289 John T. Noonan, Bribes (1984).  
290 Bob Hodge, Kam Louie, The Politics of Chinese Language and Culture: The Art of Reading Dragons 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998). ch.5. pp.96-119. Ambiguity of the Chinese language as a 
linguistic feature was discussed in the following literature: Matthew Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century: 
The Journals of Matthew Ricci 1583-1610 (New York: Random House, 1953), Hui-ching Chang, "The 
"Well-Defined" Is "Ambiguous" - Indeterminacy in Chinese Conversation," Journal of Pragmatics 31 
(1999). Q. S. Tong, "Inventing China - the Use of Orientalist Views on the Chinese Language," Inventions 
2, no. 1 (2000). 
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Jikai, former vice-president of Changsha Intermediate Court, “there is mi (refers to cash 
but literally means rice) in it”.291  Euphemisms are also applied when bribers talk about 
their own act of bribery to a third party. The most frequently used phrases include 
“dadian”,292  “goudui”293and most notable of all, the “guanxi-practice” expressions as 
enlisted in the introduction of this chapter. These “guanxi-practice” expressions include, 
for instance, “zou guanxi” (go through guanxi), “tuo guanxi” (to do something through 
guanxi), “guanxi yunzuo” (operation of guanxi), “huodong guanxi” (to activate guanxi), 
etc.294  In some public sectors, in which corruption is pervasive and bribery a common 
practice, euphemisms become less evasive. “xiaoyisi (a little expression)” is substituted 
by comparatively more direct terms, such as, “haochufei (benefit-fee)” or “xinkufei (fee 
r the labor)”, which suggest what is offered is a payment of a service.295   
ants to 
resent himself as offensive or threatening when he is at the mercy of the bribed.  
.3.3. Acceptance of a “gift” 
                                                
fo
 
In general, we use euphemisms when we are reluctant to utter some semantically 
transparent terms to denote unsettling topics.296  In the account of bribery, nothing is more 
“unsettling” than the concept of corruption and any normative terms related to it. Not to 
rub something into the face of the bribed is the least a briber can do and the least that 





Sometimes when the bribed official has difficulties to settle with a venal image, only 
employing euphemisms will not be sufficient for the bribe to be accepted. It is especially 
the case when an official is offered a bribe for the first time.298  Under this circumstance, 
further persuasion becomes necessary. According to a survey among 100 officials, who 
 
291 Court Judgment: Ruanling County Procuratorate vs. Tang Jikai, 2nd Instance, Huaihua Intermediate 
Court [2006] No.52. 
292 Among these expressions, dadian is the only one that was inherited from imperial times and still 
popularly applied. The term “dadian guanxi” hit 2,120,000 results when searched on www.baidu.com. (8 
Dec., 2007). If one expands the search and include terms, such as “shangxia (literally means up and down) 
dadian”, “qianhou (literally means front and back) dadian”, the number of hits will be even higher.  
293 The term was originally used to refer wine blending. This evolved meaning is more popularly used in 
the southwest China. 
294 As a linguistic phenomenon, the semantic meaning of “guanxi” in these phrases has evolved beyond “a 
status of relatedness” and become an independent entity by itself, which the practitioners can “operate”, 
“activate” and “do something through”.  
295 These terms repetitively appeared in the cases investigated in this research and can be easily located in 
corruption reports in the media. 
296 Matthew S. McGlone, Jennifer A. Batchelor, "Looking out for Number One: Euphemism and Face " 
Journal of Communication 53, no. 2 (2003). p251. 
297 Experiments also found that instead of concern for the addressee’s feelings, speakers apply euphemisms 
“out of concern for themselves for self-presentational purposes”. Ibid. 
298 Gufeng Huang, Rui Li, "Haizhuqu Jianchayuan Dui Xinghui Renyuan De Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao 
[Survey Report of Bribe-Taking Conducted by Haizhu District Procuratorate]," (2006) 
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were prosecuted for bribe-taking, the most convincing persuasions are “This is what you 
deserve. Don’t be too humble” and “you are not giving me face if you don’t accept it”.299  
Another common but somewhat circuitous tactic consists of setting up an imaginary 
straw man first and then to claim that the bribe is to cover the expense of engaging the 
straw man rather than the bribed to carry out the necessary corrupt acts. For example, one 
of my interviewees reported that she had once invited an official to dinner, to whom she 
had submitted an application for a residence permit. After dinner she handed the official 
an envelope containing cash. At first, the official declined to accept it. My interviewee 
insisted, saying, “Please take it. What I requested is not an easy task. This (the money in 
the envelope) is not for you but for you to dadian300  other officials. This is just to cover 
our expenses.”301  As she expected, the envelope was then accepted. 
rty). In fact, the judge appeared to be actually doing Zhang a 
vor by accepting his gift.  
 … it will be 
e being unreasonable … I will grant them a favor and accept the gifts.”302 
                                                
y
 
The auction house owner Zhang in Celadon excelled in this art of performance. In order 
to avoid possible rejection of the gift or gratuity that he offered, Zhang always 
thoughtfully provided the judge with alternative reasons for acceptance, thereby 
neutralizing the venality projected by the gift. For example, during his first visit, Zhang 
stage-managed the scene by carrying the heavy liquor-case all the way up to the judge’s 
apartment on the seventh floor. When the judge saw Zhang appear at his doorstep, next to 
the liquor-case, heavily-breathing, the judge said, “I shall accept your kind intent…If I 
don’t accept your gift and insist that you carry it all the way back downstairs, you would 
curse me in your mind, wouldn’t you?” In this twisted discourse, it looks as though the 
judge had decided to accept the gift not because it was a gift which he would actually 
enjoy having but because he did not want to be “bujin renqing” (behaving without any 
consideration for the other pa
fa
 
Great resemblance is found in a similar speech of the Empress Dowager over a century 
ago when she accepted gifts at her extravagant 60th birthday party, which took mandarins 
two years to prepare. Having announced previously that she did not want anything costly 
in view of the hardship of foreign wars inflicted upon the country at that moment, 
nevertheless, the Empress decided to take the treasures sent in from all corners of the 
country. In her acceptance speech, she said, “The gifts were presented by officials, who 





300 See footnote 60. 
301 Interview H.022. 
302 Hengjun Ren, Rules in the Officialdom of Late Qing Dynasty [Wanqing Guanchang Guize Yanjiu] 
(Haikou: Hainan, 2003). pp.125-6. 
 88  
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
In order to reduce the venality of bribe-taking, many bribers choose to deliver the gifts at 
traditional holidays or other ritual occasions, including weddings and funerals in the 
family of the targeted official, when gifts are customarily exchanged. According to the 
aforementioned survey conducted by Haizhu Procuratorate among 100 bribers, 45.8% of 
the respondents said they would choose to bribe during the spring festival.303  Such 
occasions seem to have provided more legitimacy to cash-bribes, addressed as “lijin” 
(gift-money) wrapped in red envelopes (hongbao). When the competition for favor is 
intense, in order to maintain a good relationship with the targeted official, bribers feel 
compelled to send hongbao on any occasion which entails financial costs for the family 
of the targeted official, such as traveling, illness, moving, and opening of school-terms of 
the official’s children. According to the same survey among 100 bribers mentioned above, 
0.2% of the respondents had chosen to bribe during the months of August and 
sonal relationship. The quality of this relationship (guanxi) 
is a variable that affects the decision of the person concerned on whether he would 
                                                
5
September, the time of the commencement of new school terms.304 
 
For risk-conscious officials, whether to accept a bribe does not only involve an issue as to 
what is offered but also as to who offers it. According to the previously mentioned survey 
among bribe-taking officials, 80% of the respondents stated that they would choose to 
accept bribes selectively depending on who the bribers are. 47% chose to accept from 
“people who look loyal and trust-worthy”; 40% chose to accept from “people who look 
rich”.305  The weight of these “extra variables” increases as the value of the public 
resources that an official is entrusted to allocate increases. It is because these officials are 
usually “chased after” by many bribers.306  Hence they can afford to be “picky” and 
choose to exchange only with bribers, who are not only generous with “gifts” but also 
have “likable” disposition. It will be over-ambitious to attempt to generalize the qualities 
required for the “likableness”. However, in the context of bribery, a few characteristics 
are quite identifiable, for example, generosity, loyalty and discreetness, all as indications 
of whether the briber is likely to act opportunistically. This is exactly why in situations 
where guanxi-practice is called for, the participants would emphasize the importance of 
the quality of the personal relationship between the favor-seeker and the favor-grantor. 
This is also why “guanxi-practice” phrases are named after the word “guanxi”, which 
indicates the existence of a per
engage in a certain exchange. 
 
303 Supra note 24. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Gufeng Huang, Rui Li, "Haizhuqu Jianchayuan Dui Xinghui Renyuan De Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao 
[Survey Report of Bribe-Taking Conducted by Haizhu District Procuratorate]," (2006) 
306 For example, Xu Guoyuan, former major of Chifeng City confessed that people who had bribed him 
were so many that it was easier for him to recollect the names of those who had not bribed him rather than 
those who had. See http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-08/534042.html.  
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4.4. Guanxi-practice and corruption 
 
Research shows that corruption in China is becoming more “intensified” and 
“institutionalized”;307  that corrupt activities are more secretive; and that they involve 
greater economic value and complex arrangements. 308  Such corrupt operations are 
certainly not the same as a traffic officer receiving 50yuan from an offender in exchange 
for dropping a ticket, an operation which is simple, finishes on the spot and leaves little 
evidence. Judicial corruption for example can not finish with a single act; it is regulated 
by more complicated procedures; it involves multiple players and its completion takes a 
much longer period of time. Corruption becomes more risky as the problem of corruption 
has been moved to the top of the political agenda and anti-corruption campaigns have 
become more intensive. Even though the overall apprehension rate is low, officials are 
cing the risk of more severe punishment than in many other countries, if detected and 
rrupt transactions is more significant since the loss resulting from 
on-performance can not be redressed through legal institutions because of the illegality 
government adopted a strategy of identifying with anti-corruption dissidents in the 
                                                
fa
convicted.309   
 
This illicit feature of corrupt exchange entails two risks for its participants. The first is the 
risk of external exchange safety, which refers to detection and punishment. The second is 
the risk of internal exchange safety, which rises when one of the exchange parties behave 
opportunistically. Such risk occurs, often enough, when the performance of two parties 
does not take place simultaneously, which is exactly the case of the more complex type of 
corrupt conduct just explained above. The party who performs first bears the risk of 
non-performance of the other party. Compared with legal transactions, the risk of 
opportunism in co
n
of the exchange.  
 
Sentiments of moral repugnance and censure towards corruption are, presumably, not as 
prevalent in China as in western countries since the boundary between state and society is 
rather “blurred” and the concept of public interest has not yet taken root. Nevertheless, 
individuals are certainly more aware of public ethics today especially since the 
 
307 Andrew Wedeman, "The Intensification of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly 180 (2005). 
p.920. Guo, "Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis." p.364. Ren, "Institutionalized 
Corruption: Power Overconcentration of the First-in-Command in China." 
308 Ting Gong, "Dangerous Collusion: Corruption as a Collective Venture in Contemporary China," 
Communist and Post-communist Studies 35 (2002). Haibin Ma, "Dangqian Zhiwu Fanzui De Tedian 
Yuanyi He Fasheng Fazhan Qushi Jiqi Fangfan Duice [Characteristics, Causes, Trends and 
Counter-Measures Regarding White-Collar Crimes in Contemproary China]," in Zhongguo Zhiwu Fanzui 
Yufang Diaocha Baogao [Investigative Report on Professional Crimes and Its Prevention of China], ed. 
Criminology Research Society of China (2004). 
309 The most severe sentence of bribe-taking and embezzlement is death penalty. Chinese Criminal Law. 
Art.383, 385. 
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official political narratives as a means to “retain and even strengthen its political 
legitimacy”.310 Cognitive dissonance, related to moral censure, also constitutes a barrier 
to the contracting process of corrupt exchange. Cognitive dissonance is the psychological 
experience of discomfort and unease caused by the disparity of one’s related 
cognitions.311  In the context of bribery, it consists of a contradiction of what one claims 
in public and what one does in private. For example, most people would normally feel a 
sense of unease taking a bribe after having delivered a public speech promising honest 
onduct in office.   
ssonance 
ill also hold potential corrupt participants back from manifesting their intent.  
their bribe is turned down; however, bribe-solicitation, regardless of its result, is an 
                                                
c
 
The risk of detection and punishment, the risk of opportunistic behavior of the other 
exchange party, the moral costs and the cognitive dissonance constitute the main barriers, 
impeding the contracting process of corrupt exchange. A direct manifestation of such 
obstacles is the cumbersome initiating process involving the exhibition and 
communication of the intent to conduct corrupt exchange, a prerequisite for any 
transaction to take place. We tend to be blind to the significance of exhibition and 
communication of intent to exchange because firstly we exchange most things we need in 
established market-places, where the intent to exchange is evidently displayed and 
secondly in day-to-day non-corrupt social contexts such intent to exchange can be 
naturally expressed. However, in corruption, unscrupulous revelation of one’s intent to 
exchange something which should not be subject to exchange can be incriminating, 
which raises the risk of exposure and sanction. Moral awareness and cognitive di
w
 
However, these barriers are placed asymmetrically between the bribers and the bribed. 
Firstly, the bribed are facing more severe legal sanction than the bribers if the corrupt 
activities are detected. According to the Chinese Criminal Law (1997), the offense of 
giving a bribe is subject to prosecution only when the value of the bribe exceeds 
10,000yuan, whereas for the offense of taking a bribe the threshold is half of that amount, 
i.e. 5,000yuan. The highest sentence for the offense of giving a bribe is life imprisonment, 
while for taking a bribe it is the death penalty. Bribers are not subject to prosecution if 
 
310 Carolyn L. Hsu, "Political Narratives and the Production of Legitimacy: The Case of Corruption in 
Post-Mao China." p.52. 
311 Cognitive dissonance is “one of the most influential theories” in social psychology. The gist of this 
theory is that when two cognitions are relevant to one another, they are either consonant or dissonant. Two 
cognitions are consonant if one follows the other and they are dissonant if one implies the opposite of the 
other. Psychologically, people feel more comfortable when their cognitions are consonant or consistent. 
The theory proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance by changing their attitudes, 
beliefs, behavior or by justifying or rationalizing their attitudes, beliefs or behavior. Leon Festinger, A 
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). Eddie Harmon-Jones, 
Judson Mills, "Chapter 1: An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview of Current 
Perspectives on the Theory," in Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology, 
ed. Eddie Harmon-Jones, Judson Mills (1999). 
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indictable and more serious offence than passive bribe-taking.312  The success or failure 
of anti-corruption campaigns is always measured by reference to the number and the rank 
of the bribed officials that are convicted and punished but not by that of the bribers. Far 
fewer bribers than the bribed are prosecuted and punished despite the fact that each act of 
bribe-taking has to correspond to an act of bribe-giving.313  Even when bribers are 
prosecuted, lighter sentences including exoneration of punishment or even withdrawal of 
charges are frequently offered them, if they agree to expose and to testify against the 
official they bribed.314   
 
Secondly, the moral scrutiny is stronger for the bribed than the bribers. The reason is that 
the public is generally more inclined to be sympathetic to and to identify with bribers, 
who are often perceived as victims of the predatory conduct of the officialdom in an 
authoritarian culture. The act of bribe-giving is more likely to gain empathy from the 
public and to be considered as an act induced by duress. In contrast, the bribe-taking 
officials are generally considered privileged, venal and greedy. Such perception is only 
reinforced by the governmental propaganda strategy, which tends to demonize corrupt 
convicts and attributes corruption to individual moral decay rather than dysfunctional 
institutions.  
 
Thirdly, the bribed is expected to experience stronger cognitive dissonance compared 
with the bribers. Between bribers and the bribed, it is the latter that need to address their 
dedication to public interests and their moral excellence in public office to maintain the 
legitimacy of their office. Inevitably, such a moral and upright image will be debunked at 
the scene of corrupt exchange, which will bring about unappealing psychological 
experience. 
 
Similar to the asymmetric placement of the barriers between bribers and the bribed, the 
bargaining powers of bribers and the bribed are unevenly distributed as well, only that 
this time the bribed is placed in an advantaged position. Such imbalance is primarily the 
result of the gap between the supply of valuable public resources controlled by a few and 
the demand of many for the supply of these resources.315  In other words, there are usually 
more potential bribers than bribed. Hence, the bribed generally has much greater 
discretion in choosing his exchange parties compared to the bribers. Information 
asymmetry is another factor attributable to the imbalance due to the wide discretion 
                                                 
312 Chinese Criminal Law (1997). Art. 386, 383, 390.  
313 For example, according to The Procuratorate Daily, the numbers of persons prosecuted for bribe-taking 
and bribe-giving were 12:1 during Jan. 1999 - Jun. 2000 in Jiangsu Province. In Guangzhou City, the ratio 
was 10:1 in 2000-2001 and 6:1 in 2002. Shuming Li, "Yaobuyao Dui Xinghui 'Wangkaiyimian' [Shall We 
Show Leniency to Bribers?]," The Procuratorate's Daily, 17 Oct. 2007.  
314 Chinese Criminal Law (1997). Art.68, 390. 
315 Ren, "Institutionalized Corruption: Power Overconcentration of the First-in-Command in China." 
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enjoyed by officials in interpreting vague rules, regulations and inconsistent procedures 
prevalent in the legal and administrative system of the country. In the process of corrupt 
exchange this opaque state of affairs can be easily manipulated to the officials’ 
advantages.316 
 
What is observed in the scenes of bribery and the process of guanxi-practice reflects a 
mutual recognition by the bribers and the bribed of the asymmetric distribution of the 
legal, moral and cognitive barriers and of the unequal distribution of the bargaining 
power between them. Pressurized by their disadvantaged bargaining position and 
encouraged by the lesser risk and lower possibility of legal sanction, bribers often take a 
proactive role in taking the initiative to communicate the corrupt intent. They are 
sensitive to cues and opportunities presented to them. In contrast, the bribed often choose 
to remain passive and responsive as an optimal strategy. However, being passive does not 
mean being weak. On the contrary, as this chapter has demonstrated, the bribed usually 
have the control of whether, at which point and to which extent he would commit himself, 
promise and deliver the requested service, depending on whether the exchange safety is 
safeguarded and whether the above mentioned legal, moral and cognitive barriers are 
properly dealt with.  
 
Guanxi-practice is a trust-building process, which is designed to remove the barriers 
mentioned above. Regarding the legal barrier, experienced bribers carefully control the 
contracting process and deliberately create some time lapse between gift-giving and 
favor-seeking. During the corruption investigation against the deputy major of Suzhou 
city, who was later convicted of taking bribes worth of 100 million yuan, a briber 
confessed to the investigator that the money he gave the deputy major was a gift not 
attached to any specific request. The briber continued, it would be too “vulgar” if one 
only thought of gift-giving at the advent of a specific request. 317  By placing a 
chronological distance between the two acts, bribers help to loosen the causal link 
between bribe-giving/taking and the delivery of corrupt service, which hides the corrupt 
intent and at the same time generates an alternative classification of the exchange conduct 
as a product of an affective relationship, such as “renqing wanglai” (exchange of favors), 
rather than the materialization of the intent to abuse public power. In some regions and 
public sectors, officials taking cash from bribers on ritual occasions (lijin) has seemingly 
become such a normal practice that moral justification is not even called for.318 
                                                 
316 Shige Song, "Quanli Zhuanhuan De Yanchi Xiaoying: Dui Shehuizhuyi Guojia Xiang Shichang 
Zhuanbian Guocheng Zhong De Jingying Zaisheng Yu Xunhuan De Yizhong Jieshi [the Lapsing Effect of 
Power-Transfer: An Interpretation of the Elite Reproduction and Recycle in the Process of Market 
Transition of Socialist Countries]," China Sociology 4 (2005). 
317 See http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-11-21/095616699381.shtml.  
318 For example, see the policy notification issued by Anhui CCP authorities in an attempt to stop the trend 
of lijin offering and taking. http://www.ah.xinhuanet.com/xinwen/2004-01/21/content_1532929.htm  
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At the same time, guanxi-practice also solves the internal exchange safety problem for 
the officials. As shown in the chapter, the practice almost always starts with the 
favor-seekers providing gifts and other gratuities to the targeted officials, showing their 
commitment. The process could be lengthy and costly. The author of Celadon revealed 
that he spent 200,000yuan in guanxi-building in the first year of his business 
operation.319  Recently, an excel spreadsheet was accidentally discovered by internet 
users, which listed the proposed expenditure on “public relationship building 
(gongguanfei)” of a small Chinese company to bribe local officials and other stake 
holders in a provincial city in 2009. The total cost amounts to 1.06 million yuan.320  These 
gifts and treats serve as a “down payment”, which helps to limit the damages of possible 
future opportunistic behavior of the bribers for the benefit of the bribed.  
                                                
 
Guanxi-practice also helps the bribed to overcome the moral and cognitive barriers. For 
example, in Celadon, Zhang’s premeditated acts made judge Hou’s acceptance of the 
liquor, the tutorship and the cash look natural rather than inappropriate. Zhang 
successfully replaced a context in which a gift is prohibited by prescribed formal rules 
with a context in which acceptance of a gift is expected, in compliance with tradition and 
social convention. An otherwise venal and unlawful context of bribery was transformed 
into one filled with sentiments of kindness, care and understanding. In the process, intent 
to exchange is implied and communicated through acknowledgment and endorsement of 
friendship, goodwill and gifts.  
 
In this changed context, the meaning of gift is no longer that represented in the traditional 
gift-exchange custom. Its disguise as private inducement for illicit service is not very 
difficult to recognize. Firstly, such guanxi-practice always takes place in a 
principal-agent-client relationship. In other words, the gift-receiver always holds an 
entrusted office, mostly public office, from whom the gift-giver has obtained or expects 
to obtain favored treatment. Secondly, the direction of the flow of gifts is one-way traffic, 
namely, from the one with lower or no power and authority to the one with higher power 
and authority. Thirdly, the gift is no longer a “token” of friendship or affection, but bears 
great economic value, which far exceeds that involved in traditional gift-exchange. For 
example, Mu Suixin, former Mayor of Shenyang City, had accepted in two years’ time 
three luxury Swiss watches, one gold shoutao (a type of peach symbolizing longevity), 
20,000yuan, 60,000HK$ and 10,000US$, all presented as “gifts”, from Liu Baoyin, a 
corporate chief director.321  Fourthly, the benefits returned to the briber is always of 
 
319 See http://www.csonline.com.cn/news/chsh/200608/t20060806_504840.htm  
320 The spreadsheet can be found at 
https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=p8HQ5LYG2qBA3YU3B_gSLfA.  
321 Dalian City Procuratorate vs. Mu Suixin, Criminal Division, Dalian Intermediate Court [2007] No.153. 
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greater value than the value of the gift(s) given (otherwise, the exchange will be 
pointless), not at the costs of the favor-grantor but of a public collectivity – the 
principal.322  For example, in the aforementioned example of Liu Maoyin, in exchange for 
his Swiss watches and other gifts, the favors returned to him from the mayor included the 
release of fifteen cars, smuggled by Liu and seized by the local police, a public 
procurement contract for the purchase of eight luxury cars from Liu’s company and a 
waiver of taxation of a construction project of Liu’s company.323 
 
Nevertheless, guanxi-practice only functions on the condition that a mutual understanding 
of the evolved meanings of the gift-giving process is shared by the gift-givers and the 
gift-receivers. In this sense, guanxi-practice is a conspiracy between its practitioners to 
overcome the legal, moral and cognitive barriers by utilizing the social institutions of 
reciprocity and custom of gift-giving in order to facilitate the contracting process of an 
illicit activity. The process of gift-giving serves not only as a tacit expression of the intent 
to engage in corrupt-exchange but also as a demonstration of the briber’s trustworthiness 
and commitment to the exchange relationship.   
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Coming back to the story mentioned earlier in the introduction, it is not surprising that 
lawyer Zhai failed to obtain endorsement of his corrupt initiative from the targeted judges 
by simply posting them a written proposal. Instead of seeing it as a victory of 
anti-corruption efforts, this chapter employs this example to present a different 
perspective on the understanding of corruption. As this chapter has demonstrated, failure 
or success of corrupt transactions is not only contingent upon the external environment 
but also upon the internal transactional mechanism. In this sense, lawyer Zhai failed his 
quest not necessarily because judges in China are not corruptible but more likely because 
he misunderstood how corruption was conducted. He mistook corrupt exchange for a 
legal market transaction and expected the targeted judges, who hardly knew him, to risk 
their careers by acknowledging and endorsing a corrupt conspiracy. Doing so, he skipped 
the trust-building process and provided insufficient commitment while manifesting his 
ignorance of the judges’ legal and exchange safety concerns. Moreover, he failed to 
observe customary etiquettes and codes of conduct, which are supposed to help the 
judges to remove their moral and cognitive barriers to bribe-taking. His plan was poorly 
thought through and devoid of any understanding of how corrupt exchange operates. 
Lawyer Zhai’s misunderstanding stems from his lack of awareness that corruption is 
more than bribes changing hands. The attempt to draw academic attention to this 
                                                 
322 For a more comprehensive analysis of the social cost of guanxi-practice, see Ying Fan, "Guanxi's 
Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost," Journal of Business Ethics 38, no. 4 (2002). 
323 supra note 89. 
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endogenous feature of corruption is an attempt to improve our understanding of how 
corruption operates and accordingly seek for more effective solutions to control it.  
 
By investigating the interactions between bribers and the bribed in the process of 
initiating corrupt transactions, this chapter finds that the illegality of corruption compels 
its practitioners to resort to “alternative operating mechanisms” to break down the legal, 
moral and cognitive barriers so that the contracting process can proceed. Guanxi-practice 
functions exactly as this “alternative operating mechanism”. It facilitates the contracting 
process of an illegal transaction not only by minimizing the otherwise prohibitively high 
transactional costs created by the legal barrier, but also by removing the moral and 
cognitive constraints of the bribed. Gifts, its main prop, are used as an initial payment 
from the briber, to demonstrate the briber’s commitment, to close his distance to the 
targeted official and to set up an alternative social context, in which the exchange 
activities can be rationalized and re-defined. Performed with tactics and etiquettes, 
guanxi-practice seamlessly grafts a corrupt and legally unenforceable agreement upon a 
social setting, in which venality is neutralized and rationalized. In this re-defined social 
reality of corruption, an instrumental relationship is perceived or at least presentable as a 
reciprocal relationship based on social commitment.  
 
Therefore, this chapter contends that corruption, in particular bribery, is not a “cold”, 
“impersonal” transaction, oriented at immediate short-term gain, but an exchange with a 
rather “human” interface between its practitioners, which is designed to prepare the 
bribed to overcome the legal, moral and cognitive barriers that will otherwise obstruct the 
exchange from taking place. It is rather ironic that contrary to the views advanced by 
some western China scholars, who attempt to distinguish gifts from bribes, and 
guanxi-practice from corruption, guanxi-practitioners are striving to blur these boundaries. 
The very existence of equivocation, excuses and camouflage, so characteristic of 
guanxi-practice, demonstrates a shared sense of awareness of the illegality and 
impropriety of the conduct. Were it not for this awareness, such a heavy-loaded 
masquerade would be meaningless. In fact, the very term of “guanxi-practice” is a 
euphemism, used to conceal the confrontation with the “unsettling topic” of corruption.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the social and cultural institution of “guanxi-practice” 
has “smoothed” the otherwise cumbersome initiating phase of the contracting process of 
corrupt exchange. However, it only marks the start of the contracting process. In the next 
two chapters, I will explain how corrupt service is delivered by judges or court officials 
in the litigating process, which lies in the center of the contracting process, namely, the 
contractual performance phase.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this Chapter will probe into the contractual performance of 
judges, namely how they manage to deliver corrupt services in courts to bribers safely. 
This phase lies in the center of corrupt exchange in courts not only because the corrupt 
service is the main object of exchange but also because it is the phase, where the 
corruption participants have to extend their activities beyond the dyad of the briber and 
the bribed and hence to face possible challenge and scrutiny from the formal institution 
where the act is carried out. Execution of such act, no matter whether it is about an 
acquittal, a dismissal of a case, an award or the enforcement of an award, is necessarily 
subject to the rules regulating court decision-making. Therefore, in order to understand 
what has facilitated the delivery of corrupt services in courts, it is important to first 
understand how court decisions are made. More specifically, this chapter intends to 
answer the following questions: 1) who has the power to make which kind of decisions in 
courts and how is the decision-making process regulated; 2) what are the main features of 
the decision-making process; and 3) how do these features affect the contracting process 
of corrupt exchange in terms of the contractual performance of bribed judges?  
 
This chapter mainly introduces the main court decision-making bodies and the features of 
the decision-making process. The next chapter will illustrate how these features affect the 
delivery of corrupt services in China’s courts. This chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first section introduces the CCP’s administration of the ranking system and the 
general principles regarding decision-making, which are followed by all public 
administrations, including courts. Then the second section introduces the main 
decision-making bodies concerning court affairs and the main features of court 
decision-making. Empirical data employed in this chapter include firstly the regulations 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the party) governing and affecting 
decision-making in courts; secondly, policies and directives issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC), including opinions, instructions and guidelines; thirdly, internal 
regulations of individual courts investigated; and lastly commentaries, memo, essays and 
reports written by judges and other legal practitioners.  
 
5.2. CCP rules on decision-making 
 
In order to exert complete control over the state, the CCP implanted a ranking system and 
certain principles of decision-making in all public institutions. To understand 
decision-making in China’s courts, it is necessary first to understand these basic elements 
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5.2.1. The ranking system 
 
The ranking system is a key factor in understanding public administration in China. In 
general, this ranking system refers to a “unified, pyramidal, rigidly stratified national 
bureaucratic system”.324  It very much resembles the nomenklatura of the former Soviet 
Union,325  which refers to “a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a 
description of the duties of each office”.326  However, bureaucratic hierarchy has a much 
deeper historic root in China, a country with the largest and oldest bureaucracy in the 
world. 327  Elaborate classification of officials’ ranks and close observation of the 
hierarchical order is the signature of Chinese bureaucracy throughout its history.328 Since 
the CCP took power, this ranking system had developed into a much more mature and 
complex system, which maps out all executive posts in all institutions over which the 
CCP exercises control.  
 
All the posts enlisted in the nonmenklatura are ranked at six levels. Each level has two 
scales: chief (zhengzhi) and secondary (fuzhi). The rank of the cadre should correspond to 
the rank of the post.329  The CCP has the exclusive power to administer these posts and 
their appointments.330  Since the number of nominated candidates usually equals the 
                                                 
324 Huai Yan, Organizational Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin, 
Suisheng Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders (M.E. Sharpe, 1995). p.44.  
325 M. Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao China: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer 
and Removal of Party and State Leaders," China Quarterly  (1985). J.P. Burns, "Strengthening Central 
Ccp Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura," The China Quartely, no. June (1994). 
Maria Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: Ccp Cadre Management from a Township 
Perspective," China Quarterly  (2003). 
326 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, "Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China," China Quarterly 170 
(2002). Fn.8. 
327 As early as 1100-256 BC, Zhou Dynasty already boasted a number of 3,675 officials. A more mature 
bureaucratic management system (junxianzhi), characterized by a ranking system, was developed as early 
as Qin Dynasty (221-207BC), the first imperial dynasty in China. Qingyuan Wei, Bai Hua, Zhongguo 
Guanzhishi [History of the Chinese Bureaucratic Institution] (Shanghai: Oriental Publishing Centre, 2001). 
pp.10-4. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Occasionally, cadres of higher rank are assigned to a post of a lower rank in order to raise the profile of 
the post without changing the rank of the post. It is because the ranks of the posts of an institution are all 
hierarchically linked. To raise the rank of the executive post of an institution means all posts in the 
institution will be raised.  
330"Regulation Concerning the Recruitment and Promotion of Party and Governmental Cadres,"  (The 
CCP Central Committee, 2002). Art.2(1). For literature on the ranking system of China in the English 
language, see Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, 
Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders," The China Quartely, no. June (1985). Hon S. Chan, 
"Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990-1998," The China Quartely 179 
(2004). Maria Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: Ccp Cadre Management from a 
Township Perspective," The China Quartely 173 (2003). Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Role of the Control 
Organs in the Chinese Communist Party: 1977-83," Asia Survey 24, no. 6 (1984). Burns, "Strengthening 
Central Ccp Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura." For more empirical research on the 
topic, see Carol Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, ed. Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from 
Insiders (M.E. Sharpe,1995). 
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number of vacant posts, competition takes place mostly in the course of the nomination 
procedure, which is subject to few explicit rules. Competition intensifies when it 
concerns posts of higher ranks because of fewer vacancies of such posts. The selection 
and nomination is conducted by the superior party committee indicated in the job title 
list.331  Since most candidates are similarly eligible according to the often broadly defined 
selection criteria, the selection is strongly influenced by the personal preferences of the 
individual leaders of selection bodies.332  The pyramidal structure of the ranking system 
suggests that the majority of the ranked posts remain at the bottom with restrained 
discretion on a limited range of issues and a very few on the top with much less inhibited 
discretion on a much wider range of issues.  
 
5.2.2. General features of CCP decision-making 
 
Controlling the appointment and management of executive posts in public institutions 
helps top-level party leaders to exercise and retain complete control over the 
administrative machinery of the state. However, wielding this power alone would not 
ensure the party leaders sustained control once such appointments have been made. To 
solve this “defect”, the top-level party leaders developed two strategies. The first is to 
endow the top-level party leaders with the ultimate decision-making power regarding 
public affairs through a loosely regulated decision formulation process. The second is, in 
contrast, to discipline the relationship between the top-level party leaders as superiors and 
the leaders in all public institutions as subordinates, which requires the latter to 
unconditionally execute the decisions reached by the former. This superior-subordinate 
discipline is imposed upon all ranks in the ranking system. It ensures that the instruction 
from the very top leadership reaches the targeted posts at all levels in the chain of 
command and will be firmly executed.  
 
5.2.2.1. Formulation of decisions – the “democratic centralism” 
 
In this chapter, the term “formulation of decisions” refers to the process in which an 
opinion is formed, developed, discussed, finalized and transformed into an authoritative 
decree. The term is largely the same as “decision-making” but is used more so as to make 
contrast to “execution of decisions”, which is introduced in the next sub-section.  
                                                 
331 "Regulation Concerning the Recruitment and Promotion of Party and Governmental Cadres." Ch.3-6. 
Before 1983, the Central Committee exercised directly control of the recruitment and promotion of cadres 
two levels down. Since the cadre management reform in 1984, the Central Committee decided to control 
only one rank down to increase incentives of subordinates as well as to ease the managerial burden. Also 
see Suisheng Zhao, The Structure of Authority and Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework, ed. Carol 
Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders (M.E. Sharpe, 
1995). p.238. 
332 Yan, Organizational Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System. p.41. Zhao, The Structure of 
Authority and Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework. p.236-7. 
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Formulation of decisions in the CCP follows the principle of “democratic centralism” 
(minzhu jizhong zhi).333  According to the CCP Charter (2002), “democratic centralism” 
can be summarized as a combination of two decision-making approaches. The first is the 
“democratic approach”, which means that decisions on critical issues shall be decided in 
a “collective decision-making process” through panel deliberation. The second is the 
“centralistic approach”, which means that regarding other “non-critical” issues individual 
leaders are competent to make decisions on their own according to the division of labor 
among the leaders.334   
 
In practice, two features of the decision-formulation process are most noteworthy. Firstly, 
as the most important public institution in the country, the CCP’s exercise of power is not 
constrained by the Constitution. For example, the latest Constitution (2004) does not have 
any rules restraining the CCP’s exercise of power but only highlights its leadership in the 
preface. Similarly, the role of law is only mentioned in passing in the preface of the CCP 
Charter.335  The CCP is not regarded as an administrative organ. For that reason, its 
decisions and its procedure of decision-making are not subject to administrative review 
either. Instead, the superior party committee, which is responsible for composing the 
subordinate party committees, is the arbitrator of disputes rising among the subordinate 
party committees or their members. The internal party discipline inspection committee is 
mandated to inspect individual members’ abuse of power, such as corruption, but not 
institutional abuse of power of the party organization.  
 
Secondly, the party rules regulating the decision-formulation process are few in number 
as well as vague, open-ended and lack sanctions. For decisions formulated through the 
“democratic approach”, the main explicit rule contained in the CCP Charter is that the 
majority rules. However, the Charter does not specify what constitutes a majority. 
Moreover, the Charter reserves an unspecified number of exceptions to the rule of 
majority. For example, according to the Charter, when controversy arises concerning 
decisions on critical issues, voting should be suspended except in emergent 
circumstances.336  However, what constitutes a “critical issue”, a “controversy”, or an 
“emergencies” is not specified.337  Since the collective decision-making process will be 
                                                 
333 Guoguang Wu, "Documentary Politics": Hypotheses, Process and Case Studies, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin, 
Suisheng Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders (M.E. Sharpe, 1995). p.26. 
334 CCP Charter (2002). Art.10(5). 
335 In its preface, the CCP Charter states that the Party shall operate within the Constitution and the law. 
However, no institution or procedure is designated to check the exercise of power of the CCP. CCP Charter 
(2002). Preface. 
336 CCP Charter (2002). Art.16. 
337 For example, according to the memoir of Zhao Ziyang, former Chief Secretary of the CCP, who had 
been forced to step down and kept under house arrest since 1989, on the decision of the announcement of 
the martial law in May 1989, two of the five members of the standing committee of the Politiburo voted in 
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invoked only for “critical issues”, it means that in daily institutional operation, each 
leader can apply a narrow interpretation of the “critical issues” and make decisions on a 
wide range of affairs through the “centralistic approach” without the need to resort to the 
collective decision-making process.  
 
For decisions formulated through the “centralistic approach”, which are made by 
individual leaders on their own, rules are even scarcer. The exercise of the “centralistic” 
decision-making power is constrained more by the individual leader’s competence, which 
is based on the division of labor. Among all leaders, the head of the decision-making 
body enjoys the widest competence. The head also has a particular advantage in the 
collective decision-making process due to the vagueness of the rules and due to his 
position as the chair person of the deliberation panel. This latter function comprises 
authority to initiate a collective decision-making process, to decide on attendance and to 
preside over the deliberations. By manipulating the deliberation process, the head has the 
advantage to incorporate and translate his individual preference into a collective decision 
to enhance the legitimacy of a decision that may not be representative of the collective 
opinion and also to shift the responsibility in case that the decision leads to negative 
consequence. The challenge to the head, though, lies in its cost and inefficiency due to 
the extra time and resources needed for politics maneuvering in the deliberation process.  
 
Adding to the “free environment” of the decision-making in the CCP is the fact that the 
election of the members of the decision-making body lacks transparency and public 
involvement. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the nomination of candidates to key posts in 
all public institutions is all subject to top-down control.338  Public involvement only takes 
place to a limited extent at the grass-root level.339  At the top level, the nomination 
procedure and practices within zhongnaihai (CCP Headquarter) have been closely 
                                                                                                                                                 
favor of the announcement, two against, one abstained. The “discrepancy” was clear. According to the rules, 
the issue should be submitted to the full panel deliberation of the Politiburo. However, Deng concluded the 
discussion by saying that he agreed with the “majority opinion”, namely, the announcement. In the preface 
of the memoir, Zhao’s then secretary Bao Tong commented that maybe Deng thought the affair was not 
“significant” enough for the full panel deliberation or maybe the concept of “rule” did not exist in Deng’s 
mind. Ziyang Zhao, Gaige Licheng [Course of Reform] (H.K.: New Century, 2009). Preface. p.10. 
338 The superior party committee nominate and appointment leaders of party institutions. For leaders of 
non-party governmental institutions, the official appointment is completed by the people’s congress, which 
endorses the nomination of the party committee. For further reference about the importance of personal 
loyalty as a criterion for leader selection, see, for example, Xuezhi Guo, "Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese 
Elite Politics," The China Journal 46, no. Jul. (2001). 
339 Direct election by the public is conducted at the village level and the urban neighborhood level. 
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guarded. It is the most privileged information, about which outsiders can only 
speculate.340   
 
The afore-mentioned features of “democratic centralism” suggest that this principle is not 
designed to promote democracy in decision-making in its real sense. The question 
therefore arises as to what its real function is? From the perspective of the supreme 
central leadership, this “democratic centralism” greatly resembles an ancient Chinese 
governing strategy,341  which aims to solve a managerial dilemma. This dilemma consists 
of squaring the need to shift workload by delegating power from the central leadership to 
regional and sectional leaders with the need for the means that would enable the center 
leadership to monitor and supervise the latter’s exercise of power. The major obstacle to 
effective supervision is the classic problem of information asymmetry, which the 
conventional wisdom has described as “The mountain is high and the emperor is far way”. 
As a response to overcome this obstacle, the central leadership reserves the power not 
only to appoint the chief leader of every administrative region and ministry, but also a 
number of deputy chiefs, who answer to the chief leader but cannot be removed, demoted 
or transferred even by the chief leader. This institutional arrangement effectively weakens 
the potential threat from the leaders dispatched to take charge of far-flung resource-rich 
regions and influential ministries. Holding the power to select the deputy leaders, who are 
more or less equally placed in the collective decision-making body with the chief regional 
or ministerial leader, manifests a sense of distrust among the regional or ministerial 
leadership. The reservation of the power to appoint deputy leaders, consequently, makes 
coalition-building against the central leadership more difficult. The same rationale and 
practices are copied, repeated and executed downwards from the regional or ministerial 
leaders to the leaders at the prefecture level and from the prefecture to the county levels.   
 
5.2.2.2. Execution of decisions – the party discipline 
 
In contrast to the “soft” and accommodating rules on the decision formulation process, 
the rules governing execution of these decisions are termed as “discipline (jilü)”, and 
appear vigorous and rigid. According to the CCP Charter, decisions of superior party 
                                                 
340 H. Lyman Miller, "Politics inside the Ring Road: On Sources and Comparisons," in Decision-Making in 
Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao (M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
p.229. 
341 The same as the ranking system, this practice also has a historical root. In order to prevent public 
administrators from outgrowing the royal power, Chinese emperors usually avoided to delegate important 
decision-making power to one post but, rather unnecessarily, to parallel posts (for example, having two 
prime ministers, or sending an eunuch to “assist” the prime minister). Such practices were devised to 
maintain a level of mutual constraint among these posts to the benefit of the emperor’s despotic control. 
Qian Lin, Zhongguo Gudai Quanli Yu Falü [Power and Law in Ancient China] (Beijing: CUPL Press, 
2004). pp.260-1. Such practices, termed as “imperial managing strategy”, had played an very important role 
for the despotic control over the state in ancient Chinese history. Wei, Zhongguo Guanzhishi [History of the 
Chinese Bureaucratic Institution]. p.82. 
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organizations must be strictly observed and “firmly executed” by subordinate party 
organizations.342  In the earlier history of the CCP, all party members were granted the 
right to speak freely about party policies in meetings and publication.343 They were also 
entitled to criticize any member of the Party on any issue.344 However, since 1976 these 
clauses were gradually removed from the Charter.345  Only in the revised CCP Charter 
(2002), party members are “re-granted” the right to “attend” discussions of party affairs 
but “they shall voluntarily keep their thoughts in line with the party central committee 
and must not openly express any views or remarks in disagreement with the basic theory, 
lines, principles and experience of the Party”.346  The discipline is consolidated by the 
CCP Regulation on Punishment of Disciplinary Violation, which showed the least 
tolerance of conduct challenging the hegemonic position of the CCP and conduct that 
defies the “political disciplines” as well as the “organizational disciplines”.347   
 
In practice, this party discipline results in very indirect and oblique communication 
between subordinates and superiors and an absence of direct argumentation in meetings, 
in deference to members of superior status, which hinders and discourages independent 
thinking and debates in the decision-making process. 348  The discipline is further 
enhanced by the superior’s possession of loosely checked discretional power in their 
managing of institutional affairs. Those who are reluctant to follow superiors’ 
instructions can be easily punished with discrimination at work and have their career 
development arrested. This is especially the case in the institutions where appointment to 
public posts is highly competitive349  and “following the superior(s)” is the dominating 
work ethos.350 The discipline is edified by the ritualization of the hierarchical order in 
daily events, in which officials are expected to attend rank rituals in every possible detail. 
                                                 
342 For example, see CCP Charter (1945). Art.14. CCP Charter (2002). Art.15. 
343 Charter (1945) (1956) Art.3(1). Party member has the right to have free and pertinent discussion on the 
execution of party policies in party meetings and publication. For a more detailed historical account of the 
development of the CCP democratic centralism, see Stephen C. Angle, "Decent Democratic Centralism," 
Political theory 33, no. 4 (2005). pp.524-7. 
344 Charter (1945) (1956) Art.3(4).  
345 The first revision of the CCP Charter (1977) after the Cultural Revolution, however, showed no 
toleration of opposition and disagreement, let alone protection of the democratic rights of party members. 
Instead, it was replaced with “party members shall have the courage to fight against any speech or conduct 
that is not in line with Party principles” and “party members shall be loyal to the Party … and complete the 
tasks instructed by the Party enthusiastically”. See CCP Charter (1977). Art.2. 
346 CCP Charter (2002) Art.7. Bill of Rights of CCP Members (2004). Art. 12. 
347 CCP Regulation on Punishment of Disciplinary Violation (2003). Ch.6 and 7. 
348 Carol Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, Introduction: Core Issues in Understanding the Decision Process, 
ed. Carol Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders (M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995). xxxi 
349 In the annual national civil servant recruitment examination, in average 78 candidates compete for one 
junior rank post. For posts in charge of valuable resources, the competition could be as intense as 4,584 
candidates competing for one post. See http://learning.sohu.com/20081026/n260248589.shtml  
350 Jiaqi Yan, The Nature of Chinese Authoritarianism, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, 
Decision-Making in Deng's China - Perspectives from Insiders (M.E. Sharpe, 1995). p.7. 
 105 
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
For example, when conferences convene, the order in which officials arrive, speak, and 
are seated is specifically arranged according to the rank order.351  When the rank could 
not be further divided to manifest the power hierarchy, rules on the sequence of 
appearance of leaders of the same rank are specifically established and carefully 
observed.352  Even at banquets, the seating plan follows certain rules, complying with the 
order of the power hierarchy.353    
 
However, that this strict top-down control is compromised by a monitoring issue. This 
monitoring issue refers to the fact that, given the size and the complexity of the territory 
and its population, it is prohibitively costly for the top-leader to monitor the 
implementation of every decision that they have reached through a long chain of 
command at each subordinate level due to information asymmetry. Monitoring is 
particularly problematic when the interests of the central leadership are incompatible to 
that of the local. However, this does not mean that the central leadership has lost control 
over the state. It means, instead, that the center leadership has to prioritize objectives that 
are most crucial to their immediate interests and accordingly to mobilize and concentrate 
monitoring resources on the implementation of decisions that are made to achieve these 
objectives.354  Meanwhile, the central leadership has adopted a strategy, which is to divide 
the power and delegate it to a collective decision-making body, which is composed of one 
chief and several deputy leaders. In the decision-making body, the chief leader has 
superior status vis a vis the deputy leaders; however, the chief leader has no power to 
appoint, remove or transfer the deputy leaders. This strategy encourages distrust among 
the subordinate leaders and cancels out the individual strength of each member of the 
decision-making body. Hence it helps the superior leadership to constrain individual 
subordinate leaders from taking advantages of their direct access to resources and to 
prevent them from outgrowing the central power, which might lead to fragmentation and 
hence threaten the hegemonic position of the supreme central leadership.355 
                                                 
351  Yan, Organizational Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System. p.44.   
352 For general remarks on this “informal politics” see 
http://lateline.muzi.net/news/ll/chinese/1498633.shtml?cc=30805, 
http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/chapter_100453_66515.html and 
http://pk75329.bokee.com/viewdiary.30113366.html   
353 Apparently, the best seat is the one facing the door of the chamber, which is least disturbed by the 
traffic in the chamber but is provided with the direct view to oversee the traffic in the chamber. The worst 
are the ones closest to the door because their occupants are disturbed not only by the traffic of the guests, 
but also traffic of waiters, who enter and put dishes on the dining table over the shoulders of the persons 
who happen to sit there. Interview. L.035. During this research, the author also located a blog post 
illustrating this practice. See http://wuyuhui1212.blog.163.com/blog/static/10539247420096282473886/  
354 Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: Ccp Cadre Management from a Township 
Perspective." 
355 For more literature on the tension of the central-local relations and the potential threat and problem of 
fragmentation, see Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993). Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model 
and Its Limitations," in Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. K.G. 
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In summary, in order to retain control over the state, the CCP central leadership has 
developed a ranking system, which connects and subordinates the leaders of all public 
institutions to the supreme leadership of the CCP central decision-making body. To 
safeguard its monopolistic political position, the CCP central leadership also dispenses 
itself from any constitutional obligation by placing no constraint on its decision 
formulation process. To ensure that such uncontestable decisions can reach down to and 
be fully executed at the ground level, the CCP central leadership also disciplines the 
hierarchical order of the ranking system, which requires subordinates to unconditionally 
comply with and execute instructions from their superiors. Meanwhile, a monitoring 
problem exists, which leaves room for non-compliance at the local levels. To solve the 
problem, policy/task prioritization is necessary and sharing of power among leaders is 
required. These conditions exist in all hierarchal relationships of public administration in 
the country, including the relationship between the central and local governments as well 
as the relationships between the CCP/government and courts and between superior and 
subordinate courts. 
   
5.3. Decision-making bodies in courts 
 
Decision-making in China’s courts greatly resembles that in the CCP as introduced above. 
Before elaborating this resemblance, this section will firstly introduce who can make 
decisions on judicial affairs both inside and outside of a court.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lieberthal, D.M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Y. Huang, "Central-Local 
Relations in China During the Reform Era: The Economic and Institutional Dimensions," Word 
Development 24, no. 4 (1996).  Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: Ccp Cadre 
Management from a Township Perspective." Andrew C Mertha, "China's “Soft” Centralization: Shifting 
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations Source," The China Quarterly 184, no. 1 (2005). 
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5.3.1. At the internal level 
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Following the “democratic centralism” principle, the decision-making bodies within 
courts all take the collegial form. These decision-making bodies are hierarchically placed, 
roughly classified at three levels. As shown in Chart I, the top level is the party-group, 
headed by the court president. According to the CCP Charter, a party-group is defined as 
a party organ in a non-party institution dispatched by the party committee, which share 
the same territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter the “territorial party committee”) as that of 
the court. The court president is necessarily a party member and the head of the party 
group. 356  Other members of the party group include all court-level leaders (yuanji 
lingdao), mainly, a multiple number of vice-presidents, the head of office of the party 
discipline and inspection committee, and sometimes the director of the political 
department.357  Court-level leaders, who are not party members, are not members of the 
party-group but can attend party-group meetings with no right to vote.358  According to an 
internal directive of one county court, the mandate of the party-group includes “to inform 
and execute instructions from superior party organs; to discuss court annual agenda … to 
discuss and administer activities concerning thought construction (sixiang jianshe), 
institutional construction (zuzhi jianshe) and attitude construction (zuofeng jianshe)…to 
decide issues concerning court recruitment, professional training, job assignment, 
promotion, appointment, award, resignation and lay-off; to deliberate judicial affairs and 
to pass court internal regulations concerning court administration, political work and 
human resource management; to discuss issues concerning court infrastructure 
construction and staff benefits and staff welfare; to discuss issues concerning applications 
and reports to be submitted to the superior governing bodies.”359 
 
The decision-making body next under the party-group is the court adjudicative committee 
(shenpan weiyuanhui), which is also headed by the court-president. Other members are 
court-level leaders and division-level leaders. 360  It means that all members of the 
                                                 
356 Infiltration of party members in non-party institutions started when the CCP was established in the 
1920s. The infiltrating team was called dangtuan (party union) and later dangzu (party group). See The 
CCP Charter 1927, 1945 and 1956. 
357 This research found no official documents on the constitution of the court party-group. The members 
indicated here are a summary based on the news reports on activities of party-group members of the SPC 
and the lower courts. 
358 As a measure to promote “multi-party democracy”, non party-member judges are appointed to a limited 
number of deputy executive positions in some courts. According to a recent speech of vice-president of the 
SPC (who is not a party-member), there are a total number of 252 non party-members appointed to 
executive posts in courts all over the country. Among the 252, eight were appointed as vice-presidents in 
eight high courts. See http://www.humanrights.cn/cn/zt/qita/rqxz/wanexiang/4/t20090625_471768.htm. 
These court leaders can attend party-group meetings but possess no right to vote. 
359 It is excerpted from the procedure of the party group of the Jiashan County Court of Zhejiang Province. 
The file can be accessed at http://www.jscourt.org/asp/news_show.asp?classid=3&nclassid=9&id=1029.  
360 Practice varies from court to court in regard to whether a court leader, who does not perform judicial 
functions, shall be appointed as a member of the court adjudicative committee. In some courts, directors of 
political department or even logistic department are also appointed as members of the court adjudicative 
committee. See See Ruihua Chen, "Zhenyi De Wuqu [the Holdup of Justice]," Peking University Law 
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party-group are members of the court adjudicative committee, with the occasional 
exclusion of non-judge members. 361  The party-group nominates the candidates for 
membership of the court adjudicative committee, who will be formally appointed by the 
people’s congress upon the approval of the territorial party committee.362  The main 
function of the adjudicative committee is to deliberate on individual cases, which are 
submitted by the court president and are considered “important” or “difficult”.363 
 
Next under the court adjudicative committee operates the collegial panel (heyiting), 
which is established in each court division that performs judicial functions. In lower and 
smaller courts, one court division only hosts one collegial panel; whereas in some higher 
and larger courts one division may host several panels. The collegial panel is usually 
composed of three members, including one head-judge, one “responsible judge”, and the 
third member could be either a judge or a people’s assessor.364  The constituency of the 
panel should be “relatively stable”.365  Each collegial panel is chaired by the head-judge, 
who presides over the adjudicative procedure. Before a SPC reform launched in the late 
1990s, the head-judge was nominated by the court president or the divisional director in a 
case-by-case manner. After the reform, head-judge becomes a permanent certified 
executive post, which is appointed by the court president through a qualification 
procedure.366  Once a case is assigned to a head-judge, the head-judge can nominate 
himself or one of the other two panelists (not the people’s jury in any case) as the 
“responsible judge”. The “responsible judge” is responsible for interacting with litigants. 
The responsible judge prepares and attends the court hearings, proposes a ruling and 
performs other tasks handed to him by the head-judge.367  In some courts, the responsible 
                                                                                                                                                 
Review 1, no. 2 (1998). p.384. Zheng Liu, "Lun Woguo Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu De Xianshi Kunjing Ji 
Qi Gaijin Silu [the Significant Dilemma of the Adjudicative Committee and Considerations on Reform 
Measures]," Xingshi sifa luntan [Criminal justice forum] 1 (2008). pp.38-9.  
361 For example, in replying an inquiry from a regional people’s congress, the National People’s Congress 
instructed that a DIC representative should not be appointed as a member of the court adjudicative 
committee if the representative is not a judge. See 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/xwdf/2004-08/19/content_363189.htm. However, in practice, the 
practice may vary from court to court. For example, see Liu, "Lun Woguo Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu De 
Xianshi Kunjing Ji Qi Gaijin Silu [the Significant Dilemma of the Adjudicative Committee and 
Considerations on Reform Measures]." p.39. ft.4. 
362 Notification on Equipping Cadres in People’s Courts and Procuratorates. 
363 Organizational Law of People’s Courts. Art.11. 
364 Organizational Law of People’s Courts. Art.10. In most cases, the people’s assessor has little 
involvement in the adjudicative process and plays a more decorative rather than substantial role in the 
judicial decision-making. For more information on this subject, see Liang, The Changing Chinese Legal 
System, 1978-Present: Centralization of Power and Rationalization of the Legal System. pp.146-7, 151-2, 
197-9. 
365 For example, see Working Procedure of the Collegial Panel of Wuhou District Court, Chengdu City, 
Sichuan Province. Art.6. 
366 The SPC, "Measures of Appointment of Shenpanzhang in People's Courts," (2000). 
367 For example, see the Working Procedure of the Collegial Panel of Wuhou District Court, Chengdu, 
Sichuan Province (available at http://www.whfy.gov.cn/remark.asp?id=137 ). Art. 8 listed sixteen 
obligations of the Head-judge, most of which are related with organizing meetings and decision-making. 
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judge can delegate some of his preparatory work to the court recorder (shujiyuan), if 
available.368  When a court president or divisional director sits in a collegial panel, he is 
automatically the head-judge.369   
 
In basic courts, namely, local county courts (in rural areas) or district courts (in urban 
areas), cases, to which an expedited procedure (jianyi anjian) is applied, can be 
adjudicated by a single judge without a collegial panel. This expedited procedure is not 
typical in the cases represented here and hence not discussed in the rest of the chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Art. 9 listed ten obligations of the responsible judge, all concerning examination and investigation of the 
case through interacting with litigants. Art. 10 listed six obligations of other panel members, which require 
limited involvement in the adjudication process. Similar regulations are found, for example, in the 
following courts: Kunming Intermediate Court (Yunnan Province), Jincheng Intermediate Court (Shanxi 
Province), Zhuzhong Intermediate Court (Hunan Province), Jiyuan Intermediate Court (Henan Province).   
368 For example, see the Working Procedure of the Collegial Panel of Wuhou District Court, Chengdu, 
Sichuan Province, Art.13. 
369 Ibid. For more about the reform in practice, see the memo of a symposium on this subject organized by 
the National Judge’s School on Yuqian Bi, ed. Sifa Shenpan Dongtai Yu Yanjiu [Research on Judicial 
Development], vol. 1 (Beijing: Law Press,2002). pp.1-19.  
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At the external level, courts are required to operate under the “leadership” of the party. 
This leadership is implemented in courts through the court party-group, which is directly 
subordinated to the territorial party committee. As a branch dispatched by the party, the 
court party-group is obliged to follow party rules, including “executing party guidelines, 
directives and policies; discussing and making decisions on significant issues about the 
institution concerned; managing cadres … completing tasks assigned by the party and the 
state; and supervising the work of subordinate party organs.”370  
 
Other than the “territorial party committee”, courts are also subject to supervision by their 
superior courts on judicial affairs, which constitutes the so-called “double 
administration”(shuangchong guanli).371  Supervision from superior courts is sometimes 
also called “vertical administration” (chuizhi guanli) because, unlike the territorial party 
committee, which shares the same territorial jurisdiction of the court that it monitors, the 
superior court enjoys a higher level of jurisdiction. Between the “double administration” 
of the territorial party committee and the immediate superior court, the former takes the 
leading role. It is mainly because the territorial party committee has the decisive power in 
nominating court leaders (renquan), while the superior court is only assisting in the 
process.372  The former also has the jurisdiction over court financial affairs (caiquan) 
since it provides the main part of court funding, in particular, judges’ salaries.373 
 
Nevertheless, the superior court has the jurisdiction to monitor subordinate courts on 
daily court affairs (shiquan), for instance, issuing adjudicative guidance, policies, 
interpretations, ruling on appeals, launching campaigns, organizing training courses and 
performance evaluation. Meanwhile, as the political power of the judiciary grows, the 
SPC is becoming a strong competitor against regional and local powers in controlling 
lower courts. One of the most overt attempts of the SPC to assert power is the launching 
of a new judicial ranking system,374  which excludes territorial party committees and is 
solely regulated by the SPC. However, this new judicial ranking system has not shown 
much impact since it fails to gain support from the Treasury and is not able to link it to 
                                                 
370 CCP Charter (2002) Art.46. 
371 Courts, as well as a few other specialized public institutions, are subject to the so-called “double 
leaderships” (shuangchong lingdao) of the party committee of the same territory and of the court at the 
superior level. For details, see Notification on Equipping Cadres in People’s Courts and Procuratorates. 
372 Regulations on Party Groups of People's Courts Assisting Local Party Committee to Manage Court 
Cadres, Fa zu zi [1984] No.3. 
373 The local government is responsible for most of the operational costs of courts as well as judges’ 
salaries.  Since 2003 the national treasury also provides a certain amount of funding annually to courts to 
subsidize especially the purchase of equipments and the maintenance of court buildings. See Notification 
about Special Central Subsidy to Political and Legal Institutions. Ministry of Finance [2003]. No.69. The 
document can be accessed at http://www.fc110.gov.cn/zcfg/bwfg/200909/45878.html.  
374 The Priliminary Regulation on Judges' Ranks. 
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judges’ salary, benefits and other welfare items as much as the ranking system controlled 
by the territorial party committees does.375   
 
Apart from the territorial party committee and the superior court, some other public 
institutions can also exert influence over court decision-making by sending instructions to 
court leaders. These institutions include, for example, the government, the people’s 
congress and the police, as shown in Chart II. Among these institutions, only the people’s 
congress has formal authority to monitor court affairs.376  Governmental institutions, 
instead, are prohibited from interfering in judicial affairs, according to the 
Constitution. 377  However, when leaders of these governmental institutions send 
instructions to court leaders, their authority is not necessarily based upon their 
governmental offices, but on their positions in the territorial party committee. Under the 
current practice, the head of the government is necessarily a member of the leadership of 
the territorial party committee. So is the head of the police.378  When court leaders take 
instructions from these leaders, who hold two positions, one in the party and the another 
in the government, it is practically difficult as well as unnecessary to check or distinguish 
the source of the authority of the instructions concerned. 
 
5.4. Features of decision-making in courts 
 
The features which characterize CCP decision-making as introduced in Section 1 also 
characterize decision-making in China’s courts. The decisions discussed here in this 
section include all decisions reached by judges on behalf of the courts in the entire course 
of litigation, including decisions related to case-registration, the adjudication and the 
enforcement of court awards in case of non-voluntary performance.  
 
5.4.1. Formulation of decisions – the “democratic centralism” 
 
Following the principle of “democratic centralism”, all court cases, except those 
adjudicated under the expedited procedure, are heard and deliberated by a collegial 
decision-making body, namely the collegial panel or the court adjudicative committee as 
                                                 
375 See the speech of vice-president of the SPC, Li Guoguang, at the National Conference on Implementing 
Regulation on Judges' Ranks. 
376 For literature on this subject in the English language, see Randall Peerenboom, "Judicial Accountability 
and Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision," SSRN eLibrary  (2008). 
For a collected volume on the same subject in the Chinese language, see Zhiping Liang, ed. Ge'an Jiandu 
Yu Sifa Gongzheng [Individual Case Supervision and Judicial Fairness], vol. 2, Hongfan Pinglun [Hongfan 
Review] (2005). 
377 Chinese Constitution (2009). Art.126.  
378 Recent practices show that the head of the police is also often granted an executive position (changwei) 
in the party committee to take in charge of political-legal affairs. Zhu, ed. Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao 
(1979-2004) [China Legal Development Report (1979-2004)]. p.180. 
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introduced in Section 5.3.379  Adjudication in these collective decision-making bodies 
represents the “democratic approach” of court decision-formulation. As mentioned above 
in Section 5.2.2, court rules regulating this process are lax, giving the court president, 
who normally also chairs the deliberation panel, a particular advantage in the formulation 
process. The court adjudicative committee decides by majority ruling. However, 
members of the court adjudicative committee have unequal voting power despite that the 
rules suggest otherwise. According to the SPC guidelines as well as the internal 
procedural rules of individual courts studied in this research, the court president can 
suspend the voting based on the magnitude of “controversy”.380  What constitutes “a high 
magnitude of controversy” is not specified. In addition, the court president, as the chair of 
the decision-making body, can decide when to commence a deliberation, who should 
attend the deliberation, how to summarize the deliberation and when to call for a vote.381  
Through manipulating these procedural rules, the court president can rather easily induce 
consent of committee members, who owe their appointments to the court president.  
 
Similar rules apply in the deliberation of the collegial panel. The deliberation follows the 
rule of majority. However, if the head-judge finds himself in the minority, he has the 
opportunity to request the panel to re-deliberate and re-vote.382  If the head-judge is still 
not satisfied with the result of the re-deliberation, he can present the case to his superior, 
the divisional director, for review. In practice, if a head-judge has a significant interest in 
a particular case, he has many ways to secure the majority’s support in a panel, which 
normally consists of only three members.383  For example, the head-judge can set the tone 
at the beginning of the deliberation, which makes any dissenting opinion appear as a 
                                                 
379 Article 10 of the Organizational Law of the People’s Courts states that cases will be adjudicated by 
courts in a collegial manner. According to the same law, the court adjudicative committee, as the higher 
decision-making body on adjudicative affairs, operates under the “democratic centralism” principle. 
380 For example, see Art.24 of the working procedures of the court adjudicative committee of Jincheng 
Intermediate Court (Shanxi Province), Art.34 of the procedure of Naxi District Court of Lu Zhou City 
(Sichuan), Art.10 of Kunming Intermediate Court and Art.26 Wenshanzhou Intermediate Court. 
381 For example, see Art.13, 14, 17, 21, 24 of the Working Procedure of the Court Adjudicative Committee 
(2007) of Jincheng Intermediate Court, Shanxi Province; Art.30, 33, 34(4), 36(4), 37, 38, 39 of the 
Working Procedure of the Court Adjudicative Committee of Guangdong High Court (2008); Art. 2(1), (2), 
(7), (9), 3 (1), 4(2) of the Working Procedure of the Court Adjudicative Committee of Luohu District Court,  
Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province. Also see Chen, "Zhenyi De Wuqu [the Holdup of Justice]." p.403. 
382 For example, see the procedures on the court adjudicative committee in Jincheng Intermediate Court, 
Shanxi Province (Art.24), Guangdong High Court (Art.38), Naxi District Court of Luzhou, Sichuan 
Province (Art.9), Kunming Intermediate Court, Yunan Province (Art.34). Also see the procedures on the 
collegial panel in Wuhou District Court, Chengdu, Sichuan Province (Art.16,24), 2nd Civil Division of 
Yunan High Court (Art.47), Zhejiang High Court (Art.18), Kunming Intermediate Court, Yunan Province 
(Art.16). 
383 By law, the collegial panel shall consist 3-7 judges (including people’s jury) in criminal cases and any 
odd number in civil cases. Criminal Procedural Law. Art.147, 202. Civil Procedural Law. Art.40. In 
practice, this research has not come across a single case, of which the collegial panel is consisted of more 
than 3 judges. It means as long as one judge concurs the opinion of the head-judge, that opinion will prevail 
as the majority opinion. The practice was also confirmed in an interview conducted by the author with a 
high court judge. Interview. Z.019. 
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challenge of the head-judge’s authority. The head-judge can summarize the contested 
issues and the “majority opinion” in a manner which is close to his opinion, and adopt the 
decision accordingly. The head-judge can also replace a non-cooperative fellow judge 
with a “cooperative” people’s assessor as a panelist.384  Some judges openly complain 
that such practices make “deliberation” akin to a ritual rather than a procedure to foster 
genuine debate and discussion.385  For this reason, the SPC stipulates that during the 
collegial panel deliberation the responsible judge shall speak first and the head-judge last 
in order to mitigate the “following” pressure.386  However, in practice, if the outcome of a 
case is vital to a head-judge, the head-judge can allocate himself to the role of responsible 
judge. In this way, the head-judge can deliver the first speech not as the head-judge but as 
the responsible judge.387  When dissenting opinions emerge, the head-judge has the 
authority to decide whether the disagreement is “serious” (zhongda fenqi) and 
consequently decide whether to submit the case to superior court leaders for examination 
and arbitration.388   
 
The “centralistic approach” of decision-making is represented by the so-called “pian 
zhidu” (the approval system), which was not written down in the Organizational Law of 
the People’s Court but has a far more significant influence upon court administration.389 
                                                 
384 Currently, there are few rules regulating the appointment of people’s assessors as panelists in the 
collegial panels. In rural courts, the practices are so flexible and informal that sometimes judges, who were 
in a rush, would simply find whoever available around the court room to fill the bench. Interview. W020.  
385 A judge Xuan Yi elaborated on the “collegial panel in reality” in his LLM dissertation. According to 
Xuan, only the responsible judge is involved in the court hearings. The other two panel members are more 
like “escorts”. During the hearings, some of them read files of other cases which they are responsible of, or 
read books or newspapers. Sometimes, the “escort” judges excuse themselves immediately after the 
opening session of the court hearing. Yi Xuan, "Woguo Faguan Duli Shenpan Linian Xianzhuang Ji Duice 
Tanxi [on the Concept, Present Conditions and Countermeasures of the Judge's Independent Trial in Our 
County]" (East University of Political Science and Law, 2006). pp.22-3. Evidence of such practices can be 
easily found in the Chinese language sources. In English language literature, similar practices were also 
documented in Liang, The Changing Chinese Legal System, 1978-Present: Centralization of Power and 
Rationalization of the Legal System. pp.159-60. Evidence of similar practices can also be found in the 
following online posts from judges: Songping Tan, Xiaochun Li, "Several Issues About Collective 
Adjudication,"  http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=161447. Guofeng Zhang, "Shenpan 
Heyizhi Yunzuo De Jige Wenti [a Few Issues on the Operation of the Collegial Panel in the Process of 
Adjudication]," zhongguo Fayuan Wang [People's Courts Network]  (2004). Chengxiang Wu, "Analysis 
of the Current Operation of the Adjudicative Panel," Chongqing 1st Intermediate Court, 
http://www.cqcourt.gov.cn/Information/InformationDisplay.asp?newsid=44996. For a rationalizing 
interpretation of this practice, see Suli, "The Adjudicative Function and Administrative Management of 
Courts," Zhongwai Faxüe, no. 65 (1999). p.43. 
386 The SPC, "Measures on the Working Procedure of the Collegial Panel in People's Courts," (2002). 
Art.10. 
387 Tan, "Several Issues About Collective Adjudication." Zhang, "Shenpan Heyizhi Yunzuo De Jige Wenti 
[a Few Issues on the Operation of the Collegial Panel in the Process of Adjudication]." 
388 SPC, "Measures on the Working Procedure of the Collegial Panel in People's Courts." Art. 12.  
389 Weiping Zhang, "Improvement of the Operational System of People's Courts," Research in Law and 
Commerce 77 (2000). p.4. For a more comprehensive empirical study on this subject, see Shuping Luo, 
"Shenpan Weiyuanhui "Shenpi Anjian" Zhidu Ying Yu Quxiao [the Practice of Adjudication by Seeking 
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The pi’an zhidu refers to a series of rules regulating the issuance of official court 
documents, which grant individual court leaders the decision-making power on certain 
court affairs by examining and approving drafts of court documents before issuance.390 
This “centralistic” pi’an zhidu encompasses the “democratic approach” of court 
decision-making. For example, when a rank and file judge intends to submit a case to the 
court adjudicative committee, it has to be approved by the head-judge, divisional director 
and the court president.391  The “centralistic approach” covers virtually all court affairs. 
According to Article 105 of the Chinese Civil Procedural Law, interim court decisions on 
requests for disqualification, extension of the time constraint of legal proceedings, the 
issuance of court orders on fines, permission to summon a litigant to court by force, and 
on court orders imposing custody, are all to be signed by the court president. In some 
courts, court orders to freeze litigants’ bank account, court warrant, the waiver or 
reduction of litigation fees as well as “any other document that the court president sees 
necessary” are all subject to the approval and endorsement by the court president.392 
Vice-presidents are also entitled to examine and approve certain court documents, but 
within a comparatively narrower range.393  Such authority is granted to individual court 
leaders, not the court adjudicative committee. It means that by controlling the processing 
of court documents, individual court leaders can influence the decision-making without 
going through a group deliberation in the court adjudicative committee.   
 
Similar prerogatives are reserved for divisional directors, who can frustrate a collegial 
panel’s decision from being translated into a court decision by refusing to endorse it.394 
The same applies in relations between the head-judge and other panelists in the collegial 
panel. In practice, when unanimous decision is not reached, the head-judge will firstly 
decide whether the decision is “seriously controversial” and whether it should be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Approval from the Adjudicative Committee Should Be Abandoned]," sifa gaige lunping [Judicial Reform 
Review] 3 (2002).  
390 The SPC, Procedures on the Issuance of Official Documents in People’s Courts (1996). Ch. 6. For more 
literature on this topic, see Zhang, "Improvement of the Operational System of People's Courts." p.6. Luo, 
"Shenpan Weiyuanhui "Shenpi Anjian" Zhidu Ying Yu Quxiao [the Practice of Adjudication by Seeking 
Approval from the Adjudicative Committee Should Be Abandoned]." 
391 The Criminal Procedural Law as well as internal procedural rules in all the courts investigated in this 
research all includes a reservation clause, which grant the court president and/or the deputy vice-president 
the authority to instruct lower decision-making bodies to submit a particular case to the court adjudicative 
committee for deliberation as long as he considers necessary. For example, see the Procedures of 
Adjudicative Committee of Helan County Court, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Art.6. The document is 
available at http://www.nxhlfy.gov.cn/23/2008-12-8/7843001@369.htm. Procedures of Adjudicative 
Committee of Luohu District Court, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province. Art.1(3)4. Procedures of Adjudicative 
Committee of Kunming Intermediate Court, Yunan Province. Art.14(9), 15(5), 16(4), 17(6), 18(4). For 
similar discussions, see also Chen, "Zhenyi De Wuqu [the Holdup of Justice]." pp.385-6.  
392 See the Preliminary Regulation on the Issuance of Court Documents of Jiashan County Court (2007). 
Art. 1. Available at http://www.jscourt.org/asp/news_show.asp?id=2027  
393 Ibid. 
394 Zhang, "Shenpan Heyizhi Yunzuo De Jige Wenti [a Few Issues on the Operation of the Collegial Panel 
in the Process of Adjudication]." 
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presented to the divisional director. The divisional director will then examine the decision 
and decide whether the case shall be presented to the court president or vice-president in 
charge, who will then decide whether or not the case should be submitted to the court 
adjudicative committee for deliberation.395 Compared to the collective decision-making, 
the exercise of this “centralistic” decision-making power is even more difficult to check. 
For example, when a court president silently disapproves a collegial panel’s decision 
simply by inaction, namely by either not endorsing it or not submitting it to the court 
adjudicative committee for deliberation, the court internal regulations provide no formal 
solution for the collegial panel to solve the impasse.396  To guarantee decisions that are 
reached through such a non-democratic approach will be fully implemented at the lower 
levels, a strict “following discipline” is imposed to regulate the superior-subordinate 
relationship to ensure full execution of decisions that are reached in the top. This 
“following discipline” features both the relation between court leaders and their party 
superiors and the relation between court leaders and their court subordinates. 
 
5.4.2. Execution of decisions – the “following discipline” 
 
First of all, the absolute majority of members of the court party-group, the top court 
decision-making body, are party members.397  They are automatically subject to the CCP 
disciplinary rules, including following superiors’ instructions. The most “superior” 
superior of the judiciary is the CCP central leadership. In a recent speech in the National 
Political and Legal Conference, the serving PRC President Hu Jintao said, “Political and 
legal work has to … serve the party and state agenda. To maintain the party as the ruling 
party … is the primary political task of the political and legal institutions.”398  In that 
speech, Hu also required judges to uphold firstly the “supremacy of the party’s mandate”, 
secondly the “supremacy of the people’s interests” and lastly the “supremacy of the 
constitution and laws”.399  Soon after the speech, a political campaign labeled “the three 
supremacies” (sange zhishang) was launched by the SPC and carried out in all courts 
through out the country. In a national political study course for judges above the rank of 
                                                 
395 For example, Art. 3(2) of the Working Procedure of the Court Adjudicative Committee of Luohu 
District Court, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province states that before a case can be submitted to the court 
adjudicative committee, the responsible judge shall fill a form and have it examined and approved by each 
court leader till the court president or the vice-president in charge. For more description of the practice, see 
Luo, "Shenpan Weiyuanhui "Shenpi Anjian" Zhidu Ying Yu Quxiao [the Practice of Adjudication by 
Seeking Approval from the Adjudicative Committee Should Be Abandoned]." p.57. Guohong Lan, 
"Reconstructing Internal Court Management System [Fayuan Neibu Guanli Tizhi Zhi Chonggou]," Fengtai 
Court Net  (2009). 
396 The SPC guideline only indicates that dissenting judges in the collegial panel can apply for a review 
once regarding the decisions of the court adjudicative panel but not to the individual acts of the court 
president.  
397  
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president of high court, the SPC president Wang Shengjun reiterated that “courts must 
submit to the party’s leadership… The party’s leadership can only be strengthened and 
can not be doubted, loosened, weakened and especially can not be taken simply as a 
figurehead.”400  
 
In fact, the “three supremacies” campaign directly attacks the growing demand for 
judicial independence from reform-minded judges and academic lawyers. In pledging to 
follow the “three supremacies”, Tang Jianfu, president of Junxian County Court (Henan 
Province), wrote that the demand for judicial independence had led to some troublesome 
judicial practices, for example, emphasizing judges’ passive and impartial role in the 
adjudicative process. Tang condemned such practices since he considered that regarding 
“law as the only supremacy” had tainted the “dignity of the rule of law” and destroyed 
“the good image of people’s courts and judges”.401 
 
Political campaigns such as that of the “three supremacies” are by no means new in the 
courts of contemporary China. Just before President Hu took office, a series of political 
campaigns initiated by the former PRC President Jiang Zemin entitled respectively 
“three- representative” (sange daibiao) and “three-emphasis education” (sanjiang jiaoyu) 
had dominated the political activities in courts for several years.402  Contrary to the 
apparently hollow ideology-filled political slogans, discourses and study meetings that 
feature in these campaigns, a rather concrete objective is pursued by the campaign 
initiators. This objective is to raise the general awareness of the ultimate power of the 
party leaders and to strengthen the discipline of unconditional compliance in 
superior-subordinate relationships.403  It means that the following discipline applies not 
only to the hierarchy between court top leaders and their party superiors but also to the 
hierarchy within courts from court top leaders down to the rank-and-file judges. After 
having achieved that objective, instructions from the central leadership of the CCP can 
                                                 
400 See an excerpt of Wang Shengjun’s speech posted on the website of Tai’an Intermediate Court at 
http://www.tacourt.gov.cn/html/dtljh/2009-6/dtljh18599694.shtml.  
401 See http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=74056.  
402 Information about these political campaigns can be easily accessed on the internet by searching the 
keywords “sanjiang jiaoyu” or “sange daibiao”. 
403 This “hidden” objective is well understood by people who had been exposed to Chinese political 
campaigns. In the bulletin board of the chinacourt.org website, a bulletin visitor posted a question, “Now 
judges are required to emphasize politics. Forgive me if I am slow on this, is strictly complying with law 
not to emphasize politics? What is to emphasize politics?”. More than ten visitors answered to the post. 
One said, “[to emphasize politics] means to rule the case according to how you are instructed to rule by 
your superiors”. Another said, “… to be explicit, to emphasize politics means to follow your superior. Do 
what your superior has said.” Other visitors provided similar comments. For details, see 
http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=294090. Similar remarks can also be found, for example, in 
the following blog posts http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5a3baaa00100alg5.html and 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_48b8489b0100021x.html.   
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reach courts at all levels with a minimum of friction or resistance through the chain of 
command mapped out by the power hierarchy inherent in the ranking system.  
 
Under the principle of the “three supremacies”, problems will not arise when the interests 
of the party or court leaders are aligned with public interests and the outcome of the 
application of law. However, when the interests of the party collide with law and public 
interests, asserting the “party’s supremacy” will contradict certain constitutional 
principles, which are formally supported by the party.404  This contradiction is most 
conspicuous in the so-called “political” and “sensitive” cases, involving the vindication 
of citizens’ constitutional rights and thereby confrontation with the arbitrary use of power. 
In order to cover this contradiction and to avoid such confrontation in litigation, courts 
have no choice but to disregard the law, mainly by violating procedural rules and/or 
rendering arbitrary court decisions devoid of rational legal argument since rational legal 
thinking would inevitably impede the realization and consolidation of the political 
interests of the party. Inevitably, such an approach hinders the development of rational 
legal thinking and weakens its role in the judicial decision-making process. As will be 
elaborated later in the next chapter, it is this institutional design on decision-making in 
courts that greatly affects the delivery of corrupt services in the adjudicative process 
despite the fact that the CCP’s political interests are involved in only a minor fraction of 
all court cases.  
 
Instructions made in an arbitrary fashion are replicated in the court decision-making 
process. When a court president, vice-president or divisional director makes a decision on 
a case either through the collective decision-making process or the “centralistic” pi’an 
zhidu, the decision is made through simple instructions without reasoning. 405  The 
instruction has to be faithfully executed by the responsible judge in the adjudication and 
the court ruling. The leaders, who made the instruction, do not write the legal opinion nor 
do their names appear on the court ruling.406  If the subordinate judge fails to observe the 
                                                 
404 What happened in a recent interview between a journalist and the director of the Zhengzhou 
Municipality Zoning and Construction Bureau is an example, in which the party’s self-purported claim as 
the embodiment and the “representative” of “the people’s interests” was debunked. In the interview, the 
journalist questioned the bureau director why the bureau permitted some real estate developer to turn a 
piece of land, which was allocated to develop residential complex for low-income citizens, into the 
construction of up-market luxury residences. The bureau director responded with a question to the 
journalist, “Do you speak for the party or for the people?” The question implies and consequently exposes 
an informally shared understanding of the dichotomy between the party’s interests to the people’s interests. 
The story has raised great attention from and discussion among citizens on the internet. For detailed report 
of the story, see Zhengzhou zoning bureau http://news.163.com/09/0617/09/5C0HSV0S0001124J.html. 
Another dialogue between a journalist and an official of the Pet Management Office of Zhengzhou City had 
generated similar effect. For details see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-11-06/153418991902.shtml  
405 Suli, "The Adjudicative Function and Administrative Management of Courts." p.41. 
406 "The Reply on the Issue Concerning the Signature of Court President on Court Judgment," ed. SPC 
(1969). Haiying Huang, "Jitifuzezhi Shibi Zouyi [Remarks on The "Collective Responsibility"]," Renmin 
sifa [People's Adjudication], no. 2 (1988). p.68.  
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law and/or the rational legal reasoning in order to execute the instruction, he will be 
normally exonerated, since he is not the judge who made the decision.407   
 
For a court leader, the decision whether to exert influence through direct instruction or 
through a consent-seeking process in the collegial decision-making body is based on a 
trade-off. The advantage of influencing a court decision through direct instruction stems 
from its efficiency while the disadvantage is that it exposes the court leader and makes it 
difficulty for the court leader to avoid responsibility for the act if it is called for. As to the 
approach of influencing a court decision through a consent-seeking process, its 
disadvantage is its inefficiency because it demands time and other resources to mobilize 
and maneuver so as to induce consent. Its advantage is that it helps the court leader to 
avoid responsibility. As mentioned in the previous sub-section, a subordinate will not be 
held responsible for executing a wrong decision. At the same time, if the wrong decision 
is reached through a collective decision-making process, the responsibility will fall on the 
collective decision-making body, which means that in practice no individual will be held 
accountable.408  For example, according to an internal regulation of the Zhejiang High 
Court, if a case is considered a “wrong case” and the ruling is based on the instruction of 
the court adjudicative committee, the judges of the collegial panel, who made the ruling, 
will not be held responsible, unless the collegial panel has misrepresented the facts and 
accordingly misled the court adjudicative committee. The regulation is silent on the 
issues of responsibility and sanctions for misconduct in such circumstances.409  The same 
is found in the regulation of the Changsha Intermediate Court.410  Such decision-making 
environment has substantially hindered the development of the rational legal thinking and 
the establishment of the rule of law. It has also inevitably reduced the predictability and 
stability of law and weakens the public trust placed in the legal system in general.  
 
In open court regulations, the “following discipline” is not manifested in a manner as 
straightforward as it is in party organizations. In courts, only regulations on the 
decision-making process of the court adjudicative committees have laid down explicitly 
that decisions reached by the adjudicative committee must be implemented by the 
collegial panel.411  However, the “following” pressure is imposed upon rank and file 
judges through other indirect means. For example, in recent years, courts have introduced 
                                                 
407 For example, see the Regulation on Evaluation of Adjudicative Performances of Zhejiang High Court, 
Art.14. also the Regulation on Evaluation of Adjudicative Performances of Changsha Intermediate Court 
(Hunan Province), Art.25.  
408 The following literature was all written by judges based on their working experience. Luo, "Shenpan 
Weiyuanhui "Shenpi Anjian" Zhidu Ying Yu Quxiao [the Practice of Adjudication by Seeking Approval 
from the Adjudicative Committee Should Be Abandoned]." Huang, "Jitifuzezhi Shibi Zouyi [Remarks on 
The "Collective Responsibility"]." Wu, "Analysis of the Current Operation of the Adjudicative Panel." 
409 Rules on Case Evaluation and Examination, Zhejiang High Court [2008]. Art.14.  
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a series of measures to allow court leaders to supervise and evaluate the work 
performance of subordinate judges.412 Such evaluation is then treated as the basis for 
promotion, demotion, award and punishment. With their career and even livelihood held 
in the hands of their superiors,413  the rank and file judges do not only follow but also are 
encouraged to apply law “creatively” to please their superiors.414  Understandably, in such 





This chapter has demonstrated that under the guidance of an instrumental view of law and 
courts, courts are incorporated in a party-state bureaucratic structure, which is designed to 
serve, channel and execute the political agendas of the party through court affairs by 
activating a chain of command disciplined to follow instructions. Simultaneously, courts 
have also inherited two of the most significant features of decision-making from the CCP, 
namely a loosely supervised procedure about the formulation of decisions and a strictly 
disciplined procedure of the execution of such decisions. This political arrangement is 
detrimental to law and justice not because how it places the party’s interests before law 
but because how court decision-making has been designed and institutionally regulated to 
achieve that end. Such an institutional design of court decision-making is damaging since 
once it is established, it can be abused not only for the political interests of the party but 
also for the corrupt interests of individuals, who are entrusted with decision-making 




                                                 
412 In some court, the collegial panel will not only have to follow the decision of the court adjudicative 
committee, the panel and the panel members will also be appraised of their performance by the court 
adjudicative committee in each case that is submitted to the court adjudicative committee. For example, see 
Chapter 5 of the Working Procedure of the Court Adjudicative Committee (2007) issued by Jincheng 
Intermediate Court, Shanxi Province. Available at http://jcfy.jconline.cn/3/2007-9-5/10001@19.htm  
413 An example can be found in the case of Mai Chongkai, former president of Guangdong High Court. 
Mai had reportedly arrested the career advancement of a court official simply because the court-subsidized 
flat allocated to Mai by the official’s department was not to Mai’s full content. Renzhou Liu, "Jujiao Mai 
Chongkai Chenglun De Guiji [Zooming in the Falling Trajectory of Mai Chongkai]," Jiancha fengyun 
[Procuratorial Review], no. 3 (2004). Also Available at 
http://www.uibe.edu.cn/upload/up_jcsjc/alfx/alfx_07032002.html. 
414 Interview C011. 
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6.1. Introduction 
 
For a judge with corrupt intent, success of the corrupt activity largely depends on whether 
he can deliver the promised corrupt service without exposing such corrupt act. The 
capacity to deliver includes the capability to translate and transform an individual 
decision, supposedly fulfilling one’s corrupt interest, into a court decision in accordance 
to the law. Chapter 5 has illustrated how the decision-making power is exercised and 
regulated in China’s courts. This chapter will show that the features described in Chapter 
5 regarding court decision-making have provided the most nurturing environment for the 
delivery of corrupt services in the adjudicative process. The lack of scrutiny of the 
formulation of decisions allows party leaders or court leaders to frame or incorporate 
corrupt interests into public interests with little reasoning. The strict superior-subordinate 
discipline of unconditional compliance enables the superiors to effectively execute such 
decisions into court decisions with minimum resistance. Execution conducted in this 
manner encourages and sometimes requires subordinate judges to disregard adjudicative 
procedures and to discard rational legal reasoning. When such arbitrary practices have 
been systematically registered in courts, any judge can conveniently utilize the 
established level of tolerance of arbitrariness for their own initiative to carry out corrupt 
activities as long as their private interests do not run into conflict with the private 
interests of their superiors. This condition has greatly facilitated the contractual 
performance of the bribed and hence smoothed the contracting process of corrupt 
exchange.  
 
This chapter will exemplify how the particular way of decision-making has enabled and 
facilitated corrupt practices and how the power structure has affected the dynamics of 
corruption in China’s courts. Empirical data used for the case studies include focused 
interviews of legal practitioners, particularly lawyers, during 2005-2009 as well as court 
documents or press releases of cases involving judges who had committed bribery in 
performing their court duties. The total number of these cases amounts to 398, all taking 
place over the period of a quarter of a century spanning 1985 till 2009.415  This chapter is 
divided in two sections, one focusing on the delivery of corrupt services, one focusing on 
the dynamics of corruption in China’s courts. 
 
6.2. Delivery of corrupt services in courts 
 
                                                 
415 These sources include the legal sections of Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), 
Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu 
yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an 
internet-based magazine run by the Supreme Procuratorate. They also include the legal columns of two 
major internet news websites in China: www.sina.com and www.xinhuanet.com.  
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In China’s courts, allocation of judicial decision-making power is highly stratified. As 
shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, within a court, the court president tops the power 
hierarchy. Next are other members of the party-group, the highest decision-making body, 
followed by the divisional directors, who are also members of the court adjudicative 
committee. Further down are the head-judges and at the bottom are rank and file judges. 
Beyond the court, leaders of the territorial party committee can also influence court 
decisions by exerting influence upon the court president. The data studied show that party 
leaders and court leaders deliver their corrupt services mainly by sending down their 
instructions through the chain of command since these leaders do not carry out court 
activities at the ground level. “Frontline judges”, in contrast, mainly deliver their corrupt 
services through their concrete judicial conduct by distorting the fact-finding process and 
by misinterpreting the law, taking advantage of the institutional tolerance of disregard of 
law. When the “frontline judges” commit to corruption, they have to ensure that their 
practices do not encroach upon the interests of their superiors.  
 
6.2.1. Party leaders 
The “party leaders” in this section refer to members of the decision-making bodies of the 
party apparatus, many of whom also hold key positions simultaneously in the 
governmental institutions. Due to the scarcity of materials concerning the CCP 
decision-making body at the central level, cases included in this section only cover party 
leaders at and below the provincial level. In examining these cases, it is noteworthy that 
although an increasing number of party leaders are prosecuted and convicted for 
corruption each year, only a few had reportedly conducted corruption in court affairs. 
However, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that party leaders are refrained 
from conducting corrupt exchange by interfering in court cases. Instead, one likely 
explanation of this low representation is that for a party-leader the value of power over 
courts is marginal comparing the value of power over other public affairs because of the 
weaker authority of courts vis a vis other public institutions. According to the data studied 
in this research, the detected corrupt acts of corrupt party-leaders mostly involve taking 
bribes in, for example, allocating public funds, awarding commissions of lucrative public 
procurement contracts, personnel management and permission of land confiscation.416  To 
obtain corrupt benefits by exercising their power in interfering court cases seem not 
particularly salient or attractive. Nevertheless, this research has been able to trace a few 
examples of corrupt practices committed by party-leaders by interfering with court affairs, 
which will be illustrated below.  
 
                                                 
416 For example, in the case against Mu Suixin, former mayor of Shenyang City, Liaoning Province, the 
prosecutor listed 60 corrupt conduct, among which only one was related to a court case. Dalian City 
Procuratorate vs. Mu Suixin, Criminal Division, Dalian Intermediate Court [2007] No.153. 
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First of all, what is striking is that these cases share a common feature in terms of the 
pattern of delivery of corrupt services – all appear “effortless”. For example, in order to 
help a local business tycoon to obtain favored treatment in a litigation tried in a court 
within his jurisdiction, Mu Suixin, former mayor of Shenyang City (Liaoning Province), 
had a brief conversation with the then president of Liaoning High Court during the break 
of a party meeting. Afterwards, the high-court president gave instructions to his 
subordinates and favored treatment was granted to the tycoon. In exchange the tycoon 
offered Mu cash and gifts worth of 850,000 yuan over a period of three years for the 
favor obtained from the court case as well as from other occasions.417  In Zhuzhou, Hunan 
Province, Zeng Jinchun, the deputy chief of the Zhuzhou Party Committee, once had 
received a similar request from a plaintiff, who pleaded for Zeng’s help to obtain a 
favored court decision in a contractual dispute. After having received a bribe of 20,000 
yuan, Zeng contacted the court. The plaintiff won the case. During the appeal, the 
defendant established contact with Zeng and asked for his favor in the appeal. In the 
meantime, the defendant successfully landed a job for Zeng’s mistress. Pleased, Zeng 
contacted the vice-president of the appeal court, which is also under his jurisdiction. The 
court reversed the decision of the first instance court and turned down all the claims of 
the plaintiff. Immediately after the decision was rendered, Zeng received a sum of 
200,000 yuan from the defendant as a demonstration of the latter’s gratitude.418   
 
Party leaders can not only obtain corrupt benefits through influencing individual court 
decisions but also through the appointment of court leaders. For example, the 
aforementioned Liaoning Mayor, Mu Suixin, had helped to promote Liang Fuquan to 
become the deputy chief secretary of the party-group of Shenyang Intermediate Court. 
After the promotion, Mu received 20,000yuan from the new appointee.419  Furthermore, 
corrupt party leaders can also interfere with other court affairs and conduct corrupt 
exchange with firms, which provide professional service to courts. In Chongqing city, 
Zheng Wei, deputy chief of the Chongqing Yuzhong District Party Committee, was once 
approached by an owner of an auction firm, who wanted to have his firm enlisted by the 
Yuzhong District Court so that the firm can tender for court auction commissions. Zheng 
contacted the court and the auction firm was enlisted. For this service, the auction firm 
owner paid Zheng a tribute of 50,000 yuan.420    
 
Unfortunately, public case reports seldom review how exactly a party leader instructs a 
court leader. Instead, a euphemistic term, “da zhaohu” (literally translated as “to say hi”) 
                                                 
417 Dalian City Procuratorate vs. Mu Suixin, Criminal Division, Dalian Intermediate Court [2007] No.153. 
418 Statement of the Changsha People’s Procuratorate against Zeng Jinchun [2008] No.2. 
419 Dalian City Procuratorate vs. Mu Suixin, Criminal Division, Dalian Intermediate Court [2007] No.153.  
420 Chongqing No.5 People’s Procuratorate vs. Zheng Wei, Court judgment, 1st instance, Chongqing No.5. 
Intermediate Court [2009]. Available at 
http://www.bizteller.cn/trade/news/newsSearch/newsContent/68207183.html.   
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was commonly employed to describe this kind of private conversation in which a superior 
addresses a specific personal request to a subordinate. When such a request was realized 
through court decisions, the authority of the instructor becomes the basis of the decisions. 
For example, in the afore-mentioned case concerning the Chongqing Yuzhong District 
party leader Zheng Wei and the request from the auction firm, after Zheng instructed the 
leader of Yuzhong District Court (whose identity was not disclosed in the court 
judgment), the court leader instructed the responsible judge to take care of the case and 
told him that the firm was recommended by a district leader.421  In Fuquan County Court 
(Guizhou Province), a plaintiff was denied access to 1,480,000 yuan, the amount of his 
court award, which the court had collected from the defendant on the plaintiff’s behalf. 
“Some leader had instructed (da zhaohu) the court to freeze the money” was all that the 
plaintiff was told.422   
 
Even though the instructed court leaders did not necessarily know the details of the 
exchange between the party leader and the favor-seeker, they seemed to share an 
understanding that they were not in a position to question the instruction but were obliged 
to follow it even if the instruction was in breach of the law. In fact, what troubles some 
court leaders most is not that party leaders interfere in court affairs but that some party 
leaders instruct rather ambiguously, leaving it to the court leaders to guess their intention. 
For example, Fu Yulin found in her research that according to her interviews, when a 
people’s congress leader (most are also party members) intends to interfere with a court 
case, he/she would not express his/her intention directly but imply it indirectly by 
displaying dissatisfaction with the court decision on the case concerned without giving 
specific instructions. Judges are then left to guess the preferences of the leader. If they 
guess correctly, the leader will let the case pass by withdrawing his right to “monitor” 
court performances. If not, the judges will continuously be summoned by the leader to 
report the case progress to his office.423 
 
6.2.2. Court leaders 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the decision-making power of different judges 
varies greatly. So do their corrupt opportunities. A judge’s position in the power 
hierarchy corresponds to the range and the value of his decision-making power and hence 
the number of corrupt opportunities. Among the 398 cases studied in this research, 236 
cases were about corrupt conduct committed by judges, who held an executive position 
                                                 
421 See supra 104. Court judgment. Chongqing No.5 People’s Procuratorate vs. Zheng Wei. 
422 See the report at http://news.sohu.com/20090211/n262174423.shtml.  
423 Yulin Fu, "Minshi Shenpan Jiandu Zhidu De Shizhengxing Fenxi [an Empirical Analysis of the 
Supervisory System of the Adjudicative Process in Civil Litigations]," in Falü Chengxu Yunzuo De 
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(including deputy position) at or above the divisional level. A judge’s position in the 
power hierarchy is also proportionate to the volume of corrupt benefits that can be 
collected. For example, according to the dataset of this chapter, between a group of 13 
high court judges with no executive function and a group of 17 high court judges with 
executive functions, 424  the average amount of bribe that had been taken was 
1,660,000yuan for judges with an executive function and 207,000yuan for judges without 
executive functions. For example, Wu Zhenhan, former president of Hunan High Court 
had received a total sum of bribes worth 5.8 million yuan just from one litigant.425  
Whereas the highest amount of bribe received by a rank and file high court judge was less 
than 9% of what Wu had taken. 
 
Other than its effect on opportunities for corruption, a judge’s position in the power 
hierarchy also determines the means of delivery of corrupt services. Similar to party 
leaders, court leaders do not normally carry out court actions at the ground level.426  
Instead, they carry out their duties mainly through making instructions. Compared with 
party leaders, court leaders can influence court decisions in a more regular manner thanks 
to the power they are endowed with by the pi’an zhidu as mentioned in Section 3.2, 
which is to examine and approve drafts of court decisions before they are rendered. Many 
of the instructions are written on the drafts submitted by the subordinate judges. For 
example, the convicted former president of Guangdong High Court, Mai Chongkai 
instructed his subordinate to render favorable treatment to specific litigants by writing 
remarks, such as, “deal with the case properly, with heed and expedition”.427  Some court 
leaders used more discreet language, such as “please adjudicate the case according to the 
law” by Zhou Wenxuan, convicted former president of Wuhan Intermediate Court,428  or 
“this case needs careful examination” by Wu Zhenhan, convicted former president of 
Hunan High Court.429  These “coded messages” would have entirely lost their meaning in 
the eyes of outsiders. Only judges who work in the institution can understand the 
important messages conveyed in such seemingly redundant instructions. For example, 
judges who worked with the afore-mentioned former president of Guangdong High Court, 
Mai Chongkai, were aware of a “customary” rule that the litigant whose name is closest 
                                                 
424 In the dataset, only about the half of the cases concerning corrupt high court judges has indicated the 
exact amount of bribes taken.  
425 The Procuratorate vs. Wu Zhenhan, Criminal Judgment, the 2nd Intermediate Court of Beijing [2006] 
No. 858. 
426 In order to contain this practice, the SPC issued a directive requiring court leaders, including 
court-presidents, vice-presidents, divisional directors and deputy directors to attend court hearings in a 
minimum number of cases. The exact number is left to be decided by each court’s superior court. SPC 
Directive [2007]. No.14.  
427 See the report at http://past.tianjindaily.com.cn/docroot/200402/10/xb01/10171301.htm.  
428 See the report at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-07-20/072613488841.shtml  
429 Zili Xu, "Court Presient Conduct Corruption for the Benefit of Adopted Son, the Whole Family Was 
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to Mai’s written instruction is the party to be given favorable treatment.430  Sometimes, 
the instruction is more direct and explicit for instance when the court leader entrusts the 
subordinate with the corrupt conspiracy. An example is the afore-mentioned former 
president of Hunan High Court, Wu Zhenhan. When Wu was approached by a litigant for 
a favor, Wu instructed Li Xiaohua, former director of the political department of the same 
court, to take care of Yan’s cases and asked Li to report to him if it was necessary for him 
to step in.431  In circumstances where a corrupt court leader could not wait for the 
subordinate judge to submit a draft on which to indicate his instruction by written 
remarks, the leader can demand the bribing litigant or his representative to submit a 
“case-report” to the court, addressing and rationalizing their demands. The court leader 
can then endorse the report with supporting remarks and send it to the subordinate judge 
to execute.432  This makes the instruction seemingly less personal.  
 
Leaders of appellant courts can deliver corrupt services not only by instructing judges in 
their own courts but also judges in the subordinate courts. For example, a district court 
not only ruled in favor of a litigant but also waived her litigation fee because Tang Jikai, 
former vice-president of Changsha Intermediate Court, had asked the district court 
leaders to take care of the litigant (so-called “dazhaohu”) at a banquet hosted by the 
litigant for Tang and the district court leaders. During this period, Tang and his wife had 
received a total sum of gifts worth 143,700 yuan from the litigant.433  Li Xiaohua, former 
director the political department of Hunan High Court, located also in Changsha City, 
once instructed the leaders of the Changsha Intermediate Court, to render a reduced 
sentence in an embezzlement case. Having received 200,000 yuan from the defendant, Li 
instructed the intermediate court judges to “try to reduce the amount of embezzlement 
under 10,000,000 yuan and to control the sentence below the term of imprisonment of ten 
years”.434 
 
                                                 
430 Liu, "Jujiao Mai Chongkai Chenglun De Guiji [Zooming in the Falling Trajectory of Mai Chongkai]." 
Also Available at http://www.uibe.edu.cn/upload/up_jcsjc/alfx/alfx_07032002.html. For other report of the 
customary court practices of implicit instructions, see Weidong Chen, "Xingshi Ershen Fahui Chongshen 
Zhidu De Fansi Yu Sikao [Re-Examining the 'Send Back for Retrial' Decision in the Appeal of Criminal 
Cases]," (Renmin University). 
431 The Procuratorate vs. Wu Zhenhan, Criminal Judgment, No. 858 [2006], the 2nd Intermediate Court of 
Beijing. 
432 Interview L.013. Also see the case report of Wang Zhiwen, former court president of Dachuan County 
Court, Sichuan Province. Tan, Sifa Fubai Fangzhi Lun [Preventing Judicial Corruption]. pp.109-11.  
433 See Procuratorate vs. Tang Jikai, Huaihua Intermediate Court, Hunan Province [2006] No.52 
434 Jianliang Huang, Chen Qiuhua, "Faguan Tanwu, Huilu Fanzui Fenxi [a Criminological Analysis of 
Embezzlement and Bribery Committed by Judges] " Fazhi Pinglun Zhoukan [Rule of Law Review Weekly] 
(neicangao [For Internal Communication only])  (2005). 
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The loosely scrutinized procedures concerning the formulation of decisions combined 
with strict discipline of execution of superiors’ instructions allows a court leader to 
influence a court decision according to his personal preference, which is directed not by a 
set of explicit rules laid down in the law but, in the case of corruption, by who brings 
more bribe. In a divorce case, by juggling with court decisions, Cheng Kunbo, former 
president of Huangshi Intermediate Court, received 10,000 yuan from the husband and 
5,000 yuan from the wife respectively. 435  Meng Laigui, former director of the 
Adjudicative-Supervisory Division of Shanxi High Court, had operated in a similar 
manner,436  which is described in a popular satiric proverb as “eating off of plaintiff and 
then defendant (chi’le yuangao chi beigao)”.437  Reluctant to be taken advantage of by 
one judge in a bidding and aware of the court power structure and how it operates, more 
cost-efficiency-oriented litigants avoid entering in a bid and instead seek to spend the 
bribe on judges or other decision-makers, who can better guarantee a favorable 
decision.438 A lawyer once reminisced with great pride on how he once successfully won 
a “grand” case by having made the right choices of which decision-makers to approach 
after having investigated and acquired information on the moves that the other litigating 
party had taken. He said: “I feel I am more like a director and my work is to put the right 
actor at the right place and let them play”.439 
 
Bound by the strict discipline to follow instructions, in the cases studied subordinate 
judges seldom examine or question the legitimacy of the instructions given them by court 
leaders. Likewise, court leaders’ in these cases seldom question instructions from party 
leaders. Furthermore, in these cases it seems an established practice that the breach of law 
and judicial ethics is exonerated if such conduct is carried out to execute a superior’s 
instruction. In all the cases investigated, no judge had been punished for carrying out a 
corrupt leader’s instruction to deliver a corrupt service on the leader’s behalf, unless the 
judge was found having also taken bribes for the service. From the policy-maker’s 
viewpoint, it is logical that the subordinate judge is exonerated for the unlawful and 
unethical actions taken to execute the instructions. The reason is that to punish a judge for 
his misconduct in carrying out instructions is to invite the judge to examine the 
legitimacy of each instruction given to them and that will impede the execution of 
decisions from above. Punishing subordinate judges who take bribes on their own 
initiative is not in conflict with the discipline, since their bribe-taking is not part of the 
instruction.  
 
                                                 
435 For details of this report, see http://www.cnhubei.com/200304/ca240652.htm.  
436 For more details, see Li, "Corruption in China's Courts." 
437 Zhizhi Yang, "Cong Minyao Kan Woguo Fazhi Jianshe [to Assess the Development of Legal 
Establishment in Our Country from Folklores]," (2007). 
438 Interview L.013. L.014. L.015. 
439 Interview L.013.  
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In contrast, for judges, who insist to comply with the law at the “expense” of disregarding 
instructions, the consequence could be tragic. Wang Yaguang was a judge from Fuping 
County Court, Shaanxi province. In 1994, Judge Wang presided over an administrative 
dispute. The plaintiff sued the local construction and zoning bureau for dismantling his 
house. The defendant claimed that they did that because the plaintiff had not obtained a 
construction permit. The court found that the plaintiff had applied for such a permit and 
had even paid the fee for it. It was the defendant who had failed to issue the permit. 
During the adjudicating process, the president of the County Court instructed Judge 
Wang to render a decision in favor of the defendant. Believing that the defendant should 
take the blame and responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages, Judge Wang drafted a ruling 
against the defendant and submitted it to the court adjudicative committee for 
deliberation. The adjudicative committee rejected the ruling and instructed Judge Wang 
to revise it. Judge Wang made a compromise. He ruled against the defendant but reduced 
the award of damages to the plaintiff. As soon as the ruling was issued, the defendant 
made a strong protest to the court president. Immediately, the court president summoned 
the adjudicative committee to meet. The committee decided that Judge Wang did not 
follow the committee’s decision, violated court discipline and should be punished. The 
committee demanded that Judge Wang write a statement of self-criticism. Judge Wang 
wrote such a statement, in which he rebutted the committee’s decision and refused to 
admit that he had done anything wrong. Soon thereafter, the court removed Judge Wang 
from his job and warned all court staff in a notification that Judge Wang’s mistake was 
“on purpose not [due to] negligence… it was an issue of his political stance not of his 
professional competence.” Judge Wang started to complain to higher authorities but to no 
avail. Witnessing Judge Wang suffering and struggling, the court president told the judge, 
“Go on complaining. The more you complain, the more leaders I will acquaint. Let’s see 
whom the superior authority will believe.” By the time the media coverage of this case 
began, Judge Wang had been demoted and removed from his adjudicative post for seven 
years. The most humiliating aspect of all is that as one of the only three judges in the 
court with a law degree, Judge Wang was asked to attend a training course. His first 
assignment was to read Mao’s Against Liberalism.440 
 
6.2.3. “Frontline judges” 
 
In comparison to judges who are court leaders, “frontline judges” (yixian faguan) are 
those judges, who sit in the collegial panel, examine and investigate cases by interacting 
with litigants and other court-users, and carry out court functions at the ground level.  
“Frontline judges” are usually judges at the bottom of the power hierarchy, who do not 
                                                 
440 For the full report of the story, see Guangming Huang, "The Price for a Judge to Pay for Offending His 
Superiors " Southern Weekend, 23 March 2001. 
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hold any executive functions.441  When the “frontline judges” commit corruption on their 
own initiative, information about the practices are better exposed and hence allow a 
closer examination of the delivery of corrupt services in the litigating process.  
 
First of all, as explained in the previous section, any court superior, from court leaders to 
divisional leaders, can intervene in the adjudicative process at the ground level. Therefore, 
for a corrupt “frontline judge”, to succeed with the delivery of a corrupt service, he has to 
make sure that his corrupt interest is not in conflict with the interests of the superiors. It 
means that corrupt opportunities for “frontline judges” are limited to cases, which lack 
either political or corrupt interests for their superiors. Among the 398 cases investigated 
in this research, 162 cases concern corruption committed by “frontline judges”. 
According to these 162 cases, “frontline judges” can deliver corrupt services in the course 
of litigation by distorting the fact-finding process, by manipulating the interpretation of 
the law, or most often, through the combination of both.  
 
In a legal environment, where power prevails over law and authoritarianism preempts 
rational legal thinking and practices, the fairness of a legal proceeding greatly depends on 
the moral standard and integrity of the judge who presides over the proceedings. When a 
judge intends to take advantage of this authoritarian environment and to abuse his power, 
it can be more easily done by, for example, distorting the fact-finding process, including 
admitting evidence without giving the other party an opportunity to contest it, arbitrarily 
excluding legitimate evidence, obstructing the access to evidence and manipulating the 
forensic examination procedure. 442  In this environment, from the perspective of a 
defendant in a criminal trial, the difference between conducting and not conducting 
corruption could be life or death. For example, in a murder trial in Jingmen Intermediate 
Court (Hubei Province), Lü Zonghui was the responsible judge. The defendant’s relative 
came to Lü and asked for help. Lü told the family that according to the law, the defendant 
could be sentenced to death unless the defendant could provide evidence for mitigation of 
sentence, such as providing evidence of an undiscovered further crime or leads to 
dissolve another crime. The family followed the advice and with a bribe obtained a lead 
from the captain of the local police. The family leaked the “lead” to the defendant, who 
then reported the “lead” to the police in a framed interrogation. 443  Based on the 
                                                 
441 In 2007, the SPC issued a directive, which requires court leaders and divisional directors to sit in 
collegial panel and attend court hearings in a minimum amount of cases per year. Lower courts have the 
discretion to decide on the exact amount. When they do, they are automatically the head-judge, who can 
designate a responsible judge to do the preparative work.  SPC Notification [2007] no.14. 
442 For example, see the documented story of a plaintiff Zhu Dinglong in Dinglong Zhu, Guansi [Lawsuit] 
(Beijing: Law Press, 2007). p.268. Such practices can also be found in the cases complied in Tan, Sifa 
Fubai Fangzhi Lun [Preventing Judicial Corruption]. pp.67-126. 
443 According to the Procuracy Daily, convicts of corruption are often found being given mitigation based 
on “meritorious performance”. Quite a few were detected having conducted fraud (jia ligong), namely 
convicts “buying” off tips from investigators and “reporting” it back to investigators, which would be 
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defendant’s “report” in the interrogation, the captain issued a testimony confirming the 
defendant’s “meritorious performance” for the court’s reference. During the court hearing, 
judge Lü announced the discovery of mitigating evidence and admitted it immediately. 
When the victim’s family requested the court to disclose this evidence, the judge denied 
the request on the ground that the evidence is “adjudicative secret”. The judge dismissed 
the challenge from the victim’s family and rendered a decision of reprieve from the death 
sentence.444  During the litigation, Lü accepted 8,000yuan and solicited various gifts from 
the defendant’s family.  
 
Huang Xiaoguang, a former judge of Chenzhou Intermediate Court (Hunan Province), 
had safely accumulated bribes for several years from prosecuted local thugs, mostly drug 
traffickers in exchange for a reprieve from death penalty. His corrupt conduct was 
concealed so well that he was even recommended in 2006 to the SPC to review death 
penalty sentencing at the national level until his corrupt conduct was exposed. 445  
According to the cases investigated, it is also common for “frontline judges” to abet 
litigants to obtain and submit, for instance, fake age or medical certificates in order to 
facilitate the decision-making concerning probation, parole, reduction of sentence or 
executing a sentence out of prison based on deceitful medical certificate or deceitful 
“meritorious performance”.446   
 
Forging evidence is an approach to deliver corrupt services in criminal cases as much as 
in civil cases. Fan Qiyan and Zhang Jinhan, former judges of Wuhan Maritime Court, 
knowingly admitted a fake contract as the basis of their ruling, which legitimized the 
litigant’s purchase of a smuggled oil tank. For this service, the judges were rewarded with 
a bribe of 200,000yuan.447  Former judge Wang Shenjie from Shangqiu Intermediate 
Court (Henan Province), instead of waiting for the litigant to solicit his corrupt service, 
volunteered to deliver a “favor” to a plaintiff in a tort case concerning a land dispute. 
Based on the knowledge that the plaintiff was well connected with party leaders, the 
judge hoped that the plaintiff could return his “favor” by helping to advance his career or 
to land a job for his offspring. As the “responsible judge” in the case, Wang, on his own 
initiative, tampered a land certificate by scratching off important information and 
replacing it with his own handwriting. Wang admitted the certificate as evidence without 
disclosing it at the court hearing. Wang accordingly rendered a decision in favor of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
recognized as “meritorious performance”, as the defendant had done in the case described above in the 
main text. For reports on this phenomena, see http://www.jcrb.com/zhuanti/ffzt/tglg/  
444 The People's Courts Publishing House, "People’s Court Case Report (Criminal Section)," 47 
(2005).p.550-9. 
445 See http://old.jfdaily.com/gb/jfxww/xlbk/bkwz/node36356/node36358/userobject1ai1869606.html.  
446 Examples can be found in the case of Wu Yunfa, former judge of Liu’an County Court, Anhui Province, 
and the case of Zhang Gusheng, former judge of Yongshun County Court, Hunan Province. Tan, Sifa Fubai 
Fangzhi Lun [Preventing Judicial Corruption]. pp.101-4, 108-9.   
447 See the report at http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/2004_4/15/1403097759.htm.   
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plaintiff. By the time the corrupt conduct was discovered, the judge had not yet been 
promoted; however, the plaintiff had awarded the judge a sum of 210,000yuan in cash.448  
 
In another case, former judge Jiang Guoliang from Yancheng Intermediate Court (Jiansu 
Province), Jiang received a request from a defendant, who was prosecuted for 
manslaughter, accompanied by 5,000yuan as well as various gifts. Jiang delivered his 
corrupt service by tampering with an interview transcript, based on which, he interpreted 
a decisive traffic regulation in favor of the defendant.449   
 
Compared with the previous examples for the delivery of corrupt services, exercising 
stipulated discretion is a much safer approach. The vagueness, ambiguity and sometimes 
inconsistency featuring in Chinese laws leaves large room for this exercise. In Taizhou 
Intermediate Court (Sichuan Province), a bank manager was prosecuted for 
embezzlement of 3,000,000yuan. Upon a bribe, the collegial panel dismissed the charge, 
defined the conduct as an administrative violation and acquitted the defendant.450  Wide 
discretion also exists in sentencing in criminal cases. The Chinese Criminal Law 
normally only indicates two to three scales of the sentence for each crime. Judges are 
granted discretion to decide on the exact term of sentence based on the “circumstances 
(liangxing qingjie)” of the case concerned. For instance, according to the Chinese 
Criminal Law (1997), the sentences for the crime of embezzlement for more than 100,000 
yuan range from imprisonment of more than ten years to life-imprisonment, and even the 
death penalty, if the “circumstance” of the case is “particularly serious”.451 There are few 
instructions on how the “circumstance” should be gauged. In court judgments, the reason 
for this exercise of discretion is seldom elaborated. Judges are not legally bound by their 
own previous decisions or that of their peers’ in the same or superior courts. 452  
Overwhelmed by the large number of complaints on judges’ abuse of their discretion with 
regard to sentencing, the SPC only recently launched an experimental guideline to 
“standardize” the exercise of sentencing discretion for a few selected types of crimes.453 
 
In civil cases, the room for manipulation of stipulated discretion is at least as wide as that 
in criminal cases. A public-interest lawyer once represented a group of pollution victims 
in an environmental tort case against a factory. When the presiding judge decided to 
award only 30% of the plaintiffs’ full claim of damages, the lawyer asked for the basis of 
                                                 
448 See the case report of former judge Wang Shenjie, available at 
http://news.shangdu.com/category/10003/2007/11/30/2007-11-30_840426_10003.shtml.  
449 “Two Senior Citizens Fought for the Dignity of Law”. 
450 See http://sc.news.163.com/06/1028/08/2UGOM82K00500079.html  
451 Chinese Criminal Law (2009). Art.383(1). 
452 During a presentation in the 2nd Annual Conference of the European Chinese Law Studies Association, 
Chao Xi reviewed that even the SPC judges do not follow their precedent cases according to his interviews. 
453 See related report at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-06/01/content_11464962.htm.  
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the number. The judge simply ignored the question.454  In a contractual dispute case tried 
in Zhuji County Court (Zhejiang Province), former judge Lou Zemin awarded an 
excessively large sum of damages to the plaintiff in exchange for a reward of 
130,000yuan.455  Overall, it seems easier for prosecutors to scrutinize a judge’s abuse of 
power in criminal cases than in civil cases. Among the case materials collected in this 
research, cases concerning judicial corruption in criminal cases tend to provide detail 
information about how the corrupt service was carried out in the adjudicative process 
than those in civil cases, even though corruption is likely to occur in both to the same 
extent.456  A possible explanation is that in criminal cases abuse of judicial discretion 
which results from the misapplication of law is easier to identify because of the range of 
benchmark sentencing standards laid down in the Chinese Criminal Law, against which 
violation can be gauged. Such a “benchmark”, however, is much less obvious in the 
Chinese Civil Law. 
 
Enjoying only limited corrupt opportunities, some more risk-averse “frontline judges” 
chose to deliver corrupt services by engaging their superiors. For example, when a former 
judge Wu Chunfa from Guiyang Intermediate Court (Guizhong Province) was 
approached by an auctioneer for favored treatment in a court auction commission, Wu 
said he could not decide on that issue. Wu then introduced the auctioneer to his 
supervisor, Xi Lilong, former director of the court enforcement bureau. After having been 
promised a sum of money as a “gratitude fee”, Xi instructed Wu to satisfy the 
auctioneer’s demand.457  Li Xiaohua, former director of the political department of Hunan 
High Court, was once approached by Yan Caihong, an owner of an investment 
conglomerate, who had multiple cases pending in Hunan High Court. Without the 
decision-making power to deliver the corrupt services that Yan asked for, Li introduced 
Yan to Wu Zhenhan, the then president of the Hunan High Court. This brokerage earned 
Li a bribe of 370,000yuan from the litigant.458 
  
Therefore, “democratic centralism”, which is characterized by a loosely scrutinized 
process of formulation of decisions and a strictly disciplined execution of these decisions, 
has greatly facilitated the delivery of corrupt services in China’s courts in three respects. 
Firstly, it allows party leaders and court leaders to conceal their corrupt intent by framing 
or incorporating it into uncontestable instructions and to deliver corrupt services by 
effectively translating their individual decisions into court decisions by manipulating 
their endowed power to intervene in the judicial decision-making process any time. It 
                                                 
454 Minutes of the Conference on Legal Right Assertion of Pollution Victims (2009)  
455 See http://www.148com.com/html/583/83675.html.  
456 Li, "Corruption in China's Courts." 
457 See the report at http://www.xinhuanet.com/chinanews/2006-06/07/content_7196104.htm  
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also enables them to deliver corrupt services in a highly effective manner by mobilizing 
subordinate judges through the chain of command with minimal resistance from them. 
Secondly, subordinating law to power also hinders the development of the rule of law and 
rational legal thinking. It tolerates and sustains practices that disregard procedural rules 
and are devoid of rational legal reasoning. Such environment enables “frontline judges” 
to deliver corrupt services in the judicial decision-making process on their own initiative 
as long as they observe and avoid potential conflicts between their own interests and the 
political or private interests of their superiors. For example, in the 398 cases studied, none 
of the judges had been found taking bribes from litigants, who were involved in the 
“politically sensitive” cases. It is not only because these litigants usually hold strong 
ideological beliefs and are less likely to offer bribes but also because these cases concern 
the pivotal political interests of the supreme CCP leadership. Taking bribes in these cases 
will be suicidal or “bringing fire to one’s own body (yinhuo shaoshen)”, as a pertinent 
Chinese idiom would have it. Thirdly, to subject law to power damages the predictability 
of law, which generates bribes from both litigants, who intend to obtain a better than fair 
decision, and from litigants who are compelled to bribe in order to avoid a less than fair 
decision. The proliferation of corrupt conduct in turn increases the expectation of judicial 
corruption and reinforces the belief in the supremacy of power rather than of law.  
 
6.3. Dynamics of corruption in courts 
 
As introduced in Chapter 5, decision-making in China’s courts has features that allow 
personal power to supersede law. The dynamics of the power structure inherent in the 
litigating process therefore also defines the dynamics of corruption, if pursued. It makes 
corruption a multi-facet and a multi-player game. Litigants can seek to influence the 
outcome of litigation by conducting corrupt exchange with different judges or others who 
can influence the judges concerned. The multi-instance nature of litigation provides both 
litigants a spacious ground to level their dispute by deploying and re-deploying their 
economic, social and political capital to induce favorable decisions. When both litigants 
are more or less equally resourceful in terms of social, political and economic capital and 
equally committed to win the case through any means, the outcome is often lose-lose 
because the extra resources they invest in corruption may eventually be canceled out, 
which brings the case back to the starting point. The following case may serve as an 
illustration of this.  
 
In 1994, Shenmu County, Shaanxi Province, a group of villagers brought a civil suit 
against a well-connected mine-developer. The villagers bribed the judge in the basic court, 
but lost the case. Having consulted a lawyer, the villagers believed that they lost the case 
because their bribe was insignificant compared with the influence exerted upon the court 
by the defendant. More importantly, the bribe was only offered to the responsible judge, 
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but not to the court leaders. The villagers chipped in more “bribe-funds” and appealed to 
the Shenmu Intermediate Court. This time, they bribed three judges, including a 
vice-president and a divisional director, of the intermediate court. They won the case but 
soon received a stay of execution because the defendant started an exceptional retrial 
procedure in the provincial Shaanxi High Court. The case was sent back to the appellant 
Intermediate Court. The villagers bribed the retrial judge, who, after having taken the 
bribes, sustained the previous judgment. However, the defendant managed to stall the 
enforcement procedure, which gave him a chance to invoke yet another re-trial procedure 
at the provincial High Court almost a year later. This time the High Court revoked all the 
previous court decisions and sent the case back to the first trial court again. Two years 
later the dispute was eventually closed with a settlement between the villagers and the 
mine-developer.459   
 
According to a lawyer, these “lose-lose cases” are usually the result of compulsive 
decisions by vengeance-charged litigants, who simultaneously or consecutively engage 
different power-holders to support their demands through corruption whereby the court 
simply becomes an extended field of the “battle ground” of their dispute.460  After several 
rounds of litigation, accumulated litigating expenses, the cost of bribes and the high 
transaction costs involved in corrupt exchange, none of the litigants emerges as a winner. 
However, when the litigation takes place between two parties with unmatched 
influencing powers, the outcome of the litigation can be more easily manipulated by the 
party, who enjoys the power advantage.461  The aggrieved party usually either accepts its 
fate silently or embarks on a long, rough and uncertain road of petitioning, also known as 
letter and visiting (xinfang), to Beijing.462   
 
From the perspective of the judges, the outcome of the corrupt activities is also 
dynamically associated with interactions among the bribe-takers. According to the cases 
studied, this research finds that the disciplined hierarchical structure in courts makes 
corruption alliances easier to forge in superior-subordinate relationships. Such alliances 
increase the efficiency of the delivery of corrupt services because the enhanced safety 
allows direct communication among the corruption participants and improves 
coordination among various judicial posts, which are in charge of different phases of the 
adjudicative process. Such coordination integrates the corrupt services that are 
fragmented due to division of power among the registration division, the adjudication 
                                                 
459 Liu, "Yiqi Hetong Jiufen Yinqi De Sifa 'Heishao' [a Judicial 'Black Whistle' in a Contractual Dispute] ". 
460 Interview L.011. 
461 I asked a lawyer what the chance of such a disadvantaged litigant to have a fair trial would be, the 
lawyer answered he would never want to represent such a litigant. Interview W.029. 
462 For more empirical research and detailed analyses on this topic, see articles of Yu Jianrong at his 
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division and the enforcement division. The integration in turn reduces the transactional 
costs of the corrupt exchange. This study finds that in courts where such alliances have 
been forged, the delivery of corrupt services is transformed from the what Scott termed 
“parochial corruption”, namely, “a situation where only ties of kinship, affection, caste, 
and so forth determine access to the favors of power-holders”,463  to “market corruption”, 
in which corrupt services are offered in a more “non-discriminatory” manner to whoever 
pays the required amount of bribes. For example, investigators of the corruption scandals 
in the judiciary of Hunan Province found that, externally, certain “trade rules (hanggui)” 
have emerged regulating the price and the allocation of corrupt profits.464  Internally, all 
bribes collected were shared among judges, who cooperated with each other in panel 
deliberations and other mandated procedures. 465  An anonymous unofficial source 
revealed more predatory practices involving the collusion between the detained SPC 
vice-president Huang Songyou and the director of the enforcement bureau of the 
Guangdong High Court.466   
 
Among the allied corrupt judges, “clients” are usually jointly managed and profits are 
shared. Prosecutors found that, for instance, more than half of the 23 bribes taken by 
former judge Liu Juping of Wuhan Intermediate Court (Hubei Province) were shared 
with other judges.467 Normally, the illicit profit would be distributed among the “corrupt 
allies” in proportion to the judges’ position in the power hierarchy and their role in the 
corrupt activities. For example, when former judge Wu Zhilin received 10,000yuan from 
a litigant, he kept 3,000 to himself, offered 3,000 to a colleague and 4,000 to the 
court-president.468  When He Qingyuan, former vice-president of Changli County Court 
(Hebei Province) solicited a few leather jackets from a litigant, he first reserved two for 
himself, two for the court president and then allocated the rest to other staff members 
involved.469  The frontline judges are most of the time at the bottom of the pecking order, 
doing most of the labor but getting the least amount of profit. 470  Sometimes, the 
individual perceptions of these participants greatly vary as to the value of their roles in 
the corrupt activities. For instance, when Wen Zhipeng, a former official in the Legal 
Office of Hainan Province, told his superior Lou Xiaoping, the later president of Hainan 
High Court, that he had collected 400,000yuan from a briber, Lou told Wen to keep 
10,000 for himself. It was only during the investigation of the case that it was found Wen 
                                                 
463 J. C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (1972). p.88. 
464 Huang, "Faguan Tanwu, Huilu Fanzui Fenxi [a Criminological Analysis of Embezzlement and Bribery 
Committed by Judges] ". 
465 Ibid. 
466 This post can be accessed at http://www.studioclassroom.net/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=14127.  
467 See the report at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-04-16/05522320106s.shtml  
468 "Judges Standing in the Defendant's Dock," Zhengfu fazhi [Government and Rule by law], no. 6 (1997). 
469 See the report at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/44/20030120/911470.html.  
470 Interview. L.013. 
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had actually collected 600,000 instead of 400,000yuan and secretly “intercepted” 
200,000yuan as his “fair” share.471 
 
Among the 398 cases studied, collusive conduct had been detected in the corruption 
scandals in Tianjin High Court, Hunan High Court, Jilin High Court, Wuhan Intermediate 
Court (Hubei Province), Shenzhen Intermediate Court (Guangdong), Tianjin Intermediate 
Court (Tianjin Municipality), Changsha Intermediate Court (Hunan), Fuyang 
Intermediate Court (Anhui), Jingzhou Intermediate Court (Hubei), Jingmen Intermediate 
Court (Hubei), Nantong Intermediate Court (Jiangsu), Wenzhou Intermediate Court 
(Zhejiang), Chengdu Intermediate Court (Sichuan), Changchun Intermediate Court (Jilin), 
Guangzhou Intermediate Court (Guangdong), Yancheng Intermediate Court (Jiangsu), 
Shenmu Intermediate Court (Shaanxi), Mudanjiang Intermediate Court (Jilin). One 
interesting finding that emerged from studying these cases is that in the afore-mentioned 
scandals, collusion usually involves one court-president or one vice-president with one or 
a few divisional leaders and rank and file judges. In other words, collusion seldom takes 
place just between the court president and vice-presidents. 472  This pattern is also 
discernible in corruption cases detected in other public institutions.473  It suggests that the 
infusion of distrust among top executive leaders as intended by the “democratic 
centralism”-principle is taking effect. Trust and loyalty is indeed easier to develop in 
superior-subordinate relations, where one owes a job or career to the other, rather than in 
more equal relations, such as between the members of the collective leadership. And that 
trust is one of the vital ingredients of collusive corruption.  
 
Among these equals, investigators of the Wuhan Intermediate Court scandals found that 
the customary practice was non-interference.474  However, this is not always the case. 
Since the discipline of unconditional compliance does not apply in equal relationships, 
their equal status provides these leaders with the incentive and capability to compete for 
corrupt opportunities and profits. Escalation of such “turf battle” may eventually end in 
exposure and apprehension of the participants of corruption. For this, one court auction in 
Hunan High Court provides the best illustration. In this case, a shopping mall located in 
Shenzhen City was to be auctioned as part of a standard enforcement procedure of a court 
                                                 
471 http://www.hinews.cn/news/system/2004/08/12/000000717.shtml  
472 The only exception is Fuyang Intermediate Court. 
473 This includes 100 cases concerning officials in other public institutions convicted for corruption 
between 2005-2009. Only in the corruption scandal of Shenyang City, two top leaders, the mayor and the 
deputy mayor stepped down together. However, even in this case, the two leaders fell together not because 
they colluded in corruption but because both of them were corrupt and the mayor refused to cover the 
corrupt conduct of his deputy, which facilitated the investigation. See Inspection, Shenyang 'Mu Suixin, Ma 
Xiangdong' an Chachu Jishi [a Journalistic Report on the Investigation and Conviction of the Cases of Mu 
Suixin and Ma Xiangdong]. 
474 Huailiang Hua, "Jiekai Wuhan Zhongyuan Fubai Wo'an De "Heixiazi" [Open The "Black-Box" Of the 
Group Corruption Case of Wuhan Intermediate Court]," minzhu yu fazhi [democracy and law] 2004. 
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award. A total number of five plaintiffs had submitted a joint claim in the auctioned asset 
worth of 0.4 billion yuan. The high value of the auctioned asset has attracted special 
attention from two groups of judges in Hunan High Court, one from the economic 
adjudicative division and the other from the enforcement division. All aimed at pocketing 
the lucrative auction commission, part of which was customarily attributed to judges as 
kickbacks.475  Eventually, the court decided that the shopping mall would be divided into 
two packages, each division put in charge of one package. The economic adjudicative 
division commissioned the auction to an auction house, in which the son of the court 
president had a share. The enforcement division commissioned their service to an auction 
house, managed by the son of another former president of the court and then party leader 
of Hunan Province. During the auction, it was also discovered that the Shenzhen 
Intermediate Court, which had immediate jurisdiction over the shopping mall, also 
processed claims over the disputed asset. Consent could not be reached among the three 
interest groups concerning the distribution of the proceeds from the auction. The dispute 
was even presented to the SPC, which demanded that the Hunan High Court transfer a 
portion of the proceeds to the Shenzhen Intermediate Court. The Hunan High Court did 
not follow this instruction as the income from the auction sale had mostly been 
appropriated by the judges from Hunan High Court. Escalation of this conflict eventually 
led to a high-profile corruption investigation against Hunan High Court, which brought 
the collapse of the corrupt network, including the fall and conviction of the president of 
the Hunan High Court.476   
 
                                                 
475 According to the current auction law, the auction firm can claim up to 5% of the total value of the 
auctioned item respectively from the seller and the buyer for a service with little production cost. The 
auction commission is then distributed between the court and the auction firm. According to an internal 
report from the Procuratorate Daily, the customary practice is that the court takes 40% of the auction 
commission. The auction firm takes the 30%. The rest 30% is usually spent on operational costs, which 
include the cost of bribes offered to officials from other public institutions. Huang, "Faguan Tanwu, Huilu 
Fanzui Fenxi [a Criminological Analysis of Embezzlement and Bribery Committed by Judges] ". Similar 
distribution rate is also found in the report of the corruption scandal of Ulumiqi Railway Court (Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region) and most recently of the sandal of Taizhou Intermediate Court (Zhejiang).  
According to other cases investigated during this research, against a fair amount of bribe, the court can also 
help the buyer to auction off the asset at a price much lower than the market price. The court can also 
collude with the seller. The seller can set up a scarecrow company to buy off his own asset at a 
lower-than-market price. This way, the seller can keep his asset and impede the creditor from realizing his 
full claim. Victims of these practices are the innocent creditors or innocent buyers. In a recent case in 
Taizhou Intermediate Court, an innocent buyer paid for the auctioned real estate but was not able to obtain 
the estate. The case was reported by the Chinese Youth Daily. According to the report, the court had an 
agreement with every candidate auction firm that was short-listed by the court for the tendering. Based on 
the agreement, the court is entitled of 40% of the auction commission. Apart from that, the court also has 
large room of manipulation in deciding what and how the auction is to be performed. For details of the case, 
see http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2009-10/23/content_2900306.htm. 
476 Dongwen Li, "Heibai Zhijian De Shenzhen Dongmen Dashijie [Shenzhen Da Shijie in Both the Black 
and White Worlds]," Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolis Newspaper], 31 August 2005. 
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The scandal of Hunan High Court is not the only case, in which competition for lucrative 
corrupt profits eventually led to the collapse of the corrupt network. For example, 
associated with the exposure of corrupt conduct of Pei Hongquan, former vice-president 
of Shenzhen Intermediate Court, was a court bankruptcy case with an estimated value of 
160,000,000yuan. Behind the fall of Huang Songyou, former vice-president of the SPC 
and Yang Xiancai, former director of the enforcement bureau of Guangdong High Court, 
was the enforcement of a court award involving real estate property located in the capital 
city of Guangdong Province, with an estimated value of one billion yuan.477  Similarly, 
the most recent scandal in Chongqing High Court, which brought down Zhang Tao, its 
former vice-president, and Wu Xiaoqing, its former director of the enforcement bureau, 
was associated with the auction of a piece of land with an estimated value of 36,500,000 
yuan.478  In short, among court leaders of equal rank, the contrived mutual-constraint 
element of the “democratic centralism” functions not only as an obstruction of political 
conspiracy in the collective leadership but also as a barrier preventing them from 
colluding as a means to optimize corrupt opportunities and profits. In fact, their equal 
position provides these leaders with the incentive and the capacity to compete for more 
decision-making power and related benefits since the discipline of unconditional 
compliance does not apply in equal relationships. Eradicating one’s political rival by 
exposing the latter’s corrupt activities seems the most effective approach since it removes 
the competition without necessarily limiting the power attributed to the post to be taken 
over. However, this type of “democratic centralism” has little effect in fundamentally 
reducing corruption since this “democratic” arrangement is not designed to promote 
political liberty and accountability but to help the superior power to monitor 
subordinates’ performance and hence maintain its authoritarian control over the state. 
Under this instrumental view of democratic mechanism, measures of checks and balances 





Chapter 5 has identified the two most significant features of decision-making in China’s 
courts, namely a loosely supervised procedure about the formulation of decisions and a 
strictly disciplined procedure of the execution of such decisions. This chapter has 
demonstrated that it is this particular manner of decision-making applied in the 
adjudicative process that has enabled and sustained corruption in China’s courts. It is 
responsible for having greatly eased the critical phase of contracting process of 
                                                 
477 Ling Yuan, "Huang Songyou Xianru Zhongcheng an Neimu Jiaoyi [Huang Songyou Trapped in the 
Insider Trading in the Zhongcheng Plaza Case]," Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan [Oriental Outlook Weekly], 
10 November 2008. 
478 See the report at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-04-20/172717648648.shtml  
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corruption, namely the delivery of corrupt service as the object of exchange for bribes. 
Immediately associated with this finding is the fact that this particular manner of 
decision-making is systematically applied in all courts, which may help to explain why 
corruption permeates in courts across the country despite of their different location and 
jurisdiction and regardless of the finance status of the court and the salary of individual 
judges. It is these institutional factors that have not only generated and enhanced the 
incentives of corruption but also created and expanded opportunities of corruption for 
each member holding a position in the institution. Under these circumstances, the group 
political interests of the party coincide with the corrupt interests of every individual in the 
chain of command. Consequently, the institutionalization of the judiciary as part of 
consolidated party-state structure also institutionalizes corruption in China’s courts.  
 
This chapter also demonstrated that the features of court decision-making mentioned 
above have also affected the dynamics of corrupt activities in China’s courts. From the 
litigants’ perspective, such a litigating process generally favors resourceful litigants, who 
have sufficient political, social and economic capitals to dispose. When the litigants are 
equally resourceful, the outcome of the litigation becomes more precarious, depending 
upon the nature of the case, each litigant’s dedication to the case, the “quality” and the 
effectiveness of each litigant’s corrupt network as well as other contingencies. From the 
judges’ perspective, a judge’s position in the power structure of the court not only 
determines the volume of opportunities as well as profits of corruption but also the means 
of delivery of corrupt services. The higher the rank of a judge, the greater the 
opportunities as well as profits of corruption, and the safer the means of delivery of 
corrupt services. This particular manner of decision-making in courts is also conducive 
for coalition and collaboration among judges who share a superior-subordinate 
relationship. Such coalition and collaboration increases the efficiency and expands the 
volume of corrupt activities since it greatly reduces the transactional costs entailed in the 
communication and the coordination in the course of delivery of corrupt services. All 
these features described above have made corruption in China’s courts a multi-player, 
multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomenon instead of being one-on-one, 
one-dimensional and static.  
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7.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has discussed how the social institution of guanxi-practice and the 
political institutional design of China’s courts in terms of decision-making have 
facilitated the contracting process of corrupt exchange and resulted in the proliferation of 
corrupt activities in the process of litigation. This chapter will discuss how corruption can 
similarly arise in other public institutions, in particular, the specialized anti-corruption 
institutions due to their exposure to similar conditions.   
 
In terms of anti-corruption efforts, China claims the largest volume of anti-corruption 
regulations 479  and anti-corruption campaigns, 480  hosts the most empowered 
anti-corruption enforcement agencies – the Discipline Inspection Commissions of the 
Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter the DICs) 481  with the most populated 
manpower482  and the most severe punishment.483  However, accompanying the rise of 
power of these institutions is the rising number of incidences of corruption committed by 
anti-corruption agents. By the time of writing, 6 DIC secretaries and 14 procuratorate 
directors and deputy directors in charge of anti-corruption prosecution, including a 
director from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, had been reportedly punished for 
corrupt conduct during anti-corruption investigations.484  Meanwhile, 35 presidents and 
vice-presidents of the People’s Procuratorates, including 7 high-ranking presidents at the 
provincial level, had been punished for corrupt conduct while performing their duties.485 
This chapter will demonstrate how on the one hand the institutional design of 
anti-corruption institutions has created a permissive environment of corruption in these 
institutions and on the other hand how the presence of corruption in anti-corruption 
institutions has seriously affected the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and 
efforts. In doing that, this chapter also links to the findings of the previous chapters, 
                                                 
479 According to a New York Times interview of Professor Gao in Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
China has promulgated 1200 laws, rules and directives against corruption. For details, see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04corrupt.html?_r=1 
480 Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," The Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 12, no. 1 (1996). p.2. 
481 The Discipline Inspection Commission is granted the power to detain corruption suspect for 2 months, 
which can be extended to an unspecified period of time, before court trial. Working Procedures of Case 
Investigations for the Discipline Inspection Commissions. Art.28. 
482 The ratio between the number of public officials and the number of DIC agents (not including 
prosecutors) is 8.3:1 in China, namely, in average one anti-corruption agent monitors eight officials. The 
ratio is 153:1 in Hong Kong and 2000:1 in Singapore. "International Heat of The "Anticorruption Storm" In 
China," International Herald Leader 26 June 2008. Available at 
http://www.gzjj.gov.cn/redShow.asp?ArticleID=6507  
483 The highest criminal punishment of bribe-taking and embezzlement is death penalty. Chinese Criminal 
Law (1997). Art. 383(1). 
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which identify certain factors as the common causes of corruption in courts as well as in 
specialized anti-corruption institutions.  
 
Data of this chapter firstly come from authoritative sources, such as laws, bylaws, 
internal regulations, guidelines of the major anti-corruption institutions, most notably, the 
party discipline inspection commissions and the procuratorates. The second source of 
data consists of approximately 100 cases concerning corruption in anti-corruption 
institutions spanning from 1985 till 2009. Information concerning these cases comes from 
media reports of court-trials or press releases from courts or corruption investigative 
bodies, principally the party discipline inspection commissions and the procuratorates.486   
 
It is necessary to note that this chapter is to identify certain features in corruption 
investigation while using only limited data. Access to information on the detailed 
practices of anti-corruption institutions, especially information on corrupt practices in 
these institutions is strictly controlled. Therefore, the findings of this chapter shall be 
primarily applied only to the materials indicated in this research. More general 
application shall be conducted with caution and be tested when freer access to data can be 
gained. 
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four parts. Section II introduces the institutional 
structure of anti-corruption institutions, including the main actors and their structural 
relations with the political institution of the CCP. Section III discusses features of 
decision-making in the main anti-corruption institutions. Section IV connects the features 
of decision-making discussed in Section III with the occurrences of corrupt activities, 
employing reported cases collected during the course of the research.  
 
7.2. Organizational structure of anti-corruption institutions 
 
According to the recent OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) review of anti-corruption institutions in various countries, the main models 
of these institutions include institutions specializing in law enforcement, institutions 
focusing on preventive measures, policy development and co-ordination, and institutions 
                                                 
486 These sources include the legal sections of Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), Jiancha Ribao (Procuracy Daily), 
Jiancha Fengyun (Procuracy Affairs), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekly), Caijing Magazine and Minzhu 
yu Fazhi (Democracy and Rule by Law) and Anti-corruption Weekly published on Zhengyi Wang, an 
internet-based magazine run by the Supreme Prosecutorate. They also include the legal channels of two 
major internet news websites in China: www.sina.com and www.xinhuanet.com. 
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with all above functions.487  China hosts all three types, some of which have overlapping 
functions.  
 
7.2.1. Main anti-corruption institutions 
 
The first group of anti-corruption institution is the Discipline Inspection Commission of 
the Chinese Communist Party (DIC), which is designed as a multi-purpose 
















Chart 7.1 Outline of Anti-Corruption Institutions in the PRC  
 
According to the Charter of the Chinese Communist Party, the current main tasks of the 
DIC are to collect information from the public, to conduct pre-prosecution investigation 
of corrupt conduct of party members and to coordinate among various anti-corruption 
institutions.488  Since the DIC can only exercise jurisdiction over party-members, the 
People’s Inspection Committee was established in 1949 at both the national and local 
level to scrutinize disciplinary violation of civil servants, who are not party members.489 
The committee was dismantled in 1959 and restored as Ministry of Inspection (MOI) in 
                                                 
487 Dan Dionisie, Francesco Checchi, "Corruption and Anticorruption Agencies in Eastern Europe and the 
Cis: A Practitioners' Experience," (UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, 2008). pp.7-15. OECD, "Specialised 
Anti-Corruption Institutions - Review of Models," (Anticorruption Division, OECD, 2006). pp.5-8. 
488 CCP Charter (2002). Ch.8. 
489 Propaganda Office CCDI, A Brief Course of the Institutional Developement of Discipline Inspection 
Commissions (Beijing: China Fang Zheng Press, 2002).p.4. 
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1986.490  In 1993 the MOI was merged into DIC. Since then, the MOI and the DIC share 
the same personnel and facilities but carry out their activities under their respective 
names of offices.491   
 
The second group of anti-corruption institution is the people’s procuratorates. More 
specifically, a specialized branch of the procuratorates, the Anti Embezzlement and 
Bribery Bureau (AEBB), is responsible to carry out the anti-corruption activities. The 
AEBB and the DIC-MOI have different but also overlapping functions in terms of 
corruption investigation. In general, the DIC-MOI has higher authority and is entitled to 
perform the preliminary investigation and to decide whether an indictment is necessary. 
When indictment is deemed necessary, the DIC will transfer the case to the procuratorate 
for further investigation to secure evidence and to prosecute. Other than the AEBB, the 
White-collar Crime Prevention Bureau (WCPB) was also established within the 
procuratorates. Its function mainly concerns prevention-oriented anti-corruption research, 
consultation and training.  
 
The third group of anti-corruption institution is the National Bureau of Corruption 
Prevention (NBCP), which was established under the directorship of the Minister of 
Inspection in 2007.492 There is no clear division of labor between the NBCP and the 
White-collar Crime Prevention Bureaus of the procuratorates, which were established 
earlier.493  Lastly, it is important to note that apart from the specialized anti-corruption 
institutions, the head of each public institution is also responsible to monitor, investigate 
and punish disciplinary violations committed by his staff members. The rest of the 
chapter will focus on the investigative activities, mainly carried out by the DIC-MOI 
(which will be abbreviated as DIC in the rest of the chapter) and the AEBB of the 
procuratorates. In other words, preventive anti-corruption institutions are not featured in 
this chapter. 
 
7.2.2. Anti-corruption institutions and the party 
 
The same as courts, all anti-corruption institutions in China are incorporated into the 
cadres’ ranking system, which is administered by the party. Such an institutional design 
clearly helps the party to exercise control over anti-corruption activities. More 
specifically, the incorporation of the ranking system in anti-corruption institutions means 
that all permanent posts in these institutions are assigned with a rank. Each post is 
delegated certain decision-making power corresponding to its rank. The 
                                                 
490 Ibid. p.5. 
491 Ibid. p.6. 
492 Official website of the Bureau. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/114315/114316/6763150.html  
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commander-in-chief has the highest rank and accordingly the widest decision-making 
power in the given institution. At the national level, the CCDIC answers only to the 
Central Committee of the CCP.494  So is the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.495  The 
regional and local DIC and procuratorates are subject to dual-administration 
(shuangchong guanli). It means that they are subordinate to both the party committee of 
the corresponding geographical jurisdiction and the respective DIC or procuratorate at the 
superior level. Between the DIC and the procuratorate of the same geographical 
jurisdiction, the former enjoys more power since the top leader of the DIC has an 
important seat (usually only second to secretary of the party committee) in the 
decision-making body of the party committee,496  a privilege that the procuratorates do 
not have.  
 
Nonetheless, the procuratorates are endowed the power to conduct corruption 
investigation on its own initiative as long as the investigation does not encroach upon the 
jurisdiction of the DIC or is not of immediate interest of the leaders of the DIC. 
According to the data collected during this research, the procuratorates’ self-initiated 
corruption investigations are notably concentrated on offenders of lower-ranks, especially 
those who serve in SOEs, and corruption in the private sectors, which falls out of the 
jurisdiction of the DICs. Apart from having a lower political status, the procuratorate is 
out-powered by the DIC also due to its limited investigative measure. Unlike the DIC, the 
procuratorate is subject to Article 133 of the Criminal Procedural law, which requires the 
procuratorate to release the detained suspect in 24 hours if sufficient evidence for arrest 
cannot be established.497  This legal constraint limits the investigative power greatly 
compared with the DIC even though in practices the constraint can be circumvented 
through various means, for example, by applying for extensions.498   
 
7.3. Decision-making in anti-corruption institutions 
 
Since all anti-corruption institutions are state apparatus and are incorporated in the 
ranking system, the rules that feature the decision-making process in China’s courts, as 
introduced in Chapter 5, also fully apply in the anti-corruption institutions. These rules 
                                                 
494 CCP Charter (2002). Ch.8. 
495 The highest decision-making body of the SPP is its party-group, which is bound by the party rules. The 
political status of the party group is defined in Chapter 9 of the CCP Charter (2002). 
496 This reform was launched as a measure to empower the DICs. CCDI, A Brief Course of the Institutional 
Developement of Discipline Inspection Commissions. p.43. 
497 Criminal Procedural Law. Art. 133 
498 Interview H022. Also see Ling Yue, "A Study on the Legal Regulation of Hidden Unlawful Practices of 
Extended Detention [Yinxing Chaoqi Jiya De Falv Guizhi Yanjiu]," Hebei Legal Study [Hebei Faxue] 25, 
no. 10 (2007). Jie Zhao, "Consequences and Control on the Hidden Unlawful Practices of Extended 
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are characterized by a loosely monitored process of formulation of decisions and strictly 
disciplined process of implementation of such decision. 
 
7.3.1. General features 
 
The above-mentioned characteristics of decision-making are most conspicuous in the 
DIC, which, unlike other anti-corruption institutions, are part of the party apparatus. One 
immediate example is their exclusive power to apply shuanggui (meaning “two 
designations”), an “extra-legal” investigative measure. This measure allows the DIC 
investigator to detain the suspect for interrogation for a lengthy period of time without a 
charge.499 According to the DIC regulations, the shuanggui measure can be applied 
during the preliminary investigation, which can take two months with a one-month 
extension if necessary.500  At the formal investigation procedure, the detention can take 
three months with possible extension.501  The shuanggui measure is highly effective in 
extracting confession from the suspects. Such confession is used as key evidence for 
conviction and sanction.502  Despite that the Criminal Procedural Law prohibits torture 
during interrogations, courts are not competent to conduct independent judicial 
examination on this issue and to exclude such evidence produced by the investigative 
bodies.503  Legal consultancy for the suspect is not allowed or provided during the DIC 
investigation.504  Once the DIC has concluded its investigation, it can render the sanction, 
ranging from warning to removal from office and revoking of the CCP membership,505 
according to its own procedure, which is non-transparent and governed by few rules. The 
                                                 
499 The full expression of shuanggui is “to report at the designated time and at the designated place”. In 
practice, a more accurate expression should be “to be interrogated and to wait for being interrogated at the 
designated place (usually a confined place) for a designated length of time”. It should be noted that this 
detaining measure is a prerogative for the DICs. Procuratorates, for example, are subject to the criminal 
procedures. According to article 133 of the Criminal Procedural Law (1996), the procuratorate can detain a 
suspect of corrupt crimes for 24 hours and has to release the suspect if it finds the detention is not 
warranted. Meanwhile, article 134 states that the procuratorate can decide whether to arrest a suspect in 
10-14 days, which implies that the detention can last to two weeks maximum if doubts are not removed. 
For a more elaborate historical introduction of this measure, see Sapio, "Shuanggui and Extralegal 
Detention in China." 
500 DIC Regulation of Case Inspection. (1994). Art.15 
501 DIC Regulation of Case Inspection. (1994). Art.39. 
502 Only in recent years, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate as well as the Supreme People’s Court started 
to demand from investigators other forms of evidence to complement confession for conviction in courts. 
One slogan of this campaign is “zero-confession (ling kougong)”. However, this does not reduce the value 
and the need to extract confession in the investigation since the confession can provide important leads to 
the discovery of other forms of evidence.   
503 Only recently, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a directive requiring procuratorates to 
exclude evidence obtained through torture in felony concerning the application of death sentence. For the 
report on the directive, see http://opinion.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-08/11/content_5531190.htm 
504 Interview C011. H022. 
505 Directive on Disciplinary Sanctions of the CCP (2004) Art.10. 
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DIC is not competent to render criminal punishment but is responsible to transfer cases to 
procuratorates for prosecution if the DIC finds the offense is indictable.  
 
As an inner-party disciplinary organization, the DIC enjoys an “extra-judicial” or 
“above-judicial” status and its decisions have a quasi-legal or above-legal effect. In other 
words, the decisions of the DICs are not challengeable by any institution or individual 
other than its leaders in the superior party organization.506  This research has not come 
across a case, where a prosecutor prosecutes an offender or drops the charge against an 
offender because the prosecutor disagrees with the decisions of the DIC. In fact, for 
high-profile cases, the DIC sometimes engages both the procuratorate and the court 
concerned at the investigating stage so that the procuracy and the judiciary can be 
properly instructed at an early stage and their concerns, if any, can be incorporated in the 
investigative strategy.507  In this circumstance, the following prosecution and trial will be 
a showcase since the conviction and sentencing will have already been determined during 
the investigation.508  In procuratorates, the decision-making process has similar features 
but their decision-making power is limited due to their institutional constraint, which 
places them inferior to party apparatus, including the DICs.  
 
To ensure the implementation of decisions that are reached through a loosely regulated 
and unchecked procedure, strict discipline is applied in and among anti-corruption 
institutions to regulate the superior-subordinate relationships. For example, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate (SPP) has been repetitively emphasizing that the relationship 
between the superior and subordinate procuratorates is a relationship of leading and being 
led509  rather than supervising and being supervised,510 as stipulated in the Constitution 
(2004). 511  According to the Notification on Registration and Report of Leads of 
Important Cases in Preliminary Investigation Level issued by the SPP, all leads 
concerning officials, who hold a rank of or beyond xian/chu level, have to be registered 
and submitted to the superior procuratorate within five days since discovery.512  Such 
                                                 
506 The “above-judicial” status of the party is suggested by Article 126 and 131 of the Constitution, which 
do not place party organizations under the constraint of not interfering the judiciary and the procuracy from 
exercising their power independently. 
507 Such practice is usually referred to as “lianhe ban’an (collaborated investigation)”, which is most 
frequently applied in investigations initiated by the Central DIC. Examples can be found in No. 8 Section 
CDIC, Practices and Research on Corruption Investigation (Beijing: China Fangzheng, 2003). Wang, 
Juebu Yunxu Fubaifenzi You Cangshenzhidi - Tupo Da'an Yao'an De Shijian Yu Sikao [Nowhere to Hide - 
Practices About and Reflections Upon Successful Detection of Major Corruption Cases]  
508 Such show-trial is often referred to as “xianding houshen (trial after conviction)”, which has a frequent 
appearance in discussions on Chinese criminal procedural practices.  
509 For example, see SPP Opinions on Strengthening the Leadership of Superior Procuratorates over 
Subordinate Procuratorates [2007].  
510 In comparison, for example, in the judiciary, superior courts “supervise (jiandu)” the performance of 
subordinate courts. PRC Constitution (2004). Art.127. 
511 PRC Constitution (2004). Art.132. 
512 SPP Regulation [1995] No.17. 
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top-down control is further strengthened in recent years. In 2005, a regulation was issued 
which requires all local procuratorates that are below the provincial-level to obtain 
approval from the provincial procuratorate first before they can drop a charge.513  In 2008 
another regulation was issued, which takes the decision-making power on making an 
arrest from local procuratorates to provincial procuratorates as well.514 
 
Between the DIC and the procuratorate, the former enjoys a more superior political status, 
as mentioned in Section 7.2. For cases which the DIC exercises its jurisdiction, the DIC 
has the discretion to decide whether or not to send the case to the procuratorate for 
indictment.515  If the DIC decides to send the case for prosecution, a conviction usually 
follows.516 
 
Strict discipline is applied not only in inter-institutional relations but also in the 
inner-institutional relations. It means that within each anti-corruption institution 
decision-making power is highly concentrated in the hands of the staff with superior 
ranks. Namely, all decisions concerning important issues such as the initiation of 
investigation, the application of detention measures and the conclusion of an 
investigation, have to be approved by the top leaders of the anti-corruption institution 
concerned.517 Such authoritarian organizational culture has a notably conspicuous display 
in procuratorates.518  On an internet bulletin board, a young procuratorator instructed new 
law graduates on “how to behave as a new-comer in procuratorates” and said, “Try to 
make a good impression to your superiors and colleagues … everyone cares about his 
status … be careful not to offend them … always hide your true opinion”.519 
 
Such top-down disciplinary control is even more rigid in the DICs. Since the DICs are 
party institutions, the relationship between superior-subordinate DICs is immediately 
subject to the CCP disciplinary rules, which require the subordinate party institution to 
implement decisions and to execute instructions from the superior party institution 
                                                 
513 SPP Regulation [2005] No.15. Available at http://law.baidu.com/pages/chinalawinfo/6/66/e25627b
04ed47bd51c8595def4b251f7_0.html    
514 In 2008 the SPP launched a new procedural measure, which requires local procuratorates to acquire 
approval from a superior procuratorate (at the provincial level at least) for decisions to arrest a corruption 
suspect as well. The measure is termed “shuang baobei, shuang baopi (double reports on case-registration, 
double application for approval)”. 
515 CCDI [1989]. No.7. Art.1. Also Yongjian Guan, ed. Investigating Procedures of Dic (China Fang 
Zheng Press,2006). p.190. 
516 Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong. p.133. 
517 Interpretation of the Guidelines of the Working Procedure of the DICs (1994). Art. 9, 18, 19, 22, 40. 
SPP, "Decisions on Issues Concerning Internal Checks and Balances in Anti-Corruption Investigation," in 
No. 27 (1998). Art. 8. ———, "Decisions on Certain Issues Concerning Anti-Corruption Investigation," in 
No. 27 (1999). Art.21. 
518 Interview of a local procuratorate conducted in 2007. 
519 The essay was removed from Tianya Net Bulletin Board but is on file with the author. 
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unconditionally.520  To guarantee that the discipline will be smoothly followed by DIC 
agents, “personality screening” starts at the recruitment stage. For example, in DICs, 
choosing the “right” staff is considered crucial.521  The primary criteria of selection are 
the candidate’s political performance and dangxing (literally means “party spirit” and 
actually means one’s tendency to follow leaders).522 
 
In an organization governed by such rules on decision-making, dissidents can easily be 
singled out, ostracized and given discriminative treatment since the leaders enjoy great 
discretion in task assignment, performance evaluation and promotion.523 It means that 
opposition from bottom-up will be rare and can be easily frustrated, if occurs. For 
example, Luo Ziguang, former DIC chief secretary of Loudi City, Hunan Province, had 
once conspired with a colleague to “take down” a provincial leader by exposing certain 
illicit conduct of the latter. Before they were able to make any impact, the conspiracy was 
detected and Luo was detained by the Hunan Provincial DIC for “political corruption 
issues”, including, “maliciously attacking certain provincial leader”. It was never 
disclosed whether Luo and his colleagues’ allegation against the “provincial leader” was 
investigated and whether it was true. Instead, an investigation was soon carried out 
against Luo for his own corrupt conduct. Luo was found having taken bribes from various 
favor-seekers worth of 310,000 yuan and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 11 
years.524 
 
7.3.2. “Rank jurisdiction (jibie guanxia)” 
 
Other than the general features mentioned in the previous section, the decision-making in 
anti-corruption institutions is regulated by a distinctive rule, namely, the “rank 
jurisdiction”. It means that an anti-corruption institution cannot carry out an investigation 
against a suspect, who holds a rank above that of the investigating institution, unless such 
an investigation is instructed or approved by the superior institution, which has appointed 
the suspect.  
 
                                                 
520 CCP Charter (2002). Art.15, 43, 44. 
521 CCDI, A Brief Course of the Institutional Developement of Discipline Inspection Commissions. p.64. 
522 Ibid. p.73. 
523 Trade unions do not have an independent role to protect employees’ from exploitation by the employer, 
in this case, the State. Feng Chen, "Between the State and Labour: The Conflict of Chinese Trade Unions' 
Double Identity in Market Reform," The China Quarterly 176 (2003). pp.1025-8. The only institutions to 
address such discrimination are more likely to take the side of the employer rather than the employee, if 
such complaints can be lodged at all. For illustration of the difficulties for citizens to sue the State, see 
Kevin J. O'Brien, Lianjiang Li, "Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China " The 
China Journal 51 (2004). 
524 In this case, Luo may well be truly guilty for the crime of bribe-taking. However, an investigation 
against him would probably have never been carried out had he not offended the higher power first. See the 
report at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-07-26/09073200972s.shtml.  
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Since the ranking system is applied in all public institutions and administered by the same 
procedures, the rank competence can be easily identified. Taking the procuratorates as an 
example, according to the “rank-jurisdiction”, county/district (xian/qu) procuratorates 
have jurisdiction over officials of a rank at the township (xiangzhen) and village (cun) 
-level; city procuratorates have jurisdiction over officials of a rank at the county (xian/chu) 
-level; provincial procuratorates over officials of a rank at the city (ting/ju) -level; and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (hereinafter SPP) over officials of a rank at the province 
(sheng/bu) –level. 525  National leaders (typically, the Politburo members) are not 
indicated in the regulation, which suggests that no procuratorate has the competence to 
initiate an investigation against a national leader. Similar rules apply to the DICs. 
According to the working procedure of the DICs, the authority of an investigating body 
corresponds to its rank and the rank of the investigated. In other words, a DIC secretary 
has no authority to initiate an investigation against an official higher than his own 
rank.526  To do that, approval from the DIC at the superior level has to be obtained. 
Meanwhile, the subordinate anti-corruption institutions are obliged to follow the leads 
handed down by their superior institutions and to start investigation according to the 
structions.527   
                                                
in
 
The following case will provide a more concrete understanding of the “rank jurisdiction” 
in practice. The case is about Hu Jianxue, former party secretary of Tai’an City, frustrated 
an investigation initiated by his subordinate Gong Pihan, former president of Tai’an City 
Procuratorate, until Gong Pihan obtained support from the superior leaders. The story 
began with a fraud case handled by Gong’s procuratorate in 1994.528  The investigation 
led to detection of corrupt conduct of Yan Kezheng, the then deputy captain of the district 
police bureau. “A leader of the city party committee” specifically instructed Gong not to 
dig further. However, Gong was determined to get to the bottom of the case. Before Gong 
was able to take any further action, he was summoned by Hu Jianxue, the chief party 
secretary of Tai’an City. Hu instructed Gong to hold the investigation until a party 
committee deliberation on the case is conducted. Gong waited but the meeting was never 
held. Eager to advance the investigation, Gong had a detailed report delivered to Hu, 
enlisting the evidence and requesting for the permission to resume the investigation. Hu 
ignored the report. Being stonewalled by Hu, Gong called for help from his other superior, 
Zhao Changfeng, the president of the provincial procuratorate. Under the support from 
the provincial leader, Gong was able to detain the key perpetrator and witness, Yan 
 
525 Notification on Strengthening Investigation on Grand and Significant Cases, Issued by the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate in 1993. Art.3. 
526 Working Procedure of the DIC (1984). Art. 4. Art.10, Guidelines of the Working Procedure of the DICs 
(1994). Art.17. 
527 Guidelines of the Working Procedure of the DICs (1991). Art.10(5). 
528 The title is the translation of the Chinese title of the journalistic report of the case. Yamin Li, "Taishan 
Jiao Xia De Jiaoliang [a Wrestle at the Foot of Mount Tai]."  
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Kezheng, the deputy police captain. During the interrogation, Yan leaked partial 
information about corrupt conduct of some high-rank city party leaders, including the 
arty secretary Hu Jianxue.  
ter, Hu was arrested 
nd later convicted of having taken 99 bribes worth 600,000 yuan.  
t Gong after Hu Jianxue’s case is him 
specting the order of a national judicial exam.531 
                                                
p
 
As the investigation progressed, the more evidence Gong was able to acquire, the more 
desperate Hu became. He even once had words passed on to Gong, promising Gong a 
promotion if he could close the case. Gong rejected the proposal. At the same time, the 
provincial procuratorate took over the case from the city procuratorate and formally 
established an investigation against Hu Jianxue. In order to increase the authority and 
determination of the provincial procuratorate, at one point of the interrogation, a 
vice-president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate was brought in to show the suspects 
that the superior power was on the side of the investigators. Soon after the visit, a primary 
suspect confessed his corrupt conduct and that of Hu. Two days la
a
 
Although the investigation was eventually successfully carried out, Gong had suffered 
serious psychological distress during the investigation due to the difficulties laid to him 
because of the rank jurisdiction.529  Even with his integrity, courage and perseverance, 
Gong would not have won the battle against the party secretary, had he not obtained 
support from the superior power from the provincial procuratorate up to the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate.530  In reality, such support was, to a great extent, contingent. Had 
Hu Jianxue managed to gain protection from the superior power, Gong could have been 
forced to abort the investigation and likely to face personal revenge brought against him. 
In fact, after the event, Gong was later transferred from the procuratorate to the 
Provincial Department of Justice, which handles administrative legal affairs and has no 
investigative function. The only public report abou
in
 
Gong Pihan’s experience shall not be an isolated case. The reason that this case was 
publicly reported is because Hu Jianxue, the corrupt official, had fallen out of power and 
protection. Had Gong failed to obtain support from the provincial leaders and forced to 
 
529 According to the report, Gong was almost driven to insanity because of the personal pressure placed on 
him by Hu Jianxue and his collaborators during the investigation. See Ibid.  
530 According to the reports of the “front-line” anti-corruption investigators, suspects of corruption usually 
demonstrate a sense of defiance towards the investigator, whose ranks are usually inferior to that of the 
suspects. Most suspects also show great resistance towards the investigation on the belief that their patron, 
or “guanxi”, would come to rescue. Therefore, successful interrogation very often relies on the engagement 
of the leader of the investigating institution, whose rank matches or supersedes the rank of the suspect, in 
the interrogation. It is often this final push that breaks the psychological defense system of the suspect and 
leads to valuable confession. Such reports can be found at http://law.law-star.com/cac/305048835.htm, 
http://www.cnjccn.com/html/200863015192816336.html, 
http://www.psychcn.com/enpsy/200210/144933305.shtml.   
531 See the report at http://www.laiwu.gov.cn/006news.asp?id=7408. 
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withdraw the investigation, what had happened would probably never fall in the public’s 
view. Even in the report of Gong Pihan, the battle was largely portrayed as a victory of 
wise individual leaders against evil individual corruption offenders. The institutional 
efect of the “rank jurisdiction” is seldom challenged.  
-corruption institutions where the corrupt 
ctivities studied in this research took place.   
.4. Corruption in anti-corruption institutions 
                                                
d
 
Subjecting anti-corruption investigation to the strict rules of rank-jurisdiction shows the 
strong desire of the top political leadership to reserve top-down control over 
anti-corruption investigations. It grants privileges for the powerful, places them above the 
law and manifests a questionable commitment to uproot corruption. This practice 
together with those concerning the decision-making process mentioned in the previous 





Handling the leads (anjian xiansuo) is the start of any anti-corruption investigation.532  
In a recent public interview, a former director of Jianli County (Hubei Province) 
Inspection Bureau summarized current practices on how citizens’ reports are handled in 
the local DIC.533  According to this director, 90 percent of the leads will go to the chief 
secretary of the DIC directly after it has been collected from the post, phone calls or other 
means. Then three scenarios will follow, depending on the closeness of the personal 
relationship between the chief secretary and the condemned official. The first scenario is 
when the chief secretary happens to bear a grudge against the official. The chief secretary 
would instruct the investigating agent to start the investigation “seriously” and 
“immediately”. When the reported corrupt conduct is confirmed, the chief secretary 
would set the tone of the concluding remark to ensure that his opinion will be followed 
before he holds the commission meeting. The second scenario is when the chief secretary 
has a fairly good relationship with the condemned official. The chief secretary would 
then intercept the report, not to register it, and summon the official for a “talk”. During 
the conversation, the chief secretary would leak the report and emphasize the severity of 
its consequences if he decides to initiate an investigation, until the official pleads for help 
 
532 Public reports reveal that 80 percent of the leads of corruption cases come from citizens’ reports 
(qunzhong jubao) either by letters, phone calls or even emails. See the press release of the SPP 
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/1998-07/21/GB/17760%5EGM4-2110.htm. Other than citizens’ report, the 
lead may also come from targeted investigation of anti-corruption agents and leads handed over by the 
superior anti-corruption institutions or other authorities. Anti-corruption agents normally react actively 
towards the leads, which are detected by themselves from their targeted investigation. They are also 
expected to act actively towards leads instructed and transferred to them by superior authorities. Directive 
of Case Investigation of the DIC (2004) Art.10(5). Rules on Leads Processing of the People’s 
Procuratorates (2009). Art. 38-43. Also, see an article on “How to successfully complete the cases handed 
over by the superior authorities” at the website of a local procuratorate 
http://www.yyjcw.gov.cn/Article/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=90.  
533 Available at http://news.qq.com/a/20070612/002512_1.htm  
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and registers the “help” as a personal favor to be reciprocated. The last scenario is when 
the chief secretary is indifferent to the condemned official. Then the normal procedure 
ill follow.  
s the leaders of the public 
stitutions concerned as the internal monitors of corruption.  
.4.1. Scenario I – corruption by carrying out investigation  
rivate interest. Such private interests include both 
nancial and non-financial interests.  
.4.1.1. For non- financial corrupt interests 
w
 
According to the cases studied, the Jianli official’s summary is a pertinent description of 
the corrupt practices during anti-corruption investigations and it is applicable not only to 
lead-handling but all phases in the investigative process. The rest of this section will 
demonstrate such practices employing real cases. These cases are categorized in two 
groups. The first group refers to the scenario, in which an investigation is conducted for 
the private benefits, either financial or non-financial, of the investigator. The second 
group refers to the scenario, in which an investigation is NOT conducted due to the 
private benefits of the investigator. The cases to be introduced concern the DICs and the 





The first scenario refers to the situation where an anti-corruption investigation is 





To conduct an investigation for non-financial private interests is mainly conduct, which is 
carried out to take revenge and/or to remove a political rival or threat. Some of the 
revenges were carried out based on true evidence of corrupt conduct; some were carried 
out by perjury, such as the case of Jia Ailing, a 51-year-old judge in Luoyang 
Intermediate Court, Henan Province. Judge Jia had been wrongfully imprisoned for 
almost a year on the ground of a false corruption charge because she had offended the 
head of the local procuratorate. In 2001, Jia was assigned a contractual dispute case. 
During the litigation, Jia declined a bribe offered by one of the litigants, who was 
introduced to Jia by the president of the local procuratorate. Jia did not yield to the 
pressure and proposed an impartial ruling to the court adjudicative committee. Although 
the court adjudicative committee rejected the ruling proposed by Jia and rendered the 
final decision in favor of the procuratorate president’s acquaintance instead, Jia’s 
defiance to the instruction of the procuratorate president was evident. Soon after the 
closure of the court case, the local procuratorate initiated an anti-corruption investigation 
against Jia based on a false allegation of the litigant, who reported that Jia had extorted 
15,000 yuan from his girlfriend during the trial. The investigators reexamined all 
previous cases that Jia had adjudicated and interrogated more than 80 litigants, none of 
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whom reported having succeeded in bribing Judge Jia. Without sufficient evidence, Jia 
was arrested and put into custody nonetheless. Jia had been kept in custody for 265 days 
until a report of Jia’s grievance attracted the attention of Luo Gan, the then chief 
secretary of the CCDIC. Upon Luo’s interference, Jia was eventually acquitted and 
released.534  However, there is no public report about whether the perjuring litigant and 
e head of procuratorate president have been held accountable. 
ictim of abuse of anti-corruption investigative 
ower, was, however, not that fortunate.  
from some unnatural cause. The procuratorate insisted that Li hanged himself, which Li’s 
                                                
th
 
In this case, Judge’s Jia’s mistreatment was not only a result of the fact that decisions on 
restricting suspects’ freedom are not scrutinized by an independent judiciary; it is also a 
result of the particular way of decision-making in anti-corruption institutions, which 
permits an ungrounded decision formed by an individual leader to be unconditionally 
implemented by subordinates. When the investigators had failed to obtain any evidence 
of corrupt conduct of Judge Jia, none of them seemed to have challenged their superior’s 
decision and asked for the judge’s release. Law and justice are arrested by blatant abuse 
of power and the only effective remedy comes from the interference of the higher power, 
in this case, a national leader from Beijing. In this aspect, Judge Jia should consider 
herself lucky that her case had eventually attracted attention and gained sympathy from 
the CCDIC secretary. Li Guofu, another v
p
 
Li Guofu, an entrepreneur from Fuyang City, Anhui Province, was once a protégé of 
Zhang Guo’an, the then chief secretary of Yingquan District of Fuyang. Having worked 
closely with Zhang for a long time, Li knew quite a few “dirty secrets” of Zhang, 
particularly about the extravagant construction project of the Fuyang city hall, which was 
nicknamed “White House” because of their resembling external outlook. Soon Li started 
to send report letters to authorities exposing Zhang’s corrupt conduct in the construction 
project. However, one of Li’s letters was intercepted by a friend of Zhang, who worked 
as a secretary of the Fuyang city municipality. Zhang was immediately informed of the 
letter. Outraged, Zhang ordered to intercept the rest of Li’s report letters from the post 
offices and instructed the then president of the district procuratorate to establish a 
corruption case against Li. The prosecutor followed the instruction and Li Guofu was 
soon arrested. At the same time, upon Zhang’s instruction, Li’s mother and son-in-law 
were also arrested for false corruption allegations. Six months after having been detained, 
Li was prosecuted for embezzlement, bribe-taking, forging government documents and 
seals, all based on ungrounded allegations. Li was denied access to lawyer and visits from 
his family. The day before a scheduled, Li was allowed for the first time to meet his 
lawyer. Just a few hours before the meeting, Li was found dead in the detention center 
 
534 Available at http://www.onlyit.cn/mba_article/at_m/at_m_06143_558.htm  
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family found unconvincing.535  The procuratorate did not release the body to Li’s family 
and coroner’s examination was not conducted. The case was later reported by a national 
newspaper China Youth’s Daily and broadcasted by a few civil-right activists, which 
generated wide public attention. In order to avoid a public crisis, Anhui provincial leaders 
instructed an investigation to be carried out against Zhang three months after Li’s death. 
Zhang was prosecuted for plotting and avenging as well as taking 52 bribes worth 3.6 
million yuan during his term in office.536  However, the delayed punishment of Zhang 
could never bring back the life of Li Guofu to his family.  
 
In the above two cases, the vicious vengeance of the procuratorate president in Judge 
Jia’s case and the party secretary in Li Guofu’s case are shocking. However, we should 
also take notice that in neither of the two cases the revenge could have been succeeded 
through the two vindictive leaders’ individual efforts if their ungrounded decisions had 
not been loyally and effectively implemented by their subordinates. This strictly 
disciplined superior-subordinate relationship is one critical feature of the decision-making 
process in anti-corruption institutions as well as courts, which had been discussed in 
Chapter 5 and 6. This institutional design constitutes the deeper root of corruption in 
anti-corruption institutions as well as other law enforcement institutions, which sustains 
corruption even after individual corruption offenders have been exposed and removed. In 
some cases, such as that of Judge Jia mentioned above, her vindication has not 
necessarily led to the punishment of the perpetrators, a demand that she had not seemed 
to insist in pursuing. After having been jailed for 265 days, Judge Jia probably felt, 
understandably, too grateful for being able to regain her freedom and for her 
reinstatement to the court she used to work at. Tan Shibin, another victim of abuse of 
anti-corruption power, is not as lucky as her.  
 
As a former vice-president of Lianyuan County Court, Hunan Province, Tan Shibin was 
framed and wrongfully charged for abuse of judicial power in a court auction presided by 
him in 2000. Tan was detained for 292 days before he was acquitted and released. 
However, the acquittal would never regain Tan the job as a judge. In fact, a leader “from 
above” had explicitly instructed that Tan should never be reinstated in the justice system, 
if to be reinstated at all.”537 Tan lamented, “As a court vice-president, with all evidence 
at hands, it had been so difficult to prove my innocence. Imagine how difficult it would 
be if it happened to an ordinary folk.”  
                                                 
535 The family later found that Li’s both eyes went blind before the death, which makes suicide difficult to 
commit in a guarded detention center. In addition, the lawyer found that the alleged place where Li hanged 
himself is of the same height of Li, which makes suicide by hanging unlikely to succeed. For more 
information on the case, see the defense lawyers’ website 
http://www.imlawyer.org/Article.asp?ArticleID=666.  
536 A news column dedicated to this incident can be accessed at http://news.sohu.com/s2008/baigongjubao/  
537 Available at http://news.163.com/06/1030/05/2ULIMG6T0001124J.html  
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7.4.1.2. For financial corrupt interests 
 
Unlike in the circumstance where an anti-corruption investigator conducts an 
investigation as a personal revenge against the victim, when an anti-corruption 
investigator conducts an investigation for private financial benefits, they will have to 
engage someone, who can gain from the conduct of the investigator and hence is willing 
to provide the benefits to the investigator accordingly. This is exactly the rationale of the 
conspiracy between Wang Liwei, former deputy manager of the state-owned Xinhua 
bookstore, and Liu Guoqing, former director of the AEBB of Guizhou Province 
Procuratorate. Wang had a lasting personal grudge with the chief manager of the same 
bookstore, whom Wang considered as a career rival and whom Wang believed was 
corrupt. Wang sought for help from Liu Guoqing to launch an anti-corruption 
investigation against his rival. Upon Liu’s instruction, Wang wrote a citizen’s report 
letter (jubaoxin), enlisting his allegations against the chief manager. After having 
received the letter, Liu, however, did not immediately launch the investigation. Instead, 
Liu said to Wang, “There are some problems. The allegation lacks evidence”. When 
Wang started to worry, Liu mentioned in passing, “Recently, I bought a new apartment 
but I am short of money for interior decoration. Do you have some money?” Afterwards, 
Wang gave Liu a bank card, which had 179,000 yuan in the current account. Only then, 
Liu personally instructed his subordinate to proceed with the investigation.538 
 
In this case, it seems that the AEBB director was able to control the progress of the 
investigation, either the launching or the suspension, simply by giving orders to his 
subordinates. The director’s capacity to exploit the decision-making process was 
well-understood by the deputy bookstore manager, which is why he solicited the corrupt 
“service”. However, what the deputy manager was not aware of is that his antagonist, the 
chief bookstore manager, is better connected than he had thought. This gave the case an 
interesting twist - the investigation backfired. It turned out that before the investigation 
against the chief manager could produce any fruit, the chief manager had managed to 
mobilize the provincial DIC, which has a higher rank and hence higher authority than the 
AEBB, to initiate an investigation about the investigation. Out-powered, the conspiracy 
between the AEBB director and the deputy manager was exposed. The AEBB director 
was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 13 years. Meanwhile, the 
allegations against the bookstore chief were “forgotten” and never investigated again.539 
It seems that when power game has taken over the investigation, law and truth recedes to 
the background. 
                                                 
538 Court Judgment, 1st instance, Criminal Division, Guiyang Intermediate Court [2003] No.117 
539 Court Judgment, 1st instance, Criminal Division, Guiyang Intermediate Court [2003] No.117. The 
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The capacity of anti-corruption agents to exploit the decision-making process does not 
only allow them to gain corrupt interests by launching ungrounded investigations but also 
by carrying out investigations that are within their duty to carry out. In the following case, 
Zhang Zihai, a corruption victim, was left no choice but to “buy” from the local AEBB 
director the evidence in order to prove his loss from corruption. 
 
Zhang Zihan, a peasant from a county in Anhui Province, used to run a restaurant close to 
the county council, who was Zhang’s main patron. The county council kept a tally at the 
restaurant but never fully paid its bills. Zhang was soon driven to bankruptcy. In 1996 he 
brought an action against the county council at the county court. The court was instructed 
by the county council not to take the case. Zhang was then forced to bring the case to the 
appellant court - Fuyang Intermediate Court, where the case was registered. In two years’ 
time after the registration, the presiding judge had solicited countless banquet-treats from 
Zhang before the judge eventually facilitated a settlement between Zhang and the county 
council. In the settlement, both litigants agreed that the county council would pay back 
Zhang half of his claim, 270,000 yuan. Zhang received 30,000 yuan immediately but the 
rest 240,000 yuan had never come. Only three years later Zhang was told that the rest of 
the settlement had already been paid to and embezzled by the Fuyang Intermediate Court. 
However, the court denied having received the payment. Zhang had no power to request 
the city council to provide evidence of the payment either. Then Zhang sought for help 
from the AEBB director of the local procuratorate. The director promised to help Zhang 
to secure the payment slips from the county council. Meanwhile, the director indicated 
that the endeavor would entail costs. With appreciation and understanding, Zhang 
immediately said that once his court award being realized, he would make a contribution 
to the procuratorate for the construction of the new office building. The director said, 
“Nonsense. The procuratorate has money. How come the procuratorate needs money?” 
Then the director requested for 40,000 yuan, paid up front in cash.540  In this case, for the 
corruption victim Zhang Zihan, the decision-making process of anti-corruption 
investigation seemed so precarious that the only way suggested to him to engage the 
anti-corruption institutions in order to protect his right and interests is to provide private 
incentive to the investigator.  
  
7.4.2. Scenario II – corruption by NOT carrying out investigation 
 
In this scenario, “no investigation” refers to the cover-up of a corrupt practice so as not to 
trigger an investigation. It also includes suspension of an on-going investigation as well 
as a premature conclusion of the investigation. The most recent example is the corrupt 
                                                 
540 See http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20050524/101742.shtml.  
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conduct of Ding Xinfa, former president of Jianxi Provincial Procuratorate, the 
procuratorate of the highest rank, who is convicted of corruption. According to his verdict, 
Ding had dropped a charge of bribe-taking against a suspect after having taken a bribe of 
300,000 HK$. Ding also granted probation to a suspect of tax evasion in exchange for 
1,450,000 yuan, which was handed to his son.541  Similar practices are found in the case 
of Wu Xing’an, former AEBB director of Fushun Procuratorate, Liaoning Province.542 
 
Among all the corrupt anti-corruption investigators, the most notorious for abusing of 
power is Zeng Jinchun, who was ranked as the “No. 1 corrupt DIC chief secretary”. In 
2008 Zeng was sentenced to death for having collected illicit income of 60 million yuan 
during his nine years in office as the chief secretary of the DIC of Chenzhou City, 
Hunman Province. According to the related reports, the decision-making process was so 
easily exploitable that once Zeng firstly instructed a subordinate to detain a corrupt 
official. Then upon the receipt of 100,000 yuan from the official, Zeng instructed to have 
the official released. However, soon after the release, Zeng instructed to detain the 
official again until an additional 1000 US$ was paid.543   
 
Since the most immediate monitor of corrupt activities is the head of each public 
institution, the covering-up may start there already before it reaches specialized 
anti-corruption institutions. For example, When Jia Yongxiang, former president of 
Shenyang Intermediate Court received a letter reporting corrupt conduct of his 
subordinate, Liang Fuquan, a vice-president of the same court, Jia handed the letter 
directly to Liang. Afterwards, Liang gave Jia 20,000 yuan and 2,000 US dollars as a 
gesture of appreciation for “being taken care”.544  The cover-up may not have been 
exposed were it not because Jia’s involvement in a much grander corrupt scandal 
involving criminal activities of a local mafia.545   
 
Sometimes when the evidence of corrupt conduct of the suspect is too strong and too 
risky for the anti-corruption investigator to cover, the investigator can render a lenient 
sanction to close the case. For example, Peng Jinyong, former Secretary of the DIC of 
Changde City, Jiangsu Province, had rendered a lenient sanction to a corrupt police 
captain after having received 5,000 British pounds and 8,000 HK dollars from the latter. 
Peng also instructed the police bureau to make sure the captain “properly” reinstated.546 
                                                 
541 See http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-02-13/10019086114.shtml.  
542 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-01/31/content_5680165.htm.  
543 Procuratorate’s Claim, Changsha People’s Procuratorate [2008] No.2  
544 China Inspection Editorial Team, Shenyang 'Mu Suixin, Ma Xiangdong' an Chachu Jishi [a 
Documented Report of the Investigation of Mu Suixin and Ma Xiangdong] (China Fang Zheng Press, 
2002).p.152. 
545 For more about the scandal, see Ibid. 
546 Available at http://bm.jxxdxy.com/qlzf/details.asp?classid=11&newsid=190&page=1. 
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Sun Xiaohong, former president of Kunming Intermediate Court and later Yunnan High 
Court, was removed from office for smuggling and unlawful public spending in 1999 but 
reinstated to the Director of Bureau of Commerce of Yunnan Province three years 
later.547 
 
Understandably, a leader would have stronger incentive to help his subordinate to cover 
corruption from investigation if the leader was also a participant of the corrupt conduct. 
Fuyang Intermediate Court in Anhui Province was one such court, where corruption was 
operated like an enterprise, featured by collusion from the court leaders down to the rank 
and file judges. A local procuratorator revealed that a drug trafficker once bribed two 
judges in the Fuyang Intermediate Court through a county court judge. The procuratorate 
had to abort the investigation because of obstruction from the leader of Fuyang 
Intermediate Court, who stated that the alleged bribe was not a bribe but a fee charged by 
the court.548   
 
Sometimes, a corruption offender can not only succeed in having his case dropped by the 
investigating body but also obtaining confidential information about the informant of the 
crime so as to seek revenge. For example, when Pan Yile, former vice-president of 
Guangxi High Court, was forwarded a report letter with corruption allegation against him 
by a “friendly” party leader, Pan threatened the informant and read out the letter to the 
informant in defiance. 549  Leakage of confidential information by anti-corruption 
investigators not only provides the corruption offenders a chance to destroy evidence but 
also put the corruption informants in perils. The case of Li Wenjuan is a typical example. 
As a tax accountant in Anshan State Taxation Bureau, Li detected irregular practices of 
the bureau and reported it to the National State Taxation Bureau in 2000. The national 
bureau then forwarded her report back to the Anshan Bureau, where Li worked. Li was 
firstly transferred to a post in a remote location, then fired, arrested and detained in a 
labor education camp for one year as an administrative punishment. After having served 
the administrative punishment, Li was still out of job and her family was continuously 
threatened by thugs. It was only until her story was picked up by a news program run by 
the national television network CCTV, the CCDIC intervened and reinstated Li in a 
region away from her foes. During the TV interview, Li lamented that she was too naive 
to think that she could correct mal-practices just because she was on the side of justice.550 
                                                 
547 Available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenhua/22226/31113/31114/2266503.html.  
548 Available at http://www.cnicw.gov.cn/info_disp.php?id=2373.  
549 Available at http://www.people.com.cn/9807/16/current/newfiles/c1010.html.  
550 Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-03-28/12009463503.shtml. A video clip of the CCTV 
interview can be accessed at http://cctv.sina.com.cn/news/2006-03-28/13094.html. Lü Jingyi was another 
whistle-blowers who was imprisoned by Li Changhe, former secretary of the political commission of 
Pingdingshan party committee. Lü was heavily injured and survived his wife in an assassination ordered by 
Li. CCDI, Ban'an Shijian Yu Yanjiu [Experience and Research on Case Investigations] (Beijing: China 
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Lacking of effective institutional support, corruption informants, especially 
whistle-blowers, who report the crime not out of private but public interests, are 
sometimes tragically exposed to persecution by the corrupt suspects because of the 
protection of corruption offenders by the anti-corruption investigators.551 
 
Anti-corruption institutions become such powerful institutions that some corrupt leaders 
of these institutions can exert influence in other public affairs, such as the approval of 
land use, commission of public procurement contracts and promotion of cadres. In fact, 
many corrupt leaders in anti-corruption institutions were initially investigated not because 
the corrupt exchange they had conducted during anti-corruption investigation but in other 
public affairs mentioned above. For example, the aforementioned notoriously corrupt 
DIC leader Zeng Jinchun was initially investigated for his monopolistic control of 
coalmine exploitation in Chenzhou City, which had led to accidents and physical 
conflicts among various interests group. The investigation showed that a great part of his 
corrupt profit was derived from racketeering in the local mine operation.552  Similar 
practices were found in the cases of Mu Xincheng, former director of AEBB of Fanzhi 
County Procuratorate in Shanxi Province,553  and Xiong Jinxiang, former secretary of the 
DIC office in Tongguan Police Bureau, Shannxi Province.554  Zheng Wei, former DIC 
leader of Chongqing Yuzhong District, was initially investigated for his peddling in a 
profitable real estate construction project.555  In Changde City, Hunan Province, Peng 
Jinyong, former DIC Secretary of Changde City, had such a reputation that he could 
instill fear in his subordinates when they failed to deliver a “favor”.556 So is Li Baojin, 
former president of Tianjin People’s Procuratorate, who was one of the most influential 
figures in the circle of Tianjin real estate developers. Li once told his followers in private, 
“I did not know the power of the procuratorate was so great until I took the office. I can 
investigate against anyone whom I want to investigate.”557 
 
In general, the particular institutional design of anti-corruption institutions that governs 
the decision-making process creates the same environment as that of other public 
institutions, where corruption pervades and persists. The cases introduced in this chapter 
only represent a small portion of corrupt activities in today’s anti-corruption institutions. 
Nonetheless, it demonstrates that the occurrence of these activities is not only the result 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fang Zheng Press, 2003). p.193. More stories about whistle-blowers in China, see 
http://news.tom.com/zhuizong/jubaoren/.   
551 For more about the persecution of whistle-blowers, see a feature column at 
http://news.tom.com/zhuizong/jubaoren/  
552 Available at http://www.zgjrw.com/News/2009814/index/043257618200.shtml  
553 Available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2009/06-26/1750063.shtml  
554 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-04/25/content_8049844.htm.  
555 Chongqing No. 5 Procuratorate vs. Zheng Wei, Chongqing No. 5 Intermediate Court [2007] No. 195  
556 Available at http://bm.jxxdxy.com/qlzf/details.asp?classid=11&newsid=190&page=1.  
557 Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-04/120515072604.shtml.  
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of moral decadence of individual corruption offenders but also an outcome of the 
institutional defect in decision-making, assisted by the discriminative practices of “rank 
jurisdiction”, based on which anti-corruption investigations are carried out.  
   
7.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter intends to demonstrate and explain how corruption occurs in anti-corruption 
institutions. By showing how decisions are made in anti-corruption institutions, this 
Chapter intends to identify the deeper root of corruption in anti-corruption institutions. 
This chapter concludes that the fact that decisions of applications of investigative 
measures are largely exempted from judicial examination provides the investigators 
greater opportunities to abuse their power in exchange for private interests of great value. 
The disciplined superior-subordinate relationship, which is originally designed to induce 
unconditional compliance and top-down political control, guarantees the effective 
implementation of decisions, which are reached to serve private interests of those, who 
enjoy the unconstrained decision-making power. Under this condition, corruption 
offenders can effectively deploy a much greater volume of human and institutional 
resources to fulfill their corrupt objectives. Corruption proliferates.  
  
In the meantime, the “rank jurisdiction” stratifies the power of anti-corruption institutions 
at various levels as well as their related corrupt interests. In doing that, it preserves the 
current power structure and allows the powerful and resourceful to continue to conduct 
corruption with impunity. It also raises doubt on the sincerity of the anti-corruption 
measures, impairs its trustworthiness, weakens its deterrent effect and enhances the 
common belief in power rather in law. It is not surprising that when high-rank politicians, 
such as Wang Huaizhong, former deputy chief party secretary of Anhui province, fell out 
of power and was put under investigation for his corrupt activities, his first attempt was to 
seek for protection from “above”. He readily fell in a scam set up by a few “guanxi 
swindlers”, who claimed to have strong connections in the CCDIC in Beijing. Wang paid 
the swindlers over one million yuan as the “operating fee”. Upon receiving the money, 
the swindlers disappeared.558  It is neither surprising that when an offender is exposed and 
punished, the offender and the observers are more inclined to attribute the punishment to 
the offender’s falling out of protection of power rather than his breach of law. 
Consequently, it encourages the potential corruption offenders to invest more in power as 
a counter strategy rather than refraining themselves from abusing power. The effects of 
the anti-corruption measures are therefore greatly mitigated. 
 
                                                 
558 See related report at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper2086/11500/1037374.html. 
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In conclusion, by analyzing corruption in anti-corruption institutions and associating its 
occurrence with the institutional design of these institutions, this chapter addresses a 
more fundamental cause of the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures and practices 
in China that has been dispersedly observed and discussed in the previous studies. The 
chapter adds to our understanding of the complexity of the scene of corruption in which 
power consolidates private interests and private interests guide the exercise of power. The 
findings of this chapter also suggest that “the tendency to exploit power” and “the desire 
to preserve power” seems two pivotal drives and original sources to which various forms 
of dysfunctional governing, in this case, corruption control, can be traced back. How to 
contain these drives is a more fundamental issue that any good/clean-governance program 
has to be confronted with. And to solve this issue requires a change of perception of 
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On 19 January 2010, five days after the court trial was publicly announced, Huang 
Songyou, former vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court, was convicted for both 
charges of bribe-taking and embezzlement and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court 
found that Huang was guilty of taking bribes worth 3.9 million yuan from four lawyers in 
exchange for favoritism in litigation during his term of office in the SPC.559  Huang was 
also found guilty of embezzling 1.2 million yuan when he served as the president in the 
Zhanjiang Intermediate Court, Guangdong Province, before he was promoted to the 
SPC.560  During the investigation of Huang, at least four of Huang’s subordinates in the 
enforcement division of the SPC were sanctioned and removed from their offices because 
of their involvement in Huang’s case.561  One SPC judge from the case-registration 
division was also removed and convicted for bribe-taking.562  The SPC scandal provokes 
one to ask why a well-educated, respected and decently-paid judge, such as Huang 
Songyu, would commit corruption; and what commonalities does Huang’s case share 
with the corrupt conduct committed by the rest of the 12,349 judges, who had been 
reportedly investigated and punished for corruption during the past decade?563 
 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis started from investigating how corruption is 
carried out in China’s courts. Without this important step, however, that is usually 
missing in the analyses of current studies, an accurate diagnosis and deeper understanding 
of this social-legal phenomenon cannot be obtained. In doing that, this thesis adopts a 
new analytical framework, which is partly inductively developed from systematic study 
of the empirical data and partly resulted from the inspiration of established theories on 
corruption, in particular, new institutional economics of corruption. This analytical 
framework treats corruption as a contracting process, which includes four phases: 1) 
initiation of the exchange; 2) negotiation of the exchange; 3) contractual performance; 
and 4) enforcement of the contract in case of non-performance. This framework guides 
the direction and contents of the thesis and overarches the sub-frameworks applied in 
each chapter fitting to the specific topics discussed.  
 
Using the empirical data introduced in Chapter 1, the thesis has demonstrated certain 
features and patterns of corrupt conduct in each of the four phases, which are then used to 
identify which factors have facilitated the contracting process of corrupt activities under 
investigation. The thesis concludes that the high occurrence of corrupt activities that are 
found in China’s courts reflects a high degree of efficiency of the contracting process of 
                                                 
559 See http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-01-19/125119499756.shtml.  
560 Ibid. 
561 See http://www.infzm.com/content/39581.  
562 See http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-05/06/content_17732015.htm.  
563 The total number of 12,349 is calculated according to the statistics provided in the annual SPC work 
report. The number covers 13 years between 1993 and 2007 (the statistics of 1997 and 2002 are missing). A 
break down of the number can be seen in Chapter 2.  
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corruption as a form of exchange. Through investigations of each phase of the contracting 
process, the thesis found a number of factors, which have attributed to this contracting 
efficiency. Some of these factors are closely associated with the environment in which 
corruption takes place; while some others are inherent in the nature of corrupt exchange 
regardless of its social, political and cultural backgrounds.  
 
In demonstrating how exactly corruption is carried out, this thesis intends to show that as 
long as judicial power, as a form of public power, has to be delegated and exercised by 
individual judges or court officials, the incentive to conduct corruption will always exist. 
This is due to the externality of corrupt conduct, which allows corruption participants to 
enter into a deal, in which both are better off with an external cost transferred to the 
public and/or individual victims. In explaining how corruption flourishes in the enabling 
social institution of guanxi-practice and the permissive political institution of courts in 
terms of decision-making, this thesis highlights the complexity of corruption and 
corruption control. It is because, by hinging on these social and political institutions, 
corruption is institutionalized as well, in a parasitic manner. In this circumstance, 
corruption grows into a “hidden norm” (qian’guize) with its own rules and codes of 
conduct, which guide the choices of both the providers and applicants of public services. 
When corruption has developed from an occasional deviant behavior into a social norm, 
it is able not only to capture the law enforcement, including the anti-corruption 
institutions, but also to resist reformative measures by subverting formal rules with the 
“hidden norm”. 
 
8.1. Main findings 
 
Through an overview analysis of various corrupt activities in China’s courts, Chapter 2 
finds that corruption takes place in the central court divisions, at almost all levels of the 
judicial system, regardless of its hierarchical level and geographic location. Such conduct 
may involve all types of judges, regardless of their competence or salary. Chapter 2 
recognizes, however, that the prevalence and the features of the corrupt conduct are more 
closely associated with the capacity and the value of the decision-making power withheld 
by the offender.   
 
In studying the negotiation phase, Chapter 3 finds that once the corrupt intent has been 
successfully communicated between the briber and the bribed in the initiation phase, 
consensus on the exchange terms is usually easy to reach, which makes the negotiation 
highly efficient. This is because, unlike in lawful exchange, the provider of the corrupt 
service bears no production costs of the object of exchange, which, however, are usually 
of great value to the buyers. It means that corrupt judges, as the providers of corrupt 
services, are able to sell at a low minimum price, whereas corrupt court-users, the buyers, 
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will be willing to pay a high maximum price for the corrupt service. The combination of a 
low bottom-price to sell and a high ceiling-price to buy results in a wide range of price 
options that would benefit both the buyer and the seller. This feature is inherent in the 
principal-agent-client structure of corruption. Due to this nature of corruption, the 
specific environment in which corruption takes place can affect the range of the 
bargaining zone but cannot diminish it. This finding is in accordance to the established 
understanding that corruption can only be controlled but not eradicated.  
 
At the same time, the thesis also identifies several attributive factors that are actually 
closely associated with the political, social and cultural environments in which corruption 
takes place. Such factors include firstly the balanced contracting relationship between the 
briber and the bribed, which favors the bribed in terms of the bargaining power and the 
briber in terms of legal and moral barriers. To be more specific, on the one hand, the 
weaker bargaining power enjoyed by the bribers provokes them to act proactively and to 
break the “awkwardness” of the initiation phase of the contracting process without too 
much concern of the legal and moral risks of their action due to the lower legal and moral 
barriers confronting them. On the other hand, although the stronger bargaining power 
enjoyed by the bribed allows them to act passively and vet for the “right” exchange party 
in the initiation phase, the higher legal and moral risks of corruption that they are facing, 
in case of exposure, prevent them from behaving opportunistically and force them to 
commit to delivering the corrupt service as promised. This condition relaxes the opening 
and consolidates the ending of the contracting process. And this particular pattern of the 
distribution of the bargaining power and contracting barriers is characteristic of the 
specific legal, political and social environments in China where corruption takes place, 
such as the orientation of anti-corruption policies and the content and application of legal 
procedures in terms of transparency, proper exercise of discretion and guaranteed access 
to remedies for corruption victims. 
 
This balanced contracting condition is almost inseparable from the next attributive factor 
to corruption, which is the institution of the so-called “guanxi-practice”. Chapter 4 finds 
that the endemic social and cultural conduct of guanxi-practice functions as an effective 
and efficient “operating mechanism” of corruption as a form of exchange. It is a highly 
effective practice which reduces the legal, moral and cognitive barriers that prohibit the 
communication of corrupt intent and hence has greatly improved the efficiency of the 
otherwise prohibitively costly initiation phase of corrupt exchange. Chapter 4 contends 
that the causality link between guanxi-practice and corruption is the inverse of the view 
held by many. It is not that the participants of corruption are compelled to corrupt 
conduct because of the existence of certain reciprocal relationship, but on the contrary, 
these participants adopt guanxi-practice as an enabling operating mechanism that 
 171 
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
facilitates corruption. In this sense, guanxi-practice is not only “fuelling” corruption, but 
is a necessary and integral part of corruption in China.  
 
The third attributive factor that is related to the environment where corruption takes place 
is the particular structure and features of decision-making in China’s courts. Chapter 5 
and 6 finds that this particular decision-making mechanism in China’s courts has played 
an enabling role in the proliferation of corrupt opportunities and has greatly facilitated the 
delivery of corrupt services in the contractual performance phase of corrupt exchange in 
the litigating process. This manner of decision-making is primarily an outcome of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s political dominance over the judiciary, its 
instrumental view of law and courts as well as the societal subscription to 
authoritarianism. Hence, this thesis casts doubts on the effectiveness of fundamentally 
controlling judicial corruption by launching incremental judicial reforms without carrying 
out the necessary political reform to subject the party to law and to replace the supremacy 
of power with the rule of law.  
 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that the same factors that have facilitated corruption in China’s 
courts have also contributed to the proliferation of corruption in anti-corruption 
institutions, which are similarly incorporated to the ranking system and governed by 
similar rules and practices of decision-making. Chapter 7 employs a number of cases to 
illustrate how anti-corruption measures, in these cases, had been abused to serve private 
interests of anti-corruption agents. These activities will inevitably divert valuable 
investigative resources to the cases that are driven by private interests of anti-corruption 
agents. The most damaging effect of corruption in anti-corruption institutions is that it 
raises doubt on the sincerity of the anti-corruption measures. When an offender is 
exposed and punished, the offender and the observers are more inclined to attribute the 
punishment to the offender’s falling out of either favor or protection of power rather than 
his breach of law. This understanding consequently encourages the potential corruption 
offenders to invest more in power or to exchange favor with the law-enforcement agent 
as a counter strategy rather than refraining himself from abusing power.  
 
8.2. Looking ahead 
 
Controlling corruption in China’s courts is not an easy battle. A comprehensive 
therapeutic prescription warrants another systematic research, which goes beyond the 
objective of this thesis. However, the findings of this thesis have identified a few critical 
factors, without addressing which the battle will unlikely succeed. These factors concern 
the two most widely applied anti-corruption measures, namely, institutional reform and 
anti-corruption enforcement. In terms of institutional reform, changing the way that court 
decisions are made is essential. Such reform shall firstly increase transparency and 
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accountability concerning the process of the formulation of court decisions. The reform 
measures shall aim to enhancing the quality of rationalization in decision-making, 
protecting procedural rights of litigants, engaging them closely in the adjudicative 
process, increasing scrutiny from the media and civil society and providing them wider 
and easier access to court hearings, trials and judgments. Secondly, more fundamental 
measures have to be taken to dispose the strictly disciplinary authoritarianism in court 
decision-making process. Such measures shall ensure that judges are appointed and 
promoted based on merits and that judges not fired or removed from complying with law 
rather than instructions. The main challenge of the above-proposed reform measures is 
that the disciplinary authoritarianism featuring court decision-making was originally 
placed in courts to safeguard that decisions reached by political party leaders will be 
unconditionally implemented in courts through the adjudicative process. Therefore, a 
reform to dispose the authoritarianism will necessarily require the establishment of 
judicial independence. It is not because corrupt activities taken place in courts are always 
resulted from unlawful demands from the CCP leaders but because this particular 
decision-making mechanism has enabled and spurred the delivery of corrupt services in 
China’s courts.  
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that to win the battle against corruption it is not 
sufficient to reform the judicial institution alone without dealing with the social 
institution of guanxi-practice. In fact, compared with the daunting task of political reform, 
to reduce the significance of guanxi-practices is even more challenging since such 
practices stem from more discursive factors, such as the societal tolerance of venality, the 
cultural indulgence of duplicity and relative morality as well as the popular neglect of the 
value of integrity, honesty and universal trust. To change such an environment in which 
guanxi-practices operate demands much more patience, persistence, wisdom and strategic 
design. In challenging this social institution, it is critical to have a clear definition of 
guanxi-practice to be able to participate in the rather mingled guanxi-debates. Such a 
definition shall recognize the involvement of entrusted power as a key element so as 
distinguish guanxi-practice from the general social interaction between any related 
individuals. It is also important to be able to discern the popular false dilemma, which 
unnecessarily places one’s commitment to law and to sentimental relations in a fallacious 
dichotomy.  
  
As to the other controlling measure, namely, anti-corruption enforcement, it is important 
to modify the current “briber-friendly” policies and related legal measures, which have 
unwittingly helped corruption participants in stabilizing their otherwise frustrated 
contractual relations due to the need for concealment and the lack of protection from 
formal legal institutions. Confronting both the bribers and the bribed with similar 
sanctions will disturb the balance of the contractual relationship between the bribers and 
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the bribed. It will deter the bribers more effectively from initiating corrupt exchange 
blatantly and hence frustrate the contracting process to a greater extent. In the mean time, 
institutional reforms have to be carried out in anti-corruption institutions in order to 
safeguard anti-corruption enforcement from being captured by corruption and power. 
Such reformative measures include, first and foremost, placing corruption investigation 
under judicial scrutiny so as to limit the abuse of anti-corruption power. Secondly, 
reformative measure has to be introduced to lift the “power-friendly” jurisdiction control 
based on the rank of the suspect. Only then, the objective of anti-corruption can be 
deemed as creditable and sincere, which will in turn enhance its deterring effects.    
 
Lastly, it is equally important to address that to effectively control corruption, 
reformative measures, which are not limited to the ones mentioned above, have to be 
implemented in a concerted manner in order to produce the optimal effects. It is because 
systemic corruption, as a result of evolvement from individual deviant conduct into 
informal normative behavior, is an institutionalized practice, which has a high capability 
of self-rehabilitation and self-reproduction. Isolated or ill-coordinated measures will not 
be able to produce the sufficient level of impact, which is necessary in order to change 
the belief system of the wide population from a belief in the supremacy of power to the 
supremacy of law. To align various political, economic, legal, social and cultural forces 
to carry out such a grand group action, a committed political leadership with high 
coordinative capacity is indispensable. It requires a political consensus of a true 
dedication to the rule of law. It also demands concerted societal efforts to nurture rational 
legal thinking, to reward honesty, to promote integrity, to encourage defenses for public 
interests and human rights, and eventually to replace the faith in the supremacy of power 
with the faith in the supremacy of law. 
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Legality, discretion and informal practices in China’s courts  





As is generally recognized, the functioning of China’s legal system is seriously impaired 
by widespread corruption in courts. This thesis intends to identify the systemic causes of 
corruption in China’s courts by firstly investigating how corruption is carried out in 
China’s courts. Apart from the introducing and concluding chapters, this thesis is 
consisted of six main chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 develops a typology of various corrupt activities in China’s courts and 
examines its general patterns. It finds that corruption takes place in the central court 
divisions, at almost all levels of the judicial system, regardless of its hierarchical level 
and geographic location. Such conduct may involve all types of judges, regardless of their 
competence or salary. Chapter 2 recognizes, however, that the prevalence and the features 
of the corrupt conduct are more closely associated with the nature, range as well as value 
of the decision-making power held by the offender. Chapter 2 also shows that among all 
corrupt activities corruption conducted in the form of exchange, namely bribery or 
favoritism, is the most prevalent and resilient type. This particular type of corruption is 
then selected as the focus of the rest of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 sets out with an introduction of the main analytical framework, which 
overarches the thesis. This analytical framework treats corruption as a four-phase 
contracting process, namely 1) the phase of initiation of the exchange; 2) the phase of 
negotiation of the exchange; 3) the phase of contractual performance; and 4) the phase of 
enforcement of the contract in case of non-performance. This framework is employed in 
an endeavor to analyze the empirical data collected from various sources and to 
demonstrate in details the features and patterns of corrupt conduct in each of the four 
phases so as to identify more accurately which factor(s) has(have) facilitated corruption 
in China’s courts. In doing that, Chapter 3 identifies two phases that are most critical to 
the completion of corrupt exchange. The first phase is the initiation phase, in which 
corrupt intent is communicated between potential exchange parties. The second phase is 
the phase of contractual performance, especially that of the bribed. These two phases are 
further examined respectively in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 and 6, demonstrating how 
these two phases are completed by corruption participants in China’s courts and what 
factors have facilitated the process and contributed to its “success”. 
 
Chapter 4 recognizes that the initiation phase is facilitated by the omnipresent and 
omnipotent “guanxi-practice” in China. It finds that guanxi-practices are effective in 
reducing the legal, moral and cognitive barriers that prohibit the communication of 
corrupt intent and hence have greatly improved the efficiency of the otherwise 
prohibitively costly initiation phase of corrupt exchange. Chapter 5 and 6 identifies the 
decision-making mechanism in China’s courts as a structural factor, which has facilitated 
the delivery of corrupt services in courts and resulted in the proliferation of corrupt 
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opportunities. Chapter 6 also discusses the dynamics of corrupt activities in China’s 
courts, which appear as a multi-player, multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomenon 
instead of being one-on-one, one-dimensional and static. 
 
Chapter 7 investigates corruption in anti-corruption institutions and finds that the same 
factors that have facilitated corruption in China’s courts have also contributed to the 
spreading of corruption in anti-corruption institutions, which are governed by similar 
rules of decision-making and which are exposed to the same social institution of 
guanxi-practices. Following the above-mentioned findings, some policy 
recommendations are provided in the concluding chapter suggesting the directions of 
future reforms.  
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Legaliteit, discretionaire bevoegdheid en informele praktijken in de Chinese 
rechtspraak - een socio-juridisch onderzoek naar particuliere transacties 
bij rechtszaken  
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)  
  
Zoals algemeen wordt erkend, wordt het functioneren van China’s rechtssysteem ernstig 
geschaad door wijdverbreide corruptie in rechtbanken. Dit proefschrift wil de 
systematische oorzaken van deze corruptie blootleggen door in de eerste plaats te 
onderzoeken hoe corruptie wordt bedreven in China’s rechtbanken. Naast het inleidende 
en het concluderende hoofdstuk, bestaat dit proefschrift uit zes hoofdstukken.    
 
Hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelt een typologie van verschillende soorten van corrupt gedrag in 
China’s rechtbanken en onderzoekt de algemene patronen daarin. Het blijkt dat corruptie 
plaatsvindt in de centrale divisies van rechtbanken, op vrijwel alle niveaus van de 
rechterlijke organisatie, ongeacht hiërarchische positie of geografische locatie. Dergelijk 
gedrag kan voorkomen bij alle typen rechters, ongeacht hun juridische capaciteiten of 
salaris.  
Dit hoofdstuk laat echter zien dat het voorkomen en de kenmerken van corrupt gedrag 
nauw samenhangen met de reikwijdte, de aard en de waarde van het vermogen/de 
macht/de bevoegdheid van de overtreder om bindende beslissingen te nemen. Ook blijkt 
in hoofdstuk 2 dat van alle vormen van corruptie, de corruptie bedreven in de vorm van 
een uitwisseling, namelijk omkoping of bevoorrechting, het meest verbreid en ook het 
meest hardnekkig is. De rest van het proefschrift richt zich dan ook op dit type corruptie. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 begint met een uiteenzetting van het analytische kader van dit proefschrift; 
corruptie wordt beschouwd als een proces dat de vier fasen van een contract doorloopt. 
Dit zijn 1) de fase van initiëring van de uitwisseling; 2) de fase van onderhandeling over 
de uitwisseling; 3) de fase van de contractuele prestatie; en 4) de fase van afdwingen van 
de prestatie in het geval dat deze uitblijft. Dit kader wordt gebruikt voor de analyse van 
empirische gegevens vergaard uit verschillende bronnen; in detail worden de kenmerken 
en patronen van corrupt gedrag in elk van de vier fasen aangetoond. Op deze wijze 
kunnen de factoren die corruptie in China’s rechtbanken mogelijk maken beter worden 
onderkend.  
Daarbij identificeert dit hoofdstuk de twee fasen die het meest cruciaal zijn voor een 
succesvolle uitvoering van de corrupte transacties. De eerste is de initiëringfase; hierin 
wordt de intentie van corruptie gecommuniceerd tussen de mogelijke ‘contractpartijen’. 
De tweede fase is de fase van uitvoering/nakoming, met name door degene die is 
omgekocht. Deze twee fasen worden vervolgens verder onderzocht in de hoofdstukken 4, 
5 en 6. Hierin wordt beschreven hoe deze fasen worden doorlopen en afgerond door de 
corruptiepartners in China’s rechtbanken, en welke factoren dit proces vergemakkelijken, 
respectievelijk leiden tot een ‘succesvolle’ afloop.     
 
Hoofdstuk 4 stelt vast dat de initiëringfase wordt vergemakkelijkt door de in China alom 
aanwezige en almachtige ‘guanxi-praktijk’. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat er op zichzelf wel 
 188 
 
Ling Li                            Legality, discretion and informal practices  
juridische, morele en cognitieve belemmeringen bestaan die de communicatie van 
corrupte bedoelingen zouden kunnen verhinderen; deze worden evenwel door de 
guanxi-praktijken effectief teniet gedaan. Door deze praktijken geschiedt de initiëring van 
de corruptie-uitwisseling veel efficiënter, en is zij niet langer prohibitief kostbaar.    
 
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 identificeren het besluitvormingsmechanisme in China’s rechtbanken 
als een structurele factor die het gemakkelijker heeft gemaakt om in rechtbanken corrupte 
diensten te verschaffen; hierdoor heeft het aantal gelegenheden tot corruptie sterk kunnen 
toenemen. Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt ook de dynamiek van corrupte activiteiten in China’s 
rechtbanken; corruptie blijkt een dynamisch verschijnsel te zijn met vele dimensies en 
vele spelers, in plaats van een statisch, eendimensionaal, één-op-één verschijnsel. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7, dat corruptie in anticorruptie-instellingen onderzoekt, laat zien dat dezelfde 
factoren die corruptie in rechtbanken hebben vergemakkelijkt ook hebben bijgedragen 
aan de verspreiding van corruptie in anticorruptie-instellingen. Deze laatste worden 
immers geregeerd door dezelfde besluitvormingsregels, en staan bloot aan dezelfde 
maatschappelijke instituties van guanxi-praktijken. De onderzoeksbevindingen worden in 
het slothoofdstuk gevolgd door een aantal beleidsaanbevelingen die als oriëntatie kunnen 
dienen bij toekomstige hervormingen.  
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